or permitting the same to be drained by means of the demised colliery, and from permitting any water to flow" through the communication made" into the demised colliery," the effect intended being to compel the defendants to close the communi cation. Mexborough v. Bower, 7 Beav. 127. Mandatory, Effect of.-The form of a mandatory writ in respect to repairing canals used by a colliery avoided, but the effect obtained by the wording of the order. Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 193. Mandatory to Compel Removal of Débris.-If a party who has condemned land for private purposes, as a railroad from his mine, causes débris from his mine to be deposited on the land through which his right of way is exercised, he may be compelled to remove it. Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. St. 17. To Compel Defendant to Bulkhead Tunnel-Tapping Underground Current.-Where defendants, by means of a tunnel run into the mountain at a lower level than complainant's tunnel, wrongfully intercept water appropriated by complainant and flowing in its tunnel, a preliminary injunction will be granted, restraining the continuance of such diversion, even though an obedience to the injunction should render it necessary for defendants to build a bulkhead or dam across their own tunnel. Cole S. M. Co. v. Virginia W. Co., 1 Saw. 470, 686. Mandatory Writ to Compel Colliery to Stop up Openings.-The proprietors of a coal mine had so worked their mine by opening cuttings to draw off the water therein that they had caused the neighboring and adjoining mine of the plaintiffs to be flooded, and from such openings the defendants had also abstracted coal from their neighbor's mine, and sold the same for their own benefit. The bill therefore prayed that the defendants, their agents, etc., might be restrained from further digging any coals or carrying any workings into or under said lands. That they might also be restrained from making any cuts or openings or channels or pipes, or from doing any other acts to conduct water from any of the upper seams within their mines into the lower seams, so as to send such water through such lower seams into the plaintiff's mines; that defendants might also be ordered to stop up the openings and communications made by them from their mines into the plaintiff's mines, and to prevent by sure and sufficient barriers the water conducted by such cuts or openings or channels or pipes, into the lower seams from passing through such lower seams into plaintiff's mines. The bill also prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants from. getting more coal from said colliery, and for an account and compensation: held, that it was a clear case for an injunction, according to the prayer of the bill, and for an account, and also for the cost of "ascertaining the openings in the defendant's mine which had caused the injurious flow of water." (Per vice-chancellor.) Plant v. Stott, 21 L. T., N. S., 106. Mandatory Writ before Hearing-Diversion of Underground Stream.-Plaintiff in excavating a tunnel to its mining claim on the public lands of the United States, struck a subterranean flow of water, which it appropriated and enjoyed for several years. Defendants ran a tunnel from a distant point into the mountain to a point directly under and some thirty feet below the point where the plaintiff obtained said water, whereupon the water was diverted from plaintiff's tunnel into the tunnel of defendants, and by them appropriated to their own use: held, that. such diversion was wrongful, and that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. A preliminary and mandatory writ was granted. Cole M. Co. v. Virginia W. Co., 1 Saw. 470, 686. Irreparable Injury, how Stated.-The mere statement that injury is irreparable by reason of defendants taking ores, and the impossibility of ascertaining the amount and value thereof, is not a sufficient statement of irreparable injury. "The facts should be stated from which the court could learn that the taking and selling the ores would be such injury." Leitham v. Cussick, 1 Utah, 242. Pending Trial at Law.-Lord of the manor restrained from opening mine on copyhold lands pending trial of the question at law of his right so to do. Grey v. Northumberland, 13 Ves. 236; S. C., 17 Id. 281. § 705. When Should not Issue.-To entitle a party to injunctive relief the restraining of defendants in possession from operating a mining claim-the plaintiff's title must be shown to be clear and undisputed, or it must appear that steps have been taken to establish the title at law, or valid and satisfactory reasons be shown for not doing so. It would be gross injustice to allow a temporary injunction, when upon the face of the papers it appears that a perpetual injunction could never be granted. Old Telegraph M. Co. v. Centtral SmelingCo., 1 Utah, 331. As no perpetual injunction could be sustained on a bill to restrain the working of a mining claim without establishing the title at law, no temporary injunction should be allowed to restrain such working in the absence of any suit to try title, or of excuse for not bringing one. Old Telegraph M. Co. v. Central Smelting Co. 1 Utah, 331. Judicial Notice of Suits Affecting the Mine.-In applications for injunction a judge may take judicial notice of the files of his own court showing suits involving the legal title to the property. Lyon v. Woodman, 3 Leg. Gaz. 81. And the failure to diligently prosecute such suits is a ground for refusing an injunction. Lyon v. Woodman, 3 Leg. Gaz. 81. Before Title Established.