tion of a Federal court over a suit based on an alleged impairment of a contract by a State, that there should be a valid contract, or that the impairment complained of should in fact be effected; but it is sufficient, for jurisdictional purposes, if the plaintiff in good faith claim the existence of such contract and its impairment.10 Where a bill is filed to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance,11 or resolution of a city council, which has the effect of an ordinance, 12 or to prevent the passage of one,13 which will violate an existing contract with the complainant; the case arises under the Constitution of the United States; provided that the ordinance is otherwise within the powers of the municipality. A breach by the State officers of a contract is not equivalent to the taking of property without due process of law and will not give the Federal court jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin the same.14 A municipal ordinance, not passed in accordance with legislative authority, is not an impairment by the State of the obligation of a contract and a suit to enjoin its enforcement, when it is in other respects due process of law, does not arise under V. 10 Pacific Electric Co. v. Los Angeles, 118 Fed. 746. But see Risley v. City of Utica, 179 Fed. 875; Columbus Ry. Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 249 U. S. 399; Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 215 Fed. 138. 11 Walla Walla City Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341; affirming 60 Fed. 957; Mercantile Tr. & D. Co. v. Columbus, 203 U. S. 311, 51 L. ed. 198; Indianapolis Gas Co. v. Indianapolis, 82 Fed. 245; Consolidated Water Co. v. San Diego, 84 Fed. 369; Michigan Tel. Co. v. Charlotte, 93 Fed. 11; Consolidated Water Co. v. San Diego, 93 Fed. 849, 35 C. C. A. 631; Iron Mountain R. Co. of Mem. phis v. Memphis, C. C. A., 96 Fed. 113; Kimball v. City of Cedar Rapids, 99 Fed. 130; Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. of Baltimore v. Collins Park & B. R. Co., 99 Fed. 812; Anoka Water Works, Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of Anoka, 109 Fed. 580; American Water Works & Guarantee Co. v. Home Water Co., 115 Fed. 171; Riverside & A Ry. Co. v. Riverside, 118 Fed. 736; Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. Des Moines, 151 Fed. 854. But see Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 175 U. S. 109, 44 L. ed. 92; affirming 95 Fed. 539. 12 Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. Des Moines, 151 Fed. 854. 13 Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65, 46 L. ed. 808; s. c., as Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102; Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co. v. Meridian, 139 Fed. 673. But see infra, § 271a. 14 Manila Investment Co. v. Trammell, 239 U. S. 31; City of Monroe v. Detroit, M. & T. S. L. Ry. Co., 257 Fed. 782. the Constitution of the United States.15 Where the complaint averred that the enforcement of the ordinance would deprive the complainant of its property without due process of law and the State constitution contained a prohibition of such deprivation; it was held that the remedy must be first sought in the State courts.16 It has been said: that under the settled doctrine that the courts can only deal with the question of the constitutio: ality of a legislative act after it has been passed, and are without jurisdiction to interfere with proposed or pending legislation, either State or municipal, the action of a city council in adopting the report of a committee finding that the franchise of a street railway company will expire at a certain time, contrary to the contention of the company, and recommending that the council take measures to dispossess the company at the expiration of such time unless there is a previous renewal, does not give a Federal court jurisdiction of a suit to determine the controversy between the company and the city in respect to the terms of the grant, on the ground that it presents a constitutional question as to the impairment of the contract rights of the company.17 Where, in addition to these facts, it appeared that the receivers of the corporation had received a notice from the superintendent of streets, that all permits issued to the company to work and make repairs upon the streets of the city were to be revoked at a specified time, it was held, that the receivers had a cause of action arising under the Constitution of the United States. 18 The mere refusal of a municipal corporation to perform a contract, even though that refusal is expressed in an ordinance containing a direction that the other party to the contract perform some act which the contract does not require but imposing no penalty 15 Mayor, etc., of Savannah V. Holst, C. C. A., 132 Fed. 901; reversing 131 Fed. 931; Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & T. Co., C. C. A., 155 Fed. 725, 12 Ann. Cas. 500; Seattle El. Co. v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co., C. C. A., 185 Fed. 365; City and County of San Francisco V. United Railroads of San Francisco, C. C. A., 190 Fed. 507. 16 Seattle El. Co. v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co., C. C. A., 185 Fed. 365, 372. See, also, Hamilton Gas Light 17 Elkins v. Chicago, 119 Fed. 957. WRONG 227/278 for disobedience, 19 does not present a case arising under the Constitution of the United States.20 In an action to vacate the charter of a railroad company because a majority interest therein had been purchased by a competitor, the bill alleged that such purchase was ultra vires because the Georgia Constitution forbids the legislature to grant such powers to any corporation where its effect might be to lessen or destroy competition. The petition for removal contended that this impaired the obligation of the contract embodied in the company's charter, which was granted before this provision of the Constitution took effect. It was held, that this presented a Federal question, although the Supreme Court of Georgia had theretofore decided that the charter did not confer the right claimed.21 It was held: that in an action by stockholders of a corporation, to set aside a lease executed by it as inconsistent with its charter, illegal and void, no Federal question was involved within the meaning of the removal act, when complainant alleged that the action of the directors in making the lease without the consent of the stockholders was not due process of law, and the defendants relied upon an act of the legislature not mentioned in the bill, which they averred that the plaintiff claimed impaired the obligation of a contract.22 In an action in the nature of quo warranto, brought in the name of the State by her attorney general to prevent a railroad company from controlling certain lands, defendant petitioned for removal, alleging: that it acquired ownership in the land under an act of the legislature, and in accordance therewith exercised rights of ownership; that subsequently the act granting the land was repealed; and that such repealing act was a law impairing the obligation of contracts, and depriving persons of property without due process of law. It was held, that the petition showed a case arising under the Constitution of the United States, which was not eliminated by the attorney 19 St. Paul Gas Light Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 45 L. ed. 788. 