tion, which he did not seem ready to give. She was happy and contented and trusted him implicitly. A few days later Miss Ashford returned with the children and the latter jumped into the architect's arms, covering him with kisses and calling him papa.

The next day he asked them if they could bear to part with their governess, to which they replied that they could not, whereupon he told them that she was to remain with them always.

David Ashford had dreaded to come to his home from which his wife had gone forever. When he saw an attractive girl there the idea occurred to him to keep her there. So he told the housekeeper and the others to preserve his incognito, and "the architect” began to win the governess.

What is Luck?

You often hear it said: "That fellow certainly is lucky." As a rule, the "luck" in his case consists of getting up at six in the morning, living on half or less of what he earns, meeting his appointments, paying his bills, minding his own business, working like Sam Hill-and always keeping an eye on the track ahead. There may be exceptions, but that is the general rule, and anyone who tries it can demonstrate its truth. -Express Gazette.

Endeavor.

At first it was Necessity

That urged me on my way;
But when she gave up goading me
I was content to stay

Ere long I heard Ambition call,
And forth I fared again,

To soon decide that, after all,
It was not worth the pain.

Then Duty ordered me to go.
To bravely do my best;

But Duty's voice soon dwindled low.
And I was fain to rest.

At last came Love to bid me haste,
And I have striven long,
Without a day to feebly waste,
Within my heart a song.

-S. E. Kiser, in Chicago Herald.

A Little Lesson in Finance.

"It is mighty hard,” said an employee some time ago to the writer, "to save up $1,000 by laying aside a dollar or two a week, and then to take it out of the savings bank, and lose it to a get-richquick swindler, as I have just done." This man could work and save, but he had not had even a kindergarten education in finance, else his story would have been different. He had never given a thought to interest, and so was absolutely ignorant of the growth through compound interest, and, of course, had never heard of that wonderful process of accumulation known as "progressive compound interest.

One dollar deposited in a savings bank that pays 4 per cent will amount to $2.19 in twenty years. This is simple compound interest. Now, if you deposit one dollar every year for twenty years, or $20 in all, the sum to your credit will have grown to $30.97. Any wage-earner can put by a dollar a week. That money deposited in a savings bank for twenty years will have increased to $1,612. A deposit of $5 a week will have grown to $8,000, and this at 4 per cent will be $320 a year. There is no secret, no mystery about this. It is clear as the cloudless sun, and the method is just as clean and honest.Express Gazette.

The Smile Habit.

A bulletin issued by one of the railroad systems contains these thoughts:

Nothing is so contagious as a smile. Try it on the first man you see. No matter how grouchy he is, you can melt him. You really don't have to say anything or do anything. Just hold the attitude of good-will, and when you meet him smile, and you will see that his face relaxes in turn.

Cast thy bread upon the waters and it shall return after many days buttered, and sometimes with jam on it.

All that we have in the world is what we give out, and the more good we give out, the more good we have.-Express Gazette.

its representatives; and the employees were un

Right to Strike Maintained.

On September 17 the full bench of the superior judicial court of Boston, Mass., declared that employees may institute and maintain a strike simply because their employer declines to negotiate with the representative of their union. This is the first decision in Massachusetts bearing directly on the right of members of a union to call a strike for the purpose of compelling a recognition of their organization.

The question arose in the case of John Cornellier, of Haverhill, who brought a suit in equity in the superior court, complaining that because of a blacklist published and handed about by certain Haverhill concerns he was unable to obtain work or a livelihood. He sought to compel the defendants to cease from circulating the blacklist and to destroy it and also for damages. Inasmuch as he had taken part in unlawful means to effectuate and carry on a strike, such as parading in front of his former employer's place of business, picketing and being present when other employees who had not joined in the strike were assaulted, and making an endeavor to protect these men or apprehend their assailants, the court ruled that he had not come into a court of equity with clean hands and, therefore, could obtain no relief. He must resort to a suit at law for damages alone if he still desires to seek redress.

The decision was also novel in that the full court overruled one of its earlier decisions, that of Worthington against Waring, reported in the 157th Massachusetts reports, saying, "It must be considered as no longer binding as an authority for the doctrine that equity will afford no injunctive relief against an unlawful combination of blacklist."

