portant sense we have a government of men and we will have no government better than the men who administer it.

It is my good fortune to go from one part of the state to another as opportunity offers; to pass from a community which is centered in some particular interest around which revolves the public spirit and activity of that community to another community equally interested in another subject, and thus to get a conspectus of the great Empire State. I come from that view not disheartened but encouraged. I come with no feeling that there is a lack of interest on the part of our citizenship in public needs. I come with renewed courage because on every hand I see desire to promote the public welfare, desire to take honorable part in public service. No one can know what the State of New York is who does not visit the different communities and have a chance to become intimately acquainted with the people of the State of New York who are bearing in a very true sense the burdens of the State of New York. And, therefore, I have not altogether an optimistic feeling, for I am fully aware of what is to be accomplished and what as yet has been left undone; but there is every ground for encouragement and belief that each generation will see improvement and the attainment of a higher level.

We notice that fundamentally we need two things; first, the untrammeled expression of the people in the choice of their officers who administer and in the choice of their legislators who make their laws. We want no limit placed upon legitimate political activity. There is a vast amount of earnest political endeavor, of honest effort to achieve what is right in the world of politics. We want more and not less of it. But we want no perversion of our party or political machinery so as to set up obstacles in the way of that freedom of choice by which the people can get the men they want and the law's they want. And then the second thing is efficiency,-the highest degree of efficiency in the management of the business of the state. If you have those two things,-untrammeled expression of the popular will, through neces sary organization and political machinery, of course, but

created and active for the purpose of expressing and not preventing the expression of the popular will, and, on the other hand, efficiency according to approved standards, recognized in the world of business, in the management of public concerns,-then you have true democratic government.

Now, the object of civil service reform is not to provide theorists with a pet idea and an opportunity to maintain a propaganda of interest to a limited few. The object of the movement with which we are connected tonight in this public meeting is not to hamper or interfere with any legitimate political work. The object is not to protect a class of people who happen to be engaged in the state service and to give them privileges and immunities apart from what may be considered fair and necessary in order to promote the public welfare. The object is only one, and that is to have the business of the state conducted as well as it can be conducted. And so when any proposal is made in connection with this matter we ask not how does this square with what Mr. A. has said, or how does this comport with the theory advanced by Mr. B.; we ask not what effect it will have upon the fortune of this party in or out of power; we ask and should ask but one question:-What will be the effect of this in giving us better administration of government?

Now in the administration of government we want at least three things:-We want capacity, we must have disinterestedness and we must have accountability. How are we to get men of capacity? I doubt not that many an honest man, single-minded, taking an important position, with the burden-for it is a burden-of making appointments to subordinate offices, has often felt that he was restricted in doing what he desires to do and in giving the administration he wants to give because of the civil service law, and probably the intensity of his emotion will be in inverse ratio to the length of his experience in office. Here and there a man may feel that he knows just the man for a particular job. He wants him; he can't get him; he feels limited and restricted; he thinks the people will be the sufferers. But if the government is not

to be administered as a matter of individual caprice or according to the dictates of a particular officer's judgment, it must be administered in accordance with principles as embodied in a system which in the long run, and covering the multitude of cases which must be covered, gives us men of capacity. And no one has long, I believe, been honestly under the burden of office without being. grateful that some means has been afforded of testing capacity and of relieving the appointing power from the onslaughts of those who desire the appointment of dependents or favorites.

Despite the fact that I had something to do, in a very humble way, with civil service reform work and thought my position was entirely clear, I was surprised after taking office to find that there were men who thought they deserved appointments at once because they had known me when I was a baby or because they were intimate with those who were friendly, or because at one time or another chance had given the opportunity for a most agreeable acquaintance. While, of course, in my position I have very little to do with appointments in the classified list, I did have this much to do with them-to announce that I would not recommend to any one whom I appointed as the head of a department the appointment of any subordinate to office but would hold the head of the department accountable for his discharge of his duty.. The pressure of improper influence, the pressure upon a man's sense of good fellowship, the efforts to come close to a man on the side of ordinary human generosity, to appeal to him in the name, the sacred name of friendship, -these efforts are so various and multitudinous that we have long ago concluded, and it needs no debate,-that we must have the determination of capacity in appointment to subordinate positions by some other method than, the unrestrained will of the appointing officer.

Now, we have got it embodied in the Constitution of the state, we have it written by the people of the state, that appointments in the various civil divisions of the state shall be according to merit and fitness,-so far as practicable to be determined by examinations and those examinations, so far as practicable to be competitive. And

there is no clause in the Constitution since those great clauses embodying our fundamental rights were written which is of greater importance to the maintenance of high standards of administration than that clause, the full scope and meaning of which have not yet been fully determined by the courts but are destined to be in time. And so to-night it gives me particular pleasure to say that from the viewpoint of office we have nothing more important in relation to the administration of government than a system-the best that has yet been devised-of securing men of the needed capacity by competitive examinations wherever such examinations are practicable. I believe in that, I thoroughly endorse it, and I hope to see it extended throughout the states of the Union.

I have said that we have a great many who are eager to give their service to the public. That is true, and we can sift out of that large class the men who are worthy of that service only by a competitive test. Now, I do not attach undue importance to examination papers. I once was a teacher and I know well enough the qualifications which do not appear in answer to questions; but as compared with the system of making public office a partisan encampment by which the people at large can be charged by reserve forces in time of emergency, or the system by which those holding important office are distracted and worn down by the importunities of friends. and of those who believe themselves to hold them under some obligation, the system of competitive examination is so far in advance that there is no debate among reasonable men upon the question.

The activities of the state are constantly extending. The number of those who must be drafted into the service of the state is continually increasing. We may talk of our schemes of legislation for this or that supposed improvement in the law. One of the first things we need is to show the adequacy of our existing institutions, and the full scope and effect of our existing laws by having men administer them as they would administer a sacred trust in private life. We want in office, therefore, men who are not simply just over the line of availability, but the best men that can be obtained; sorted out by the best

means; held to the highest standards of efficiency; made to feel that it is the highest honor to serve the state; that it is just as sacredly a place of honorable obligation as to go to the front in defense of the country in time of war. Indeed, there may be a severer test of character in the room where, unobserved, a paid official of the government performs the work for which he gets his stipend, than in the rush, hurrah and enthusiasm of the charge upon the fields of battle.

I have said that we must not only have capacity and disinterestedness but we must have have accountability. Therefore, from such observation as I have been able to make, I have very little confidence in schemes which tend to restrict the responsibility of the officer who holds the power of appointment or removal. I would have him be compelled, wherever it is practicable, to choose disinterested men from those who according to the best tests have shown their capacity for the place. I would have those men held to disinterested service and inspired by the fidelity of their chief, and I would have that chief in a position to call every one to account and himself accountable for the efficiency of his department. I thank you.