material losses. Its prosperity would have been crippled and its expansion checked for many a year; yet in the end, the Republic would have emerged with no impairment of its power or prestige. But to Great Britain, which had so many hostages to give to fortune, defeat would have spelled instant ruin; while even victory (if we concede that victory was possible) must have been purchased at a price of which no Englishman could think without a shudder.

Fortunately, so appalling a catastrophe was averted, never, perhaps, again to be so imminent. In the end, public opinion in Great Britain came to recognise that no strip of South American territory, even were it piled kneedeep with gold, was worth a war between the two great English-speaking peoples. The blame of the whole unfortunate imbroglio was very justly laid upon Lord Salisbury, for allowing what was in itself an unimportant question to drift into the magnitude of a casus belli. Yet the impasse still continued. However great the blunder which he had committed, the British Premier could scarcely cry "Peccavi" and ask the American President to forgive him. It was then that the way to peace was made smooth by the American Commission which Mr. Cleveland had promptly appointed on January 1st. This body, through Secretary Olney, asked the governments of Great Britain and Venezuela for such documentary evidence as would aid it in its investigation. In each case a most courteous assent was given. A month later,34 Ambassador Bayard, in view of the public demonstrations in both England and the United States, proposed to Lord Salisbury that the Venezuelan question be discussed at Washington, with a view to ultimate arbitration. This was a decided proffer of the olive-branch, and Lord Salisbury responded

84 February 27, 1896.

five days later in a note in which he cordially agreed to Mr. Bayard's suggestion, and concluded with this significant sentence:

"I have empowered Sir Julian Pauncefote to discuss the question either with the representative of Venezuela or with the Government of the United States acting as the friend of Venezuela."

This little sentence conceded the whole question at issue. It recognised the United States as entitled to interfere on behalf of an American Republic as against a European power, and it tacitly withdrew the prior British declaration that such interference had no warrant in the law of nations. In other words, Great Britain accepted President Cleveland's new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle to be recognised thereafter in Anglo-American relations. Soon after, Lord Salisbury, not to be gracious by halves, withdrew his insistence upon the Schomburgk line, and agreed to submit the whole question to arbitration. A formal treaty to that effect was signed in Washington on February 2, 189735

It would be difficult to exaggerate the profound impression which the Venezuelan affair produced upon the statesmen of Continental Europe, an impression that was reflected in the press and in many monographs and special publications. The prestige of the United States was enhanced immensely, a fact of which Americans abroad were made aware in many ways. Their country

35 It provided for a reference of the whole dispute to a tribunal which met in Paris in June, 1899. This was composed of two American and two English judges and was presided over by Professor Maartens, the Russian authority on international law. The decision finally rendered on October 3d of the same year represented a compromise, and this was, on the whole, favourable to Great Britain.

was now spoken of in a tone of grave respect that was altogether new. A thoughtful observer who had carefully studied the drift of European opinion, wrote that

"The best informed French and German journalists, though they acknowledge the equity and prudence of the compromise which has been reached, think it necessary to point out that it involves possibilities of considerable gravity, not merely to England and the United States, but also to the civilised world in general." 36

And he cited the very able Kölnische Zeitung as saying:

"A precedent has been established by the joint action of the two Anglo-Saxon powers, the effects of which are likely to be felt long after the British Guiana boundary question has been forgotten."

But the most explicit statement of just what Lord Salisbury's concession meant, was made by the London Times in these pregnant sentences:

"From the point of view of the United States the arrangement is a concession by Great Britain of the most far-reaching kind. It admits a principle that in respect of South American republics the United States may not only intervene in disputes, but may entirely supersede the original disputant and assume exclusive control of the negotiations. Great Britain cannot, of course, bind any other nation by her action, but she has set up a precedent which may in the future be quoted with great effect against herself, and she has greatly strengthened the hands of the United States Government in any dispute that may arise in the future between a South American Republic and a European power, in which the United States may desire to intervene." 37

In the United States, many and various were the opinions then expressed regarding President Cleveland's 36 Nineteenth Century, December, 1896.

37 London Times, November 14, 1896.

bold and somewhat startling course. Of the unfavourable criticisms uttered at the time, it will be necessary to speak hereafter. But perhaps the matured judgments of two able men who were not of Mr. Cleveland's party may be cited as embodying the final verdict of his countrymen. Dr. Edward Stanwood, a close student of American political history and long an intimate friend of Mr. Blaine, summed up very briefly the outcome of the Venezuelan episode as "the most signal victory of American diplomacy in modern times." 38 And Mr. John W. Foster, an experienced and sagacious diplomat, who succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State in President Harrison's Cabinet, gave his deliberate opinion in these words: "I regard the President's action as a consistent, judicious and necessary application of the true intent and spirit of the [Monroe] Doctrine."39

But whatever opinion may be held regarding the wis dom of President Cleveland's action, or the accuracy with which he then defined a fundamental doctrine of American policy, one impressive fact cannot be questioned. The interpretation which he gave was instantly accepted by his countrymen and has been confirmed and extended by his successors. In less than a decade, indeed, its far-reaching significance was to receive a practical demonstration. Had nothing else occurred to make his administration memorable, this Venezuelan incident would have sufficed; since through it President Cleveland left an ineffaceable mark upon the history, not of the United States alone, but of the whole Western Hemisphere and of the world.

38 Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, p. 520 (Boston, 1898). 39 Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, p. 473 (New York, 1900). See also a similar expression of opinion by another eminent Republican Mr. Andrew D. White, in his Autobiography, ii. pp. 381 (New York, 1905).

CHAPTER X

THE RISING IN THE WEST

THE universal chorus of applause which in the United States greeted President Cleveland's Venezuela message, continued for precisely three days. At the end of that brief period, discordant notes were heard, so harsh and so insistent as to put an end to what had seemed to be a perfect political harmony. It was, indeed, Mr. Cleveland's fate never to taste in public office the sweets of popularity for any length of time; and he was now to enter upon the most trying year of all. The praise which he had lately won alarmed the Republican leaders. They had perforce commended the bold front which he had shown to England; yet this sudden popularity seemed likely to upset their plans. Was the President thinking of a third term? Mr. Chauncey M. Depew in a published interview suggested this hypothesis, and it created something like a panic among the gentlemen who were asserting that they could elect even a yellow dog in 1896. Therefore, almost immediately, the Republican press began to qualify its praise of Mr. Cleveland and to forget its enthusiasm of a day or two before. The New York Sun, which once again had drifted into the anti-Cleveland ranks, disclosed a new line of criticism in an editorial remark:

"If the eccentric statesman and instinctive antagonist of the more vital American sentiments, who now occupies the White House, had dealt with the Venezuelan affair from the beginning in the