In regard to the Haverhill strike, the court had the following to say:

It was instituted and maintained for the reason that the company. Witherell and Dobbins Company, although willing to grant the request for higher wages, was unwilling to make an agreement as to prices with or through the union or

the union or its representatives. Plainly it would not be unlawful for men to combine to secure an experienced spokesman for their collective bargaining, and to select an outsider in order to avoid future criticism for their employer or fellow employees.

Further, the fact that the person they select to speak for them and to act personally as their agent in presenting the proposed price list to their employer happens to be an official of the union would not render unlawful a strike called to enforce their demand.

Later there developed what probably was latent from the beginning, a struggle between the manufacturers to deal with their employees as they saw fit, and the union to secure recognition. As a practical manner it might be difficult to find a permanent position where the union would rest content with a degree of "recognition" that allowed it to represent its members without interference with the rights of their non-union fellow workmen and virtually forcing them to join the organization. But so far as the record and the findings of the matter disclose, the strike in question did not contemplate the discharge of non-union men, and was not immediately remotely a strike for a closed shop. On the facts appearing in the record we can not say that the combination to strike at the Witherell and Dobbins shop was for an unlawful purpose any more than a similar combination of employers for non-recognition of the union would be.-Typographical Journal.

Decisions Under the Safety Appliance

Acts

No. 8791. The United States of America vs. Pennsylvania Co. United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. July 2, 1915.

1. Where a carrier operates a train without the required percentage of air brakes being in use, due to the fact that the empty bad order and chained up cars composing such train are in condition such that the operation of the air brakes is not reasonably possible, and fails to establish that it was not reasonably possible to have placed these cars in such condition of repair, temporary or permanent, that the air brakes could have been connected up and used. such a movement is in violation of the air-brake provision of the safety appliance acts and does not come within the proviso to the act of April 14, 1910. (36 Stat. L., 298.)

2. The proviso exempts from the penalties of the acts only a movement of equipment which becomes defective when in use on a line of railway, and then only from the place where first discovered to be defective to the nearest available place where repairs can be made, and where such movement is necessary in order to make such repairs and they can not be made except at such repair point.

3. The failure on the part of the carrier to have repair yards of adequate capacity or to provide a sufficient force of men to repair cars which

may become defective in the vicinity of its established yards can not be permitted to create the necessity which the proviso declares shall relieve a railroad from liability for the movement of defective cars.

Cary R. Alburn, assistant United States attorney, and Monroe C. List, special assistant United State attorney, for plaintiff.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, for defendant.

STATEMENT OF CASE.

This is a civil action brought by the United States to recover from the Pennsylvania Co. penalties for claimed violations of the Federal safety appliance acts.

The petition contains 34 counts. The first 25 counts are based upon the hauling of that number of empty bad order cars in a train from Mosier, O., to Dock Junction at Erie, Pa., when one or both ends of each of said cars (with the exception of the car mentioned in the 25th count which was hauled by its own drawbars) were not equipped with automatic couplers as required by statute, but were fastened to adjoining cars by means of chains.

At Haselton, a station between Mosier and Dock Junction, 8 additional empty bad order cars were put into this train and hauled by means of chains instead of drawbars. The 26th count is based upon the operation of this train, consisting of 25 cars from Mosier and 33 cars from Haselton, together with engine, tender, and caboose, when less than 85 per cent of the cars were controlled by air brakes, the air brakes being operated on engine and tender only.

The case is submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts, a jury being waived.

It is stipulated in the agreed statement of facts that the railroad over which the train of bad-order cars was moved was a part of a through highway of interstate commerce; that the cars were not equipped as required by the Federal safety appliance acts; that the train on leaving Mosier on July 25, 1913, consisted of 25 cars and caboose, and a locomotive engine and tender, and that at Haselton 8 more bad-order cars were added to the train, making a total of 36

cars if the engine, tender, and caboose is each treated as a car. All the cars were equipped with proper air brakes, but only those upon the engine and tender were used during the journey.

The agreed statement of facts further shows the place in the Youngstown district where each of the 33 bad-order cars was discovered and the date upon which it was marked "bad order”these dates run from May 15 to June 29, and it is stipulated that they were all empty when moved; that the train in which they moved was not a revenue train and had no cars in it which were commercially used or which contained live stock or "perishable" freight; and that all of the cars had originally been equipped as required by the safety appliance acts, except the act of April 14, 1910, and the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission made pursuant to this act.

