CHAPTER CXXXVII.

THE intelligence of the rejection of Pinckney was confirmed by an arrival at New York on the twenty-first of March. The following day, Hamilton, feeling how much the delicacy of the public measures had been increased by the delay to act upon his earlier suggestions, wrote to the Secretary of State:

"It is now ascertained, that Mr. Pinckney has been refused, and with circumstances of indignity. What is to be done? The share I have had in the public administration, added to my interest as a citizen, make me extremely anxious that at this delicate crisis a course of conduct exactly proper may be adopted. I offer to your consideration, without what appears to me ceremony, such a course:

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First. I would appoint a day of humiliation and prayer. In such a crisis this appears to me proper in itself, and it will be politically useful to impress our nation that there is a serious state of things-to strengthen religious ideas in a contest which in its progress may require that our people may consider themselves as the defenders of their country against atheism, conquest, and anarchy. It is far from evident to me that the progress of the war may not call on us to defend our firesides and our altars. And any plan which does not look forward to this as possible, will, in my opinion, be a superficial one. Second. I would call Congress together at as short a day as a majority of both houses can assemble. Third. When assembled, I would appoint a commission extraordinary to consist of Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Madison, together with Mr. Cabot and Mr. Pinckney. To be useful it is important that a man agreeable to the French should go. But

neither Madison nor Jefferson ought to go alone. The three will give security. It will flatter the French pride. It will engage American confidence, and recommend the people to what shall be eventually necessary. The Commissioners should be instructed to explain, to ask a rescinding of the order under which we suffer and reparation for the past to remodify our treaties under proper guards. On the last idea I will trouble you hereafter.

"Fourth. The Congress should be urged to take defensive measures. Those to be: 1st. An embargo unless with convoy by special license. Additional revenue for additional expenses. 2d. The creation of a naval force-including the prompt purchase and equipment of sloops of war. This force to serve as convoys to our trade. 3d. Commissions to be granted to our merchant vessels authorizing them to arm to defend themselves, to capture when attacked, but not to cruise. The same instructions to our convoys. 4th. The organization of a provisional army of twenty-five thousand men, to be ready to serve if a war breaks out—in the mean time to receive certain compensations, but not full pay. The actual increase of our establishment

in artillery and cavalry.

"The following considerations appear to me weighty. The Empress of Russia is dead. Successors are too apt to contradict predecessors. The new Emperor may join Prussia. The Emperor of Germany, by this mean or by the fortune of war, may be compelled to make peace. England may be left alone. America may be a good outlet for troublesome armies which the government is at a loss to manage. The governing passion of the rulers of France has been revenge. Their interest is not to be calculated upon. To punish and humble us to force us into a greater dependence may be the plan of France. At any rate, we shall best guarantee ourselves against calamity by preparing for the worst. In this time of general convulsion, in a state of things which threatens all civilization, 'tis a great folly to wrap ourselves up in a cloak of security. The Executive, before Congress meet, ought to have a well-digested plan, and to co-operate in getting it adopted."

Colonel Pickering answered, that the calling of Congress had been determined on by the President, and "that some other of the measures suggested had been contemplated, and all would receive attention from himVOL. VII.-2

self and his colleagues." "The appointment of a commission," he said, "was more than doubted. It was precluded by the language of France, and was a measure which the enemies of the government wished, however circumstances may oppose it." *

Intent on the preservation of peace, Hamilton also, immediately after the installation of Adams, urged Tracy, then high in the confidence of the President, to propose to him a commission, of which Jefferson or Madison was to be one, and when "Commissioners were appointed," advised "that indemnification for spoliations, should not be a sine qua non of accommodation." †

The same measures were suggested to the Secretaries of War and of the Treasury, supported by similar reasoning. Hamilton wrote to McHenry from Albany:

"Do as much of all this as you can-make a last effort for peace, but be prepared for the worst. The Emperor Paul is at best equivocal-a successor is apt to differ from a predecessor. He seems to be a reformer too. Who can say into what scale his weight may finally be thrown? If things shall so turn that Austria is drawn to make peace and England left to contend alone, who can guarantee us that France may not sport in this country a proselyting army? Even to get rid of the troops, if it fails, may be no bad thing to the government of that country. There is a possible course of things which may subject us even to an INTERNAL INVASION by France. Our calculations, to be solid, should contemplate this poss bility.

