to avoid assessments and taxes levied on its lands, the amount involved cannot be brought within the jurisdiction of the District Court by taking the aggregate of the sums involved as to each defendant; but the jurisdiction as to each must be determined by the amount in controversy between him and the railroad company. But where a board imposed a uniform acreage tax upon the lands of the complainant in different counties it was held that the collector in each county could be joined in the suit although in one of the counties the tax was less than the jurisdictional amount.10 To give a District Court jurisdiction of a suit to quiet title to a tract of land, in which a number of persons are joined as defendants, between whom no privity of title exists, and each of whom claims title to a separate part of the tract; the value of the property in controversy between each defendant a the complainant must exceed the jurisdictional amount.11 In a suit in a District Court against a number of defendants, to quiet title to a tract of land alleged to be of sufficient value to sustain the jurisdiction of the court; it must appear from the bill, that all the defendants have a privity of interest, derived from a common source of title, or that the separate claim of each defendant is of the jurisdictional amount; since, where the defendants claim separately, the suit is separable, and the requisite amount must be involved in each separate controversy.12 It was held that two of several tenants in common, who were citizens of another State and had been joined in condemnation proceedings with their co-tenants and the mortgagees of the interest of one of the others who were citizens of the same State as plaintiff, were not entitled to a removal of the proceedings to the Federal Court, when the aggregate of their claims exceeded the jurisdictional sum, but the amount of their separate claims. was less than that amount.13

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9 Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370, 37 L. ed. 206; Keels v. Central R. Co., 147 U. S. 374, 37 L. ed. 208; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Walker, 148 U. S. 391, 37 L. ed. 494; Fishback v. W. U. Tel. Co., 161 U. S. 96, 40 L. ed. 630.

10 Everglades Drainage League v. Napoleon B. Broward Drainage. Dist., 256 Fed. 246.

11 Stemmler v. McNeill, 102 Fed. 660.

12 Stemmler v. McNeill, 102 Fed. 660; distinguishing Bates v. Carpentier, 98 Fed. 452; Cooper v. Preston, 105 Fed. 403.

13 Trotier v. St. Louis, B. & S. Ry. Co., 54 N. E. 487, 180 Ill. 471; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Dishman & Tribble (Texas), 85 S. W. 319.

But in some cases, in the nature of bills of peace, when defendants had committed or threatened separate infringements of the same right of the plaintiff; it was held, that the value of such right was the test. 14 In a suit to quiet the title to several tracts of land, held by different defendants under separate patents, which plaintiff claimed as assignee of several contracts by the same county officer; each providing that on payment of the purchase price, therein specified, a patent should issue for the land, therein described; the bill alleging that the purchase money had been duly tendered to the county officers, who were made parties to the bill, and not accepted by them, and praying that the patentees be decreed to hold the land in trust for the plaintiff; it was held that, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court upon appeal, the suit was to be considered as in effect for specific performance of the county's contracts, and the matter in dispute was the aggregate amount tendered to the county officers, although each several interest of the patentees was insufficient had its owner been the sole respondent.15 It was held that a bill for an injunction against taxes, brought by a railroad company against a revenue agent who represented all the parties interested, sufficiently stated the jurisdictional amount, when it alleged that the taxes assessed amounted to a much larger sum, which was specified; and that a question not arising on the face of the bill as to how the taxes, when collected, should be disposed of, and in what proportions and amounts they should be parcelled out to interested municipalities, was immaterial.16 In a suit by a railroad company against a number of landowners, to enjoin threatened interference with its use of its right of way through their lands; it was held, that the value of the right sought to be protected, and not the value of the land constituting the right of way across the lands of defendants, constituted the jurisdictional test.17 It was held: that a bill, to enjoin defendants from diverting the waters of a stream, in violation of complainant's prior right thereto, which

14 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bitterman, C. C. A., 144 Fed. 34.

15 Corbin V. County of Black Hawk, 105 U. S. 659, 664, 26 L. ed. 1136.

16 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Adams,

180 U. S. 28, 21 Sup. Ct. 251, 45 L. ed. 410. Similar is Western Union Tel. Co. v. Norman, 77 Fed. 13.

17 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith, C. C. A., 128 Fed. 1, 63 C. C. A. 1.

was alleged to be of the value of $2,000, and also to recover damages in the sum of $2,500, sustained by complainant by reason of the joint action of defendants in diverting such waters, showed the amount in controversy to be sufficient.18 In suits by railway carriers, to restrain different scalpers from buying and selling tickets, which were not transferable; it was held, that the value of the matter in dispute was that of the right to the injunction; and the jurisdiction was sustained, although none of the defendants had dealt in, or threatened to deal in, tickets of the jurisdictional amount.1 It was held that where the plaintiff failed to prove combination between the defendants, such a bill was properly dismissed.20 Where a bill had been dismissed, which had been filed by a creditor preferred under an assignment, praying for a declaration that the assignment, with its preferences, was valid and that different attaching creditors, each of whose claim was less than the jurisdictional amount, be enjoined from enforcing attachments levied by them separately; it was held, that the amount of the complanant's preferred claim, which exceeded that sum, was the test of the jurisdiction of the appellate court.21

1

19

§ 19. Consideration of interest in estimating the value of the matter in dispute. The interest excluded from the computation includes interest accrued on the demand, before the suit was brought, and which is collected only as an incident of the principal; 1 but not interest, which is the subject of a separate contract as a coupon, and which might be the subject of a separate suit.2 The face value of coupons due before the suit, may be added to the principal named in the bond when the jurisdictional amount is determined; 3 except, it has been held in a single case, where

18 Morris v. Bean, 123 Fed. 618. A similar ruling was made in Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Hanley, 98 Fed, 327.

19 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bitterman, C. C. A., 144 Fed. 34; s. c., 207 U. S. 205, 52 L. ed. 171.

20 McDaniel v. Traylor, 212 U. S. 428, 53 L. ed. 584.

the day of payment, named in the bond, had not yet arrived, but by its terms it became due on the nonpayment of a coupon for interest; it being said by the court, that "the coupons cannot be considered as interest, for the purpose of maturing the debt, and as separate distinct obligations for the purpose of giving this court jurisdiction."4 Interest, which has accrued upon bonds and coupons after their maturity, cannot be considered. Where the relief sought did not include interest as such, together with a principal to which it was incidental; but a calculation of interest was used as an instrumentality in determining the amount of damages caused by a breach of warranty, or by fraudulent misrepresentations as to the value of stock and for the conversion of a written obligation; and where interest was claimed as damages, although not provided for in the contract; it was held : that such interest was a part of the jurisdictional amount. Where the bill claimed payment of a sum as the amount of a debt for an advance by a building and loan association; it was held, that the court could not arbitrarily assume that this was usurious interest cloaked with such name.10 In a suit to foreclose a mortgage, insurance premiums paid by the mortgagee, when claimed in the bill, are considered to be a part of the jurisdictional amount.11

§ 20. Consideration of costs in estimating the value of the matter in dispute. Notarial fees for the presentment and protest of a note in suit, although paid before the action was brought, were considered to be costs, not damages, and excluded

Spradlin, C. C. A., 170 Fed. 322; Central Commercial Co. v. JonesDusenbury Co., C. C. A., 237 Fed. 13. Contra, Voorhees v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 250 Fed. 484; A. H. Mar shall Co., Inc. v. Buick Motor Co., 251 Fed. 685.

10 Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Price, 169 U. S. 45, 42 L. ed. 655, 18 S. Ct. 251; Turner v. Southern H. Bldg. & L. Ass'n, C. C. A., 101 Fed. 308; Building & Loan Ass'n of Dakota v. Cunningham (Texas), 47 S. W. 714.

11 Coolidge v. Ray, 75 Fed. 39,

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from the computation of the jurisdictional amount. It has been held that where a statute authorizes the inclusion of an attorney's fee in the judgment, the same is part of the costs and is not included in the jurisdictional amount; 2 but the case is otherwise where the fee is awarded by stipulation and not by statute. Where a suit was brought to enjoin a public officer from issuing certain certificates without the payment of costs and penalties which had accrued before the purchase, such costs were included in computing the jurisdictional amount.4

§ 21. Consideration of counterclaims in estimating the value of the matter in dispute.-Whether the amount of a counterclaim, pleaded by the defendant, should be added to that of the plaintiff's claim, to determine the jurisdictional amount, has been the subject of conflicting adjudications. It has been held that the question is so doubtful that a motion to remand the cause in such a case should be granted.

$ 20. 1 Baker v. Howell, 44 Fed. 113. Contra, Dallyn v. Brady, 205 Fed. 430.

2 Peters V. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 182 Fed. 113.

3 Rogers v. Riley, 85 Fed. 471; Springstead v. Crawfordsville State Bank, 231 U. S. 541; LeRoy v. Hartwick, 229 Fed. 857. See Lee Line Steamers v. Robinson, C. C. A., 232 Fed. 417, 418.

4 Glen Ins. Co. v. Romero, County Treasurer, C. C. A., 254 Fed. 233.

$ 21. 1 Held, that it should be: in Stinson v. Dousman, 20 How. (U. S.) 461, 464, 467, 15 L. ed. 966, 968, 969 (appellate jurisdiction in equity); Lovell v. Cragin, 136 U. S. 130, 34 L. ed. 372 (appellate jurisdiction in equity); Kirby v. Am. Soda Fountain Co., 194 U. S. 141, 48 L. ed. 911, 24 Sup. Ct. 619 (jurisdiction of Circuit Court where cross-bill was filed); Clarkson v. Manson, 4 Fed. 257 (18 Blatchf. 443); Carson & R. L. Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. 578; Wolcott v. Watson, 46 Fed. 529; Wolcott V.

Where the suit was one

Sprague, 55 Fed. 545; Lee v. Continental Ins. Co., 74 Fed. 424; Price & Hart v. T. J. Ellis & Co., 129 Fed. 482; American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler, 227 Fed. 321; Central Commercial Co. v. JonesDusenbury Co., 251 Fed. 13; Clarkson v. Manson (N. Y.), 60 How. Pr. 45; reversing 59 How. Pr. 480. See Champion v. Grand Rapids, etc., Ry. Co., 145 Mich. 676, 108 N. W. 1078. Contra, Falls W. Mfg. Co. v. Broderick, 6 Fed. 654; La Montague v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co., 44 Fed. 645; Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705; Industrial & Mining Guaranty Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 58 Fed. 732, 7 C. C. A. 471, 16 U. S. App. 196 (cross-bill); MeKown v. Kansas & T. Coal Co., 105 Fed. 657. Cf. West v. Aurora City, 6 Wall. 139, 18 L. ed. 819; McGinity v. White, 3 Dillon, 350; s. c., Fed. Cas. No. 8,802; Sturgeon River Boom Co. v. W. H. Sawyer Lumber Co., 89 Fed. 113.

2 Crane Co. v. Guanica Centrale (S. D. N. Y.) 132 Fed. 713.