The statement also shows that the defendant company had repair tracks at Mosier at what is known as the Market Street Yards in Youngstown and at Haselton, which is a suburb of Youngstown, but that bad-order cars had accumulated and were accumulating at each of these yards beyond the capacity of the yards to take care of them. It appears that the defendant had repair tracks at Ashtabula which were also congested beyond capacity.

It is further stipulated that on the cars in the train which had broken end and center sills the air hose could not be coupled up without danger of their being pulled apart on account of the slack in the chains. The fact that the train was not being operated by air was conveyed to the engine and train crew engaged in the movement of the train, and it was operated at a speed of about 10 miles per hour the entire journey. The distance from Youngstown to Dock Junction is 97 miles; the distance from Youngstown to Ashtabula is about 60 miles. All of the cars of the train were built and in service prior to July 1, 1911, and none of them had undergone regular repairs or had been shopped for work amounting to practically rebuilding of the bodies of them.

It is also stipulated that witnesses for the defendant, if called, would testify that at none of the three repair yards of the defendant referred to herein was there any place on the repair tracks to handle cars in excess of the number then awaiting repairs between May 15 and July 26, 1913, having regard to the reasonably necessary and practicable method of operating the railroad; that the defendant hauled the cars from Mosier and Haselton to Dock Junction for the purpose of repairing them, although it was not physically impossible to have made the necessary repairs on other than the repair tracks at any of the three repair yards between May 15 and July 26, 1913; and that in moving such a train as this one was, it is considered safer practice to have the air brakes used only on the locomotive and tender than to attempt to use them throughout

the train.

OPINION.

Clarke, District Judge:

That the defendant violated the Federal safety appliance acts in moving the cars described in the various counts in the petition in this case as it did move them is clear, unless such movement is authorized by the proviso in the act of April 14, 1910. The parts of this proviso which are important to consider read as follows:

Provided. That where any car shall have been properly equipped, as provided in this act and the other acts mentioned herein, and such equipment shall have become defective or insecure while such car was being used by such carrier upon its line of railroad, such car may be hauled from the place where such equipment was first discovered to be defective or insecure to the nearest available point where such car can be repaired, without liability for the penalties imposed by section 4 of this act or section 6 of the act of March 2, 1893, as amended by the act of April 1, 1896, if such movement is necessary to make such repairs and such repairs can not be made except at such repair point .. and nothing in this proviso shall be construed to permit the hauling of defective cars by means of chains instead of drawbars, in revenue trains or in association with other cars that are commercially used, unless such defective cars contain live stock or "perishable" freight.

The act of April 14, 1910, after prescribing the equipments which all cars shall have in section 3 contains this proviso, viz:

Provided, That the Interstate Commerce Commission may upon full hearing and for good cause extend the period within which any common carrier shall comply with the provisions of this section with respect to the equipment of cars actually in service upon the date of the passage of this act.

The agreed statement of facts shows that the cars in the train, movement of which is complained of, were all built and "in service prior to July 1, 1911," and Exhibit "B" is an order by the Interstate Commerce Commission providing in substance that carriers are granted an extension of five years from July 1, 1911, to change and apply all appliances on freight cars so as to comply with the standards prescribed by the commission in conformity to the act, except with respect to certain appliances designated which do not affect this case, and also except that when a car is shopped for work amounting to practically rebuilding the body of the car it must be equipped according to the standards prescribed by the commission. It is also provided that the extension of time thus granted must not be construed as relieving carriers from complying with the provisions of section 4 of the act of March 2, 1893, as amended April 1, 1896, and March 2, 1903.

First, the Government contends that before the defendant can claim the privilege granted by the proviso of the act of April 14, 1910, a car must be equipped with all the appliances provided for and required by the safety appliances acts, including the act of April 14, 1910. As has been stated, the Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized by this act of April 14, 1910, to extend the time for compliance with its terms, and the commission on March 13, 1911, granted such extension for cars such as were included in this train, as is shown by Exhibit "B."

This order of the commission suspended the requirements of this act to a period long after the movement complained of in this case, and therefore the proviso under the stipulated state of facts should read as if written: