ARTICLE III The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington. This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto. . . . Official Interpretations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact Japan: The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tanaka) to the American Ambassador (MacVeagh) (May 26, 1928) [extract] I BEG to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Japan sympathize warmly with the high and beneficent aims of the proposal now made by the United States, which they take to imply the entire abolition of the institution of war, and that they will be glad to render their most cordial cooperation towards the attainment of that end. The proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self-defense, and nothing which is incompatible with the obligations of agreements guaranteeing the public peace, such as are embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties of Locarno. Accordingly, the Imperial Government firmly believe that unanimous agreement on a mutually acceptable text for such a treaty as is contemplated is well capable of realization by discussion between the six powers referred to. England: The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Chamberlain) to the American Ambassador (Houghton) (May 19, 1928) [extract] 4. After studying the wording of Article I of the United States draft, His Majesty's Government do not think that its terms exclude action which a state may be forced to take in self-defense. Mr. Kellogg has made it clear that he regards the right of self-defense as inalienable, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary. 10. The language of Article I, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon French policy, awkwardly smoothed over by compromises which satisfied no one and which finally produced, in England, an unreasoning suspicion of France and, in France, a degree of exasperation which found its ultimate expression in the fateful occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Some of the conferences got completely out of hand and produced unforeseen results which embarrassed the British and French participants. This was notably the case at the Genoa Conference of 1922, a meeting convoked, despite French reluctance, as a result of Lloyd George's insistence that it was time to face up to the Russian problem and that, by doing so, the Powers would be able to solve all of Europe's outstanding economic problems. The conference failed signally to live up to its advance publicity, and its only tangible result was the dramatic rapprochement of Germany and Soviet Russia at Rapallo. Nor was this event-which foreshadowed a significant shift in the European balance and which, at the same time, widened the rift in the Ententeuninfluenced by the deficiencies of Lloyd George's diplomatic methods. There had been much talk of "open diplomacy" and "the mobilization of world opinion" before the conference opened; and provision was made to keep the international public fully informed of the discussions of the various commissions into which the conference was divided. But after this concession to democracy had been made, the political commissions in particular found that they had very little to do, while secret talks, from which many of the participating states were excluded, were conducted between an intimate group in Lloyd George's villa on the one hand and-through various devious channels-the Russians on the other. The Germans were not admitted to these talks and, since they feared a Russian arrangement with the Entente at their expense, they were amenable to the suggestions made to them by Chicherin. The resultant débacle justified Lord Grey's gibe, earlier in the year, that there was "both too much limelight and too much secrecy" in Lloyd George's diplomacy. [The General Pact for the Renunciation of War, concluded at Paris, Aug. 27, 1928. Ratified by the Senate, Jan. 15, 1929; proclaimed July 24, 1929] AN INTERNATIONAL KISS * The Kellogg-Briand Pact ARTICLE I The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. ARTICLE II The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. "In other words, we are to exchange a sort of international kiss." Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, Congressional Record, January 5, 1929. ARTICLE III The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington. This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto. . . . Official Interpretations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact Japan: The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tanaka) to the American Ambassador (MacVeagh) (May 26, 1928) [extract] I BEG to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Japan sympathize warmly with the high and beneficent aims of the proposal now made by the United States, which they take to imply the entire abolition of the institution of war, and that they will be glad to render their most cordial cooperation towards the attainment of that end. The proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self-defense, and nothing which is incompatible with the obligations of agreements guaranteeing the public peace, such as are embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the treaties of Locarno. Accordingly, the Imperial Government firmly believe that unanimous agreement on a mutually acceptable text for such a treaty as is contemplated is well capable of realization by discussion between the six powers referred to.. England: The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Chamberlain) to the American Ambassador (Houghton) (May 19, 1928) [extract] 4. After studying the wording of Article I of the United States draft, His Majesty's Government do not think that its terms exclude action which a state may be forced to take in self-defense. Mr. Kellogg has made it clear that he regards the right of self-defense as inalienable, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary... 10. The language of Article I, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government. Germany: The German Minister of Foreign Affairs (Stresemann) to the American Ambassador (Schurman) (April 27, 1928) [extract] The German Government proceeds on the belief that a pact after the pattern submitted by the Government of the United States would not put in question the sovereign right of any state to defend itself. It is self-evident that if one state violates the pact the other con-tracting parties regain their freedom of action with reference to that state. The state affected by the violation of the pact is therefore not prevented from taking up arms on its own part against the breaker of the peace. In a pact of this kind to provide expressly for the case of a violation seems to the German Government unnecessary. United States: Note of the Government of the United States to the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, and South Africa (June 23, 1928) [extract] Self-defense. There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense. If it has a good case, the world will applaud and not condemn its action. Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It is the identical question approached from the other side. Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defense, it is not in the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed definition. United States: (Report of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) (January 14, 1929) The Committee reports the above treaty with the understanding that the right of self-defense is in no way curtailed or impaired by the terms or conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free at all times and regardless of the treaty provisions to defend itself, and is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of self-defense and the necessity and extent of the same. The United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as a part of its national security and defense. Under the right of self-defense allowed by the treaty must necessarily be included the right to maintain the Monroe Doctrine which is a part of our system of national defense. The Committee further understands the treaty does not provide sanctions, express or implied. Should any signatory to the treaty or any nation adhering to the treaty violate the terms of the same, there is no obligation or commitment, express or implied, upon the part of any of the other signers of the treaty to engage in punitive or coercive measures as against the nation violating the treaty. The effect of the violation of the treaty is to relieve the other signers of the treaty from any obligation under it with the nation thus violating the same. In other words, the treaty does not, either expressly or impliedly, contemplate the use of force or coercive measures for its enforcement as against any nation violating it. It is a voluntary pledge upon the part of each nation that it will not have recourse to war except in self-defense, and that it will not seek settlement of its international controversies except through pacific means. And if a nation sees proper to disregard the treaty and violate the same, the effect of such action is to take it from under the benefits of the treaty and to relieve the other nations from any treaty relationship with the said Power. [From "Past Failures and Successes in Peace-Making with Suggestions for the Future," by the Earl of Avon, prepared for the 50th Anniversary Conference of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1969] THE NYON CONFERENCE By Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon A controversy of the years between the wars concerned the much debated term "appeasement". There was no harm in the original use of that word, which could be translated as attempts to reduce the international temperature and thereby promote peace. On the other hand it now also carries a pejorative meaning. The truth is that while attempts at negotiations in themselves are not to be condemned, it is important to ensure that the consequence of a negotiation is not to gain a little present ease at the expense of more trouble hereafter. Such indulgence becomes all the more blameworthy if the later trouble thus stored up is at the expense of an ally. In this condition it is often found that the time which is said to have been gained turns out to have benefited the potential aggressor. Therefore, I would say that while it was not wrong to attempt negotiation with Hitler and Mussolini, it was certainly wrong to place uncritical confidence in their assurances. On one occasion, in particular, during the Spanish Civil War, the democratic powers were able to show firmness and the consequences were salutary. During August 1937, attacks on merchant ships were taking place in increasing numbers in the Mediterranean. Most of these were by submarines, and at the end of the month a British destroyer was unsuccessfully attacked in this way sixty miles south of Valencia. In theory these submarines were Spanish. In fact their number was much too large for this to be possible, and as the weeks passed we had increasing evidence that on Mussolini's orders about fifty Italian submarines were attacking |