ler accounts for the effort to cover so wide an extent of country by the necessity of protecting the aqueduct that supplied Santiago with water, and of holding a district that kept the troops supplied with a certain amount of fresh food-presumably mangoes, sweet potatoes, and sugar cane.

CHAPTER XII

THE BATTLES OF CANEY AND SAN JUAN

On the evening of June 24th-the day of the action at Las Guasimas-the last men of Kent's division were ashore at Siboney. Six comparatively uneventful days followed, during which the corps gradually pushed forward and occupied the hilly, wooded country about Sevilla, as far as El Pozo. The field batteries were disembarked at Daiquiri on the 25th and 26th. The first tactical problem, that of the landing, had been successfully accomplished; General Shafter was now struggling with the second -that of getting ashore the supplies that his army needed before it could go into battle. It proved an exceedingly difficult task, owing to the lack of tugs and scows, and for several days the troops lived from hand to mouth, provisions being landed no faster than they were consumed. Had a storm driven the fleet from the coast the result might have been serious, or even disastrous. Two weeks passed before the corps had three days' rations in ad

vance.

On the 25th and 26th Garcia and 2,978 of his Cubans were carried on the transports from Aserraderos to Siboney. On the 27th the first reinforcements arrived from the United States, the Thirtythird and part of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, forming a brigade under Brigadier-General Duffield, being landed at the same point. These regiments came from Camp Alger.

Shafter at El
Pozo, June 29.

On the 29th Shafter came ashore, and established his headquarters about a mile east of El Pozo that is, a mile behind his outposts— close to the trail along which most of the army was encamped. His heavy guns were not landed, and the equipment of his corps was still far from complete, but he was unwilling—and very properly so-to delay a day longer than was absolutely necessary. Coming into the tropics in the rainy season, his men were certain, if the campaign were prolonged, to find the fevers of Cuba a more deadly foe than the guns of the Spaniards.* "It was to be a dash or nothing," as Shafter himself said.

General Shafter did not attempt any reconnaissance in person, beyond overlooking the country before him from a hill near his headquarters. He has been severely criticised for failing to keep in closer touch with his troops, and to foresee more exactly the difficulties of the field of battle; but it must be remembered that he was a man of sixty-one, exceedingly stout, and that his health suffered seriously in the tropical climate and under his tremendous burden of hard work and responsibility. Besides the exhaustion of malaria, he was enduring great pain from an attack of the gout, which incapacitated him from putting his foot into a stirrup.

* During nine weeks, while the Fifth Corps was in Cuba, it lost 318 men from disease, against 263 who were killed in action or died of their wounds.

In describing the conditions under which he went into battle, Shafter said in his official report: "These preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but we were in a sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies; and, lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8,000 reinforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manzanillo, and might be expected in a few days." The movement of Escario's brigade was of course the foundation for this last report. General Pando, it afterward appeared, was not in that part of Cuba at the time.

He was absolutely compelled to let other men represent him at the front.

Generals Wheeler, Lawton, and Chaffee, Colonel Derby of the engineers, and other officers, had been active in reconnoitring, and had received pretty full information as to the Spanish forces and positions from Cuban peasants. The enemy's weakness in artillery and lack of supplies were also learned, and it was concluded that his resistance would not be strong. Shafter undoubtedly underestimated the task he was about to set his men; but his mistake was shared by his ablest officers, and probably by every member of his corps. Wheeler, who had been close up to Caney, asked permission to attack at that point, his plan being to concentrate a heavy artillery fire upon it, and cut off the retreat of its garrison, which was known to be small, by placing a division between the village and Santiago. Shafter agreed with him as to the direction of the first attack, but preferred to intrust it to Lawton. On the 29th the commanding general telegraphed to Washington:

Advance pickets within a mile and a half of Santiago. No opposition. Spaniards have evidently withdrawn to immediate vicinity of the town. Expect to put division on Caney road, between that place and Santiago, day after to-morrow, and will also advance on Sevilla road to San Juan river, and possibly beyond. General Garcia, with three thousand men, will take railroad north of Santiago at the same time to prevent Pando reaching city.

On the afternoon of the 30th Shafter summoned his division commanders to a council of war, at which his plans for an immediate attack were formulated. Lawton's division, supported by Bates's brigade and by one battery of artillery (Captain Capron's), was to assault Caney at daybreak; the other two divisions were to march straight forward toward Santiago by the road through San Juan, Kent's deploying to the left, Wheeler's to the right; and Lawton, who promised to take Caney in two

hours at most, was to come down the high road from that village, and bring his left in line with the right of the cavalry division in time for the attack. upon the Spaniards' central position. Captain Grimes's battery, posted at El Pozo, was to support the left wing; the other two batteries of light artillery, and the Gatling guns, were to be held in reserve. The only infantry reserve was a battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, back at Siboney.* General Duffield, who was present at the conference, was ordered to move the Thirty-third Michigan along the narrow-gauge railroad from that point and threaten the Spanish detachment at Fort Aguadores.

The

General Wheeler was not at the council. veteran cavalry commander was lying in his tent, exposure to heat and rain having brought on a slight fever; and though he had not reported himself unfit for duty, it seems that Shafter, or possibly one of Shafter's aids, considered him so, and summoned his senior brigade commander, General Sumner, to headquarters in his place.

Lawton's division marched toward Caney during the night, and at sunrise next morning (July 1st) was in position for the attack. For his plan of action Lawton gives credit to General Chaffee, who had made a very thorough reconnaissance close up to the enemy's lines. Chaffee's own brigade was to move upon the village from the east, at daybreak, and capture it. Ludlow was to occupy the road between Caney and Santiago, cutting off the garrison's retreat. Of Miles's three regiments, the First Infantry was to be held in support of Capron's battery, together with Troop D of the Second Cavalry; the Fourth and the Twenty-fifth were to follow Ludlow. Caney taken, the division was to rendezvous at the Ducrot house, on the Santiago road,

* The other two battalions of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, and the Ninth Massachusetts, reached Siboney on the Harvard on July 1st.