CHAPTER XVIII THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE IN the early days of July, when Cervera's fleet had been destroyed; when the fall of Santiago was imminent, and the American troops were already preparing to move upon Porto Rico; when the last hope of relieving Manila was abandoned, and Spain itself was threatened with attack, the hopelessness of prolonging the struggle began to be evident even at Madrid. The air was full of rumours of negotiations for peace. Rumours became certainty on the 26th of the month, when Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, called at the White House and presented an informal but definite inquiry, on behalf of Sagasta's Government, as to the terms upon which the United States would be willing to end the war. He got his answer on the 30th, in a long interview with the President. The conditions offered were that Spain should renounce all claim to sovereignty in Cuba, and evacuate the island at once; that Porto Rico, with its dependent islets, and one of the Ladrones, should be ceded to the United States; and that the American forces should occupy the city and bay of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, by which the "control, disposition, and government" of the Philippines should be finally decided. Sagasta's cabinet met on Monday, August 1st, to consider these terms. It took several days for Span ish pride to swallow so severe a dose of humiliation; and it was not until the 7th that the minister of state, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, replied. His note accepted the first two propositions; to the third it also gave a seeming acceptance, though in somewhat ambiguous terms. To remove all doubt, The Peace Secretary Day drew up a protocol stating clearly, and without the slightest modification, the terms already offered to Spain; and this document he sent to M. Cambon for signature. Its precise contents were: ARTICLE I. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. ART. II. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States. ART. III. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbour of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. ART. IV. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies. ART. V. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries. ART. VI. Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be sus pended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces. Once more, of course, a reference to Madrid was necessary; but acceptance was the only possible course, and M. Cambon was authorized to sign the protocol with Secretary Day. The formal act that ended hostilities took place in the cabinet room of the White House, at twenty-three minutes past four o'clock on the afternoon of August 12th. It has already been told how the news reached Miles's army in Porto Rico just in time to stop a battle at Aibonito and another near Cayey; how it prevented the surrender of Manzanillo, but was too late to save Manila. On August 26th the President named the American peace commissioners-William R. Day, Secretary of State, chairman; Senator Davis, of Minnesota, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee; Senator Frye, of Maine; Justice White, of the United States Supreme Court; and Whitelaw Reid, formerly minister to France. One of these, Justice White, declined to serve, and his place was taken by Senator Gray, of Delaware, a leading Democratic member of the Senate. Spain's commissioners were Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the Spanish senate, chairman; Señor de Abarzuza, a member of the same body, and formerly his country's ambassador at Paris; Señor de Garnica, a justice of the supreme court; General Rafael Cerero; and Señor de Villa Urrutia, Spanish minister to Belgium. The commission met in Paris, on October 1st, the French Government providing quarters for it in the foreign office on the Quai d'Orsai. Its conferences lasted ten weeks, the Spaniards fighting hard for concessions that would at least enable their Government to put the best possible face on The conference in Paris, Oct. 1-Dec. 10. the disasters it had brought upon itself. Cuba being dealt with first, they sought to free Spain from the huge debt that she had contracted in her maladministration of the island's affairs, urging that international law requires that the liabilities of a territory should pass with its sovereignty. The American commissioners declined to admit the principle in this particular case, for the reason—a reason of indisputable equity-that the so-called Cuban debt was not contracted in any sense for the benefit of Cuba, but was incurred by Spain in her ineffectual and costly efforts to subjugate the island. The Americans also declined a proposition that Cuba should be ceded direct to the United States, the Spanish contention being that if Spain withdrew her authority, and the United States asserted none, the island would be left in a state of anarchy. This was a mere technical objection, perhaps a deliberate attempt at embarrassment, the Washington Government having pledged itself before the world to leave Cuba to her own people. A much more serious difference arose when the question of the Philippines was taken up, and the Spaniards were first informed (October 31st) that entire possession of the great eastern archipelago was required for the United States. The demand was referred to Madrid, where it was answered by a flat refusal; and it actually appeared, for a time, that the negotiations might be broken off. It seems clear that the Spanish Government regarded the protocol as leaving its sovereignty in the Philippines intact, and not open to subsequent challenge. In a despatch sent on August 7th the Duke of Almodovar del Rio declared that in assenting to the clause about Manila, his country did not renounce her title to the islands, but left it to the peace commission to agree upon such reforms as the condition of these dependencies and the civilization of their natives may render desirable." But it is equally 66 clear that the terms of the document have an entirely different meaning. They express precisely what Secretary Day meant them to express-that the United States Government had not decided whether it desired to annex the Philippines, and that their ownership was left for later settlement. "Possession" was the word in the original draft of the protocol; "disposition disposition" was substituted at M. Cambon's suggestion, as a word less offensive to Spanish sensibilities. The Spaniards suggested arbitration as to the meaning of the protocol, which was of course refused, and no progress was made until November 21st, when the American commissioners made a final proposition-practically an ultimatum, allowing a week for a definite reply. The demand for the archipelago was not modified, but it was promised that for ten years Spanish ships and merchandise should enter Philippine ports on equal terms with American traders, and that the United States should pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars. An impression went abroad that the money was offered as a repayment of such part of the Spanish Government's past expenditures in the islands as represented actual betterments. Spain's commissioners may have accepted it as such -perhaps to veil the commercial character of the transaction; but it appears that the offer was intended by the American commissioners-at any rate by most of them-as practically a proposition of sale and purchase, or at least a douceur to facilitate the desired agreement.* Neither in the wording of the proposal as submitted on November 21st, nor in the treaty as finally drawn, is any reason or consideration for the payment specified. *That this view was taken by the American commissioners has been explicitly stated by at least two of them. At the dinner of the Ohio Society in New York, February 25, 1899, Senator Gray spoke of the choice that presented itself of taking the islands either "by the ruthless |