"I know in your administration there is a doubt about a commission or envoy extraordinary. I am very sorry for it, because I am sure it is an expedient measure. But perhaps France has said she

* Ames observed-"Negotiations will be honorable, if we arm and prepare force and revenue; and useful, if the public is made to look to the issue as depending on the French."

Hamilton's Works, vii. 724.

Hamilton to Wolcott, March 30, 1797. Gibbs' Administration of Washington and Adams, i. 484.

will receive no minister till her grievances shall be redressed.

"Tis

hardly possible this can refer to any but a minister who is to reside. A special extraordinary mission cannot be intended to be excluded, because it is at least necessary to know what measure of redress will satisfy, if any is due. But grant she will refuse to hear-still the great advantage results of showing in the most glaring light to our people her unreasonableness, of disarming a party of the plea that all has not been done which might be done-of refuting completely the charge that the actual administration desires war with France. But the enemies of the government desire the measure. "Tis the strongest reason for adopting it. This will meet them on their own ground, and shut their mouths.

"But to answer the end, a man who will have their confidence must be sent Jefferson or Madison. To do this and to be safe, others must be united, say Pinckney and Cabot. Hence the idea of a Commission. I am really anxious that this should be your plan. Depend on it, it will unite the double advantage of silencing enemies, and satisfying friends."

He offered an additional reason to Pickering, observing

"If I were certain that they would not hear the commission, it would not prevent my having recourse to it. It would be my policy, if such a temper exists in them, to accumulate the proofs of it with a view to Union at home. This Union (I do not expect to proselyte all the leaders of faction) appears to me a predominant consideration, and with regard to France, more than ordinary pains are requisite to attain it. The estimation of the merit of all our past measures depends on the final preservation of peace. This, besides the interest of the country in peace, is a very powerful reason for attempting every thing. The best friends of the government will expect it, and if this expedient be not adopted, it seems to me, rupture will inevitably follow." "I cannot but add that I have not only a strong wish, but an extreme anxiety, that the measure in question may be adopted."

Colonel Pickering prepared a statement of the treatment of Pinckney with a view to publication. He hoped, that

"An exposure of the depredations and the indignities which had been suffered would remove from the people their ill-founded and illrequited attachment to France, and even excite such a spirit of just resentment and pride as would effectually control certain men who have seemed willing to chain us to that republic, and make us lick the feet of her violent and unprincipled rulers."

*

He consulted Hamilton as to the propriety of its being made public. His advice was, that it should be withheld, for the reasons

"That an opinion is industriously circulated that too much fuel has been added to the publications of the Government; that it is best to avoid inofficial publications of official matter; and that it might be useful to reserve the disclosure till the meeting of Congress, when the accumulation of insult may be the instrument of giving a stronger impulse. Such," he added, "is the infatuation of a great part of our community, that it will be policy in our government to do a great deal too much to make the idea palpable that rupture was inevitable."

The exertion of his influence was not confined to the Cabinet. He wrote to William Smith, recapitulating the reasons for a commission :

"The idea is a plausible one, that as we sent an envoy extraordinary to Britain, so ought we to send one to France. And plausible ideas are always enough for the multitude." "These and other reasons," he said, ("and principally to avoid rupture with a political monster, which seems destined soon to have no competitor but England,) make me even anxious for an extraordinary mission; and to produce the desired effect, it seems to me essential that it shall embrace a distinguished character, agreeable to France, and having the confidence of the adverse party. Hence I think of Madison, but I think of him only as one, because I would not trust him alone. I would unite with him Pinckney and some strong man from the North. Jay, Cabot, and two of the three should rule. We should then be safe. I need not tell you, that I am disposed to make no sacrifices to France. I had rather perish myself and family than see the country

* April 1, 1797.