280. Out of all this murkiness towers one bright and glorious figure. Pleading with Congress for justice to his soldiers, shaming or sternly compelling those justly dissatisfied soldiers to their duty, quietly ignoring repeated slights of Congress to himself, facing outnumbering forces of perfectly equipped veterans when his own army was a mere shell, Washington, holding well in hand that fiery temper which still, on occasion, could make him swear "like an angel from heaven," was always great-minded, dignified, indefatigable, steadfastly indomitable; a devoted patriot; a sagacious statesman; a consummate soldier, patient to wait his chance and daring to seize it: the one indispensable man of the Revolution.

281. The best excuse for the misrule of Congress was its real weakness and its consequent feeling of irresponsibility. In all internal matters, it was limited to recommendations; and the States grew to regard its requests more and more lightly. It asked men to enlist, offering bounties to those who did so; but often it found its offers outbid by the State governments to increase their own troops. It had no power to draft men into the ranks only the State governments could do that. So, too, in the matter of finances. Congress could not tax: it only called on the States for contributions, in a ratio agreed upon. Such contributions, even when reinforced by the loans from France, were not more than half of the amount necessary to carry on the war. 282. At the very beginning, Congress was forced to issue paper money. Each scrap of such money was merely an indefinite promissory note from Congress to "bearer." In five years, printing presses supplied Congress with $241,000,000 of such "continental currency"1; and, with this, perhaps $50,000,000 worth of services and supplies were bought. Congress itself

...

body from the citizens It is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of war, though they are citizens."

1 So called to distinguish this currency put forth by the central government from similar issues by the States. The State currency amounted to $200,000,000 more; but most of it had more value than the continental paper.

2 After depreciation began, even with a new issue Congress could not get nearly a dollar's worth of supplies for a paper dollar.

$ 282]

GEORGE WASHINGTON

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had no power to compel people to take this currency; but, at the request of Congress, the States made it "legal tender." The people, however, had little confidence in the promise to repay. In 1776 (when only twenty millions had been issued), depreciation set in. In 1778, a dollar would buy only twelve cents' worth of goods. In 1781, Thomas Paine paid $300 for a pair of woolen stockings, and Jefferson records a fee of $3000 to a physician for two visits. "Not worth a continental" became a byword. Before the close of 1781, this currency ceased to circulate except as speculators bought it up, at perhaps a thousand dollars for

one in coin. A mob used it to "tar and feather" a dog; and McLaughlin tells of an enterprising barber who papered his shop with continental notes.

All this meant a reign of terror in business. Men who, in 1775, had loaned a neighbor $1000 in good money compelled, three or four years later, to

were

A CONTINENTAL BILL printed by Hall and Sellars, Philadelphia, in 1776. The original is in the Massachusetts Historical Society collection.

take in payment a pile of paper almost without value, but named $1000. Prices varied fantastically from one day to another, and in neighboring localities on the same day. Wages and salaries rose more slowly than prices (as is always the case), and large classes of the people suffered exceedingly in consequence.

But it must be remembered that this "cheap money" was the only money Congress could get. If a "note" had ever been repaid, it would have been in reality a "forced loan."

Since it never was repaid, it amounted to a tax, or a confiscation of private property for public uses, the tax being paid, not by one man, but by all the people through whose hands it passed.1 Such taxation was horribly wasteful and demoralizing; but it was the only kind of tax to which the people would have submitted in the amount required. Without the paper money, the Revolution could not have been won.

a hospital. Built in 1705 by Letitia Aubrey, second daughter of William Penn. 283. The critical years of the war were '77 and '78. In 1777, Howe invaded Pennsylvania. Washington maneuvered his inferior forces admirably. He retreated when he had to; was robbed of a splendidly deserved, decisive victory at German

1 A sold a horse to the government for one hundred dollars in paper currency; when he passed the paper on to B, he received perhaps only ninety dollars in value for it. Ten dollars had been taken from him by tax, or confiscation. B perhaps got only seventy dollars' worth for the money; so he had been "taxed" twenty dollars. The government had secured the horse for a piece of paper, and eventually the horse was paid for by the various people in whose hands the paper depreciated.

§ 283]

ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE

235

town only by a mixture of chance and a lack of veteran discipline in his soldiers; and, after spinning out the campaign for months, went into winter quarters at Valley Forge- then to grow famous for heroic suffering. Howe had won the empty glory of capturing "the Rebel Capital," where he now settled down to a winter of feasting and dancing; but Washington had decoyed him from his chance to make safe Burgoyne's invasion from Canada, and so crush the American cause. Lacking the expected coöperation from the south, Burgoyne proved unable to secure the line of the Hudson, and was forced to surrender to the incompetent Gates.

This capture of an entire English army turned the wavering policy of France into firm alliance with America against her ancient rival. From the first, the French government had furnished the Americans with money and supplies, secretly and indirectly; and many adventurous young noblemen like Lafayette, imbued with the new liberal philosophy of Rousseau, had volunteered for service under Washington. Franklin had been acting as the American agent in Paris for some months without formal recognition. Now he quickly secured a treaty of alliance that recognized the independence of the United States. The possessions of the two allies in America were mutually guaranteed; and it was agreed that peace with England should be made only after consultation and approval by both allies.1

France drew Spain in her train; and, soon after, England quarreled with Holland. Without an ally, England found herself facing not merely her own colonies, but the three greatest naval powers of the world (next to herself), while most of the rest of Europe, under the lead of Russia, held

1 Large sections of the French people felt a genuine enthusiasm for America, but to the despotic French government the alliance was purely a "League of Hatred." Especially did the French government fear that if England and her colonies again united, they would do away with all occasion for the troublesome Sugar Act" by seizing the French West Indies. Spain and Holland were never our allies: they were the allies of France. The treaty with France is the only alliance America has ever formed.

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toward her an attitude of "armed neutrality"—which meant instant readiness for hostility at the slightest opening.

In America, however, the darkest months of the war were those between the victory over Burgoyne and the news of the French alliance. The first flush of enthusiasm was spent. The infamous Conway Cabal (among officers and Congressmen) threatened to deprive the country of Washington's services. Nearly a fifth of the starving army deserted to the well-fed enemy in Philadelphia, and another fifth could not leave their winter huts for want of clothing. Washington himself, as his private letters show, was so depressed by "the spirit of disaffection" in the country that he felt "the game is pretty near up." The paper money, issued by Congress in constantly increasing volume the chief means of paying the soldiers and securing supplies was nearly valueless. Foreign trade was impossible because England commanded the sea; and domestic industry of all sorts was at a standstill because of the demoralization of the currency. To large numbers of patriots, even the news of the new ally was of doubtful cheer. Many began to fear that they had only exchanged the petty annoyances of English rule for the slavery of French despotism and of the Spanish Inquisition (Source Book, No. 144).

Two results of the French treaty followed close upon its announcement. (1) The English general was ordered to evacuate Philadelphia and concentrate forces at New York. The watchful Washington was close upon the rear of the retreating army, but at Monmouth his strategy and dash were again robbed of the fruit of victory, this time by the misconduct or treason of General Charles Lee. (2) Lord North sent commissioners to America with an "olive branch" proposition: all the contentions of the Americans, previous to July 4, 1776, would be granted, together with a universal amnesty, if they would return to their allegiance. By a unanimous vote, Congress refused to consider propositions "so derogatory to the honor of an independent nation."

284. In the northern States no British army of consequence