20 St. Paul Gas Light Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U. S. 142, 45 L. ed. 788: Dawson v. Columbia Tr. Co., 197 U. S. 178, 49 L. ed. 713; Shawnee Sew. erage & Drainage Co. v. Stearns, 220 U. S. 462, 55 L. ed. 544. See Defiance Water Co. v. City of Defiance, 191 U. S. 184, 48 L. ed. 140. 21 South Carolina v. Port Royal & A. R. Co., 56 Fed, 333. 22 Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Mills, 113 U. S. 249, 28 L. ed. 949; affirming Mills v. Central R. Co., 20 Fed. 449. It was general's disclaimer of reliance on the repealing act.23 held where a railroad corporation set up as a defense that its charter was a grant by the State, giving to the railroad company, without any qualification, the right to prescribe upon what terms and at what rates freight should be transported on the road, that this grant was protected by the Constitution of the United States, and that a subsequent statute of the State upon the subject impaired the validity of such grant in violation of the Constitution; that such defense involved a question arising under the Constitution of the United States, and the case was removable.24 In a suit in a Federal court raising the question whether the State was attempting to impair the obligation of a contract, a decision that this question was res adjudicata as against the State does not oust the Federal jurisdiction, on the theory that it makes the case turn on a question not Federal.25 It was held that jurisdiction in the Circuit Courts of the United States over cases where any person is sought to be deprived of his rights under the Constitution of the United States, did not authorize a writ of certiorari to a State court for the removal of proceedings by the State against a railroad company, under a State statute, entitled "An act to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination in the rates charged the passengers, etc., and to punish the same," where it was insisted by defendant that this act of the State legislature impaired the obligation of the contract which the State had made with the company by its charter.26 A proceeding by a State to forfeit a franchise cannot be removed to the Federal courts, on the ground that it impairs the obligation of a contract; the prohibition of the Constitution being that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 27 The institution by the State of a proceeding in a court to 23 Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 33 Fed. 721. But see § 24 over note 55, supra. 24 Illinois v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 16 Fed. 706. But see supra, § 24 over notes 22-37. 25 Stone v. Bank of Kentucky, 174 U. S. 799, 43 L. ed. 1187; af firming Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 Fed. 383. 26 Illinois v. Chicago & A. R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 7,006 (6 Biss. 107). 27 Kentucky v. Louisville Bridge Co., 42 Fed. 241; Columbus Ry. Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 253 Fed. 499. obtain a judgment which it is contended would cause a violation of its contract does not impair the violation of such contract.28 Whenever the right or title of either party is grounded upon State legislation which undertakes to transfer to him property belonging to the other without due process of law, there is a controversy as to the operation and effect of the Constitution, to which the Federal jurisdiction attaches.29 A suit to enjoin an action by or under a State authority within the jurisdiction conferred by a State statute, which action is alleged with some reasonable foundation for the position, to take the complainant's property without due process of law; 20 or to deny him. the equal protection of the laws; 31 or, when such action is legislative in its nature, to impair the obligation of a contract that plaintiff holds; 32 arises under the Constitution of the United States. Such a suit, when there is no color for the contention that the defendants act under a statute of the State, does not; unless perhaps when they act in a quasi-judicial capacity.34 33 Trespasses on the property rights of an individual, committed by public officers or agents professedly acting under authority of a State law, but which are not only unauthorized by such law, but by any fair construction thereof are prohibited, cannot be im 28 State of Georgia v. Southern Ry. Co., 255 Fed. 369. 29 Crystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 76 Fed. 148. 30 Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443; San Joaquin & King's River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Stanislaus County, 90 Fed. 516; San Francisco Gas & El. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 189 Fed. 943. See Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560. 31 Southern Ry. Co. V. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 97 Fed. 513; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 132 Fed. 629; Douglas Park Jockey Club v. Grainger, 146 Fed. 414; Michigan Railroad Tax Cases, 138 Fed. 223; Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Jersey City, 199 Fed. 237, 245. In the last two cases, a charge was made of a discrimination against the complainants in assessments for taxation. 32 Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341; affirming 60 Fed. 957. And other authorities cited supra, note 11. 33 St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Steele, 167 U. S. 659, 42 L. ed. 315; Barney v. New York, 193 U. S. 430, 48 L. ed. 737; Huntington v. New York, 193 U. S. 441, 48 L. ed. 741; affirming 118 Fed. 683; Kiernan v. Multnomah County, 95 Fed. 849; Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 65 L.R.A. 864, 113 Fed. 616, 51 C. C. A. 122; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 132 Fed. 629. |