—A court of equity will rarely restrain by injunction the working of mines until the title is established at law. N. J. Zinc Co. v. N. J. Franklinite Co., and Boston Franklinite Co. v. Suit at Law. Chancery has jurisdiction to preserve the subject-matter by injunction, pending proceedings to try the right thereto, and it is not indispensable that there should be a particular form of suit, or that it should be in a court of law, if the proper steps are being taken to decide title; e. g., by proceedings under a special act of congress. U. S. v. Parrott, 1 McAll. 271. Issues of Law.—A court of equity (upon bill to restrain working of a gold mine) will not try the legal rights of parties to real estate. Irwin v. Davidson, 3 Ired. Eq. 311. Tille in Dispute-Practice.-Courts of equity will not usually grant a perpetual injunction in case where the title to the premises is put in issue, and where, from the evidence, the title is in doubt; but will only grant a temporary injunction to restrain the parties until the title can be settled at law. But the chancellor may hear evidence on this point notwithstanding. Lockwood v. Lunsford, 56 Mo. 68. Title Disputed.-The rule that an injunction will not issue where the denial of title by the defendant is positive, is not inflexible. Merced M. Co. v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 317. The allegation in complainant's bill that defendants justify under an adverse claim to the mine will not in any sense prejudice the plaintiff's right to an injunction. Merced M. Co. v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 317. Title Admitted by Demurrer.-There is no occasion that the plaintiff should first establish his title at law before he can obtain the injunction, when the averment of his right in the complaint is admitted by demurrer. Tuolumne W. Co. v. Chapman, 8 Cal. 392. Injunction where Plaintiff Prevents Fair Trial-Whether after a verdict at law in an action of trespass the court will grant an injunction against future trespass in favor of parties who refused at the trial to produce documents necessary to a fair decision, quære. Field v. Beaumont, 1 Swans. 204. Injury to Workings Considered-Speedy Trial. The local means of working coal mines, the damages arising from delay in opening them, or the loss of the opportunity of working them in connection with contiguous mines, are to be considered upon the question of injunction. Grey v. Northumberland, 17 Ves. 281; S. C., 13 Id. 236. And an injunction upon these considerations ought not to be continued unless a speedy trial of the issue at law be insured. Grey v. Northumberland, 17 Ves. 281; S. C., 13 Id. 236. General Relief-Prayer.-General relief should not be granted on a bill praying only the issuance of an injunction. Boyle v. Laird, 2 Wis. 316. Prayer.-A decree of injunction can not be rightfully extended beyond the prayer of the bill. Leitham v. Cusick, 1 Utah, 243. § 706. Answer.--Where the answer to a bill for injunction (to restrain the working of a mine) fully and fairly denies both the title and possession of the complainant, no testimony being taken, and the case standing on the pleadings alone, the injunction should be dissolved until good reason appear for continuing it. "But no reason appears to make this an exceptive case" (it being an ordinary case of alleged taking of ore by mining out of a mine claimed in fee by complainant). Magnet M. Co. v. Page, 9 Nev. 348. There are exceptions to the rule that the court will not decree an injunction where the material averments of the bill are traversed by the answer, but no special reason for exception appears in this case (the case being to restrain waste by mining, but no particulars appearing in the report). Lady Bryan G. & S. M. Co. v. Lady Bryan M. Co., 4 Nev. 415. Practice-Answer.-Upon a hearing in case of waste upon bill and answer alone, the denial of the commission of waste made in the answer is to be taken as true. Reed v. Reed, 16 N. J. Eq. 248. Denial of Equities—Affidavits.—Where the answer to bill for injunction (to restrain mining upon a quartz ledge claimed by both parties) denies all the equities of the bill, and the bill is not supported by affidavits, the injunction must be dissolved. Real del Monte G. & S. M. Co. v. Pond G. & S. M. Co., 23 Cal. 82. Equities Denied Answer Unsupported.-Upon bill for injunction to restrain the working of a ledge of silver ore, where the answer denied all the material averments of the bill, and the bill wholly unsupported by affidavits or other evidence, and the case submitted for hearing on the pleadings: held, that the refusal to dissolve the injunction was error. Johnson v. Wide West M. Co., 22 Cal. 479. The entire equity of the bill in such a case being denied by the answer, and there being no support to the bill, the injunction should be dissolved. Johnson v. Wide West M. Co., 22 Cal. 479; Burnett v. Whitesides, 13 Denial of Equities.-Where the answer denies directly and positively, upon personal knowledge, the allegations of the bill, it" denies the equity of the bill," and acting upon it as evidence, the injunction will be dissolved by the court in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Parrott, 1 McAll. 271. Denial of Fraud.-Where fraud, forgery, and antedating are distinctly alleged in the bill, and the only denial of them is on "information and belief," it is not a denial of the equity of |