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Worthington v. The London Guarantee & Accident Co.

This contention cannot be sustained. It was never supposed when the name of the Marine Court of the City of New York was changed to that of the City Court of New York a new court was created, even when accompanied by a few changes as to jurisdiction.

In the case at bar the District Court's jurisdiction as to money limit was $250, and as to territory the County of New York; to the continued, consolidated and reorganized courts, renamed the Municipal Court, is given a money limit of $500 and territorial jurisdiction coterminous with the greater city.

There are other slight changes in jurisdiction not important to notice at this time. If the District Courts and others were continued, as we have held, then no new court was created and the jurisdiction over a foreign corporation defendant, having a place of business in the City of New York, survived the consolidation and reorganization. It is an impressive fact that a portion of the language of section 1351, which continued the old courts, is taken from article 6, section 18, of the State constitution, which section it is argued was violative of its provisions. The section adopts the constitutional limitations, evidently by reason of excessive caution which prohibit the creation of a court of record, or a court having equity jurisdiction.

It is thus made clear that the drafter of this section had these constitutional provisions before him when he drew it.

The charter commissioners, having continued, consolidated and reorganized these courts under a new name, proceeded to provide for certain details consistent with the situation. The justices of the consolidated and reorganized courts were permitted to serve out the remainder of their terms as justices of the Municipal Court (sec. 1352).

It then remained to provide the full number of justices

Worthington v. The London Guarantee & Accident Co.

for the Municipal Court and indicate the districts into which the greater city should be divided.

The Borough of the Bronx was constituted two districts, the Borough of Manhattan eleven, the Borough of Brooklyn five, the Borough of Queens three, and the Borough of Richmond two, making a total of twentythree districts (secs. 1359 to 1363). As the justices of the continued courts in office at the time of the consolidation were not sufficient in number to provide the reorganized court with a justice in each district, the mayor of the greater city was allowed to appoint the number necessary until December 31, 1899 (sec. 1352, subd. 4).

No one is eligible to the office of justice unless he is a resident and elector in the district for which he shall be elected or appointed, thus making the continued consolidated and reorganized court a substitute for the inferior local courts that had either been continued and consolidated, as in the case of the old cities of New York and Brooklyn, or abolished, as was the fact in the remaining territory of the greater city (sec. 1353).

The scheme of the charter, as thus briefly outlined, leads us to the conclusion that the Municipal Court of the City of New York is not a new inferior local court, but old local tribunals continued, consolidated and reorganized under a new name and adapted to the needs of the greater city.

The decision of this case might very well rest on the point already discussed, that the Municipal Court of the City of New York is not a new local court; we are, however, of opinion that, assuming it to be such, there was no violation of article 6, section 18, of the State constitution, when the Legislature vested it with the same jurisdiction as to non-resident defendants and foreign corporations as had been for many years conferred on the

Worthington v. The London Guarantee & Accident Co.

District Courts in the City of New York, and to some extent on justices of the peace in other portions of the State.

This section of the constitution reads as follows:

"Inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the Legislature, but no inferior local court hereafter created shall be a court of record. The Legislature shall not hereafter confer upon any inferior local court of its creation any equity jurisdiction or any greater jurisdiction in other respects than is conferred upon County Courts by or under this article.

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The object of the framers of the constitution seems very plain. The inferior local court could be created by the Legislature, but certain limitations were placed upon this power. The court so created could not be a court of record, and was clothed with a jurisdiction which confined it to locality, that is, to county, city, town and village.

In Landers v. Staten Island RR. (53 N. Y., 450), this court had occasion to consider article 6, section 12, of the constitution, as amended in 1869, which continued the Superior Court of the City of New York, the Court of Common Pleas of the City and County of New York, the Superior Court of Buffalo, and the City Court of Brooklyn with the powers and jurisdiction they then had, "and such further civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred by law."

It was held that legislation seeking to vest in the City Court of Brooklyn jurisdiction of an action against a corporation for negligence as a common carrier, where the cause of action arose, the business of the corporation was transacted and its offices located outside of the City of Brooklyn, was unconstitutional, and that the words "further civil and criminal jurisdiction" had reference to the object of the jurisdiction and not to the territory

Worthington v. The London Guarantee & Accident Co.

or the persons of suitors (vide People v. Porter, 90 N. Y., 68, 75).

When the judiciary article of the constitution of 1894 was framed this matter of limitation as to locality had been fully construed by the courts, and the convention deemed it wise to place an additional restraint upon the Legislature when defining the powers of inferior local courts, to be exercised within their territorial limits, and hence, we have the provision of the constitution already quoted, which prohibits the Legislature from granting "any greater jurisdiction in other respects than is conferred upon County Courts by or under this article."

It is very clear that the framers of the constitution intended that not only should the inferior local court be strictly confined to its locality, but that the extent of its jurisdiction should be so limited that there would be no danger of powers being conferred by the Legislature that might interfere with the Supreme Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction throughout the State.

The local court was, therefore, to have no greater jurisdiction than the County Court.

What does this reasonably mean, in view of the manifest intention of the framers of the constitution in drafting this limitation? It prohibits, in effect, the creation of an inferior local court possessing greater powers and dignity than the County Court.

The constitution provides (art. 6, sec. 14), in dealing with County Courts, that they shall be continued and exercise the powers and jurisdiction they then possessed, and the Legislature was empowered to enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction, provided it should not be so extended as to authorize an action therein for the recovery of money only, in which the sum demanded exceeded $2,000 or in which any person not a resident of the county is a defendant.

This constitutional limitation as to amount discloses tho

Worthington v. The London Guarantee & Accident Co.

intention to continue the County Court as an inferior local tribunal, notwithstanding it was a court of record (Code of Civ. Pro., sec. 2, subd. 8). The framers of the constitution, in contemplating the creation of inferior local tribunals by the Legislature and limiting its power, were not dealing with the jurisdiction of these future courts as to territory, non-resident parties defendant or foreign corporations, but as to subject-matter; they were not to have, in a general way, greater powers, importance and dignity than a County Court. In conferring upon the Municipal Court the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the City of New York and of justices of the peace elsewhere, which had been exercised for many years by these local tribunals, the Legislature did not create a local court possessing greater powers, importance and dignity, within the general provisions of the constitution we are considering, than the County Court.

The constitutionality of the charter of the City of New York in this respect is, therefore, maintainable upon both of the grounds discussed in this opinion.

We answer the question propounded to us in the affirmative.

The order and judgment of the Appellate Division appealed from should be reversed, and the order and judgment of the Appellate Term, First Department, which were affirmed by the Appellate Division, should also be reversed, with costs to the plaintiff in this court.

The record should be remitted to the Appellate Term, with the direction to hear and determine the appeal herein on the merits.

HAIGHT, J.-I concur in the opinion of Bartlett, J., in so far as he holds that the Municipal Court of the City of New York is a continuation of the District Court of the old city, and is not a new local and inferior court within article 6, section 18, of the constitution.

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