CHAPTER CXLV.

WHILE this attempt of the President to violate the stipu lation under which Washington accepted the chief command alarmed the leading friends of the Administration, the public mind was kept in constant agitation by intelligence from abroad.

On the nineteenth of May, Bonaparte sailed from Toulon with a large fleet and a select army accompanied by his most confidential officers. Intense anxiety pervaded Europe as to the object of this expedition. The prevalent opinion was, that these troops were to be disembarked on the coast of Spain in the vicinity of Malaga; thence to cross to Portugal;-that the Peninsula would be subjugated; and reinforced by the fleets at Cadiz and in the Tagus; that Bonaparte would plant his standard in the Brazils, reduce South America under French domination, and, with her treasures at command, pursue ulterior designs against the United States. In England it was believed, that Ireland was his object, and that this circuitous route had been taken to escape the British navy. But the Insurrection there had been premature. Its chiefs were without talent or system, and England, roused to unanimity by the threat of invasion, confided in her ability to defend herself and to protect her sister kingdom. Conferences meanwhile were slowly progressing at Rastadt,

of which the sole object, on the part of the Directory, was procrastination. It was called the "Eternal Congress." Distrustful of the issue, Austria was increasing her armies, had gained Russia as an ally, and was holding Naples in check; anxiously awaiting the determination. of Prussia before she recommenced hostilities. Thus the state of Europe was wholly unsettled, nor was it possible, except from the wide propagation of French opinions, to divine what would be the issue. That France did not push her victories was to be ascribed to her embarrassed finances, exhausted by her long-continued exertions; and to the jealousy in the Directory of the fast approaching supremacy of the military power.

As to the United States no real change in her policy had taken place. Immediate hostilities were not contemplated. These were postponed in the hope that the Democratic party would gain the ascendency; and that thus all the advantages she desired would be attained. Uninformed of the recent act of Congress abolishing the consular convention, at the very moment Talleyrand was holding a delusive negotiation with Gerry, the appointment was announced of a Consul-General and of consuls and vice-consuls, to be stationed in the several ports of the United States. A corps of revolutionary missionaries -men, who had proved their skill as the fomentors of discord in other countries, were to be planted here, after the Directory had expelled, with grossest marks of contumely, the public envoys of the country. At the same time, Havre was added to the number of ports from which the American commerce was excluded.

Experiments had been in the mean time made upon Gerry. The attempts to inveigle him into a negotiation were at first private, and under an injunction of secrecy towards his colleagues. A new proposal was made to

him by Talleyrand to stipulate a loan now, to be paid after the war, in supplies of American produce for St. Domingo and the French Islands. Gerry favored this proposal. His colleagues rejected it. Gerry corrected the remonstrance of Marshall-but ultimately refused to sign it. It was evident, while the other envoys remained in Paris, Gerry would be controlled by them. Talleyrand then hoping they would retire, offered to treat with the "impartial" member of the Commission. Marshall informed him, that neither of them was authorized to negotiate singly, and that no two of them were disposed to withdraw. They would have withdrawn before, but for the apprehension that Gerry would remain, and thus promote the purposes of France, to continue her depredations-to appear to be willing to treat-and thus to avoid a final issue with this country. In Gerry were found dispositions which suited her. It was resolved to relieve him from the presence of his associates-Pinckney and Marshall were ordered to quit France-while Gerry, though he had assured* his colleagues that he would not remain-did so, without assigning to them his reasons. To induce him to continue, he was told by Talleyrand, that "his opinions, presumed to be more impartial, promised, in the course of the explanations, more of that reciprocal confidence which was indispensable."

Soon after the expulsion of his colleagues, conferences began. The course of these proved conclusively that the Directory "hoped by its seductive arts to prevail over his scruples, and gain his consent to terms, which, while they were present, would be rejected; or at all events to retain him, with the semblance of negotiating regularly or

"I never met with a man so destitute of candor, and full of deceit as Mr. Gerry."-C. C. Pinckney to T. Pinckney, April 4, 1798.

informally, and thus to keep the United States in the torpor of indecision, without preparation for offence or defence." The insult offered to Marshall, following the previous demands of tribute, ought to have decided Gerry to depart without delay. But a delusive hope, that he alone could accomplish what the joint mission had failed to do, prevailed. Each successive communication gave evidence of the duplicity of the Directory, yet they were received and replied to, until Gerry, deeply injured in public estimation, was reached by a peremptory order to return. Early in August he sailed from Havre.*

The energetic counsels of Hamilton had not only braced the American mind to the high duties of the great emergency, but their effect was now seen in the changed policy of France. Alarmed at the preparations for war, and determined, if possible, to quiet the indignation of the American people, the Directory at last receded from all their extravagant pretensions; declared that they did not wish to break the British treaty; and issued circulars prohibiting the further capture of American vessels; releasing the seamen; and revoking the embargo. But in the language of the revoking decree, they renewed their insults to the Government.

The American Ambassador at St. James wrote to Hamilton,† indicating the subtle policy of France, that, influenced by the union and energy of this nation, she had receded from her demands, and would enter into a liberal

"I wish," Washington wrote, "on many accounts, that General Pinckney was as safely landed in his own country as I hear Mr. Gerry is, after his terrible fright. I hope so soon as he is relieved from the panic with which he was struck, and which must have continued whilst he remained on the watery element, he will come forward in stronger language than his last letter to Mr. Talleyrand contains, and with such explanations as his own character requires, and his country has a right to demand."

September 17, 1798.

treaty to gain time, looking to the election of the next President.-Hamilton replied on the second of October:

"The public mind of this country continues to progress in the right direction. That must influence favorably the present Congress at the ensuing session. The next will be in all appearance intrinsically better.

"Of the Executive, I need say little; you know its excellent dispositions, its general character, and the composition of its parts. You know also how widely different the business of government is from the speculation of it, and the energy of the imagination dealing in general propositions from that of execution in detail. There are causes from which delay and feebleness are experienced. But this difficulty will be surmounted; and I anticipate with you, that this country will ere long assume an attitude correspondent with its great destinies-majestic, efficient, and operative of great things. A noble career lies before it."

"I am gratified," was the answer, "on receiving your opinion of the good condition of our public affairs, but I do not feel confident we are as safe as you appear to think we are. It is fraud, not force, that I fear."

The course of the extraordinary contest in Europe had shown that a principal cause of the disasters of the conquered nations, was, their confining themselves to a merely defensive system. The burthens of war were incurred without any of its advantages. No objects other than ultimate security were presented to the passions of the multitude, who usually require for the sacrifices they make, strong impulses and present benefits. Lassitude soon succeeded to the first stirrings of patriotism; and the want of administrative energy gave free scope to foreign and domestic intrigue.

This danger was obvious to Hamilton. He saw that a chief reliance of the Democratic party was upon the discontents to which the necessary measures of defence would give rise, (as Jefferson expressed it, with cold indifVOL. VII.-14