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279 powerful Bay State was another matter. It seemed to prophesy the dissolution of society, unless there could be formed at once a central government strong enough "to ensure domestic tranquillity." When Henry Lee in Congress spoke of using influence to abate the Rebellion, Washington wrote him in sharp rebuke: “You talk, my good Sir, of using influence.... Influence is no government. Let us have one [a government] by which our lives, liberties, and properties may be secured, or let us know the worst."

330. All these evils of the Critical Period had their roots in the Articles of Confederation. The Confederation called itself a "firm league of friendship." Avowedly it fell far short of a national union. The central authority was vested in a Congress of delegates. These delegates were appointed annually by the State legislatures, and were paid by them. Each State had one vote in Congress,1 and nine States had to agree for important measures. Each State promised to the citizens of the other States all the privileges enjoyed by its own citizens (the greatest step toward real unity in the Articles); and the States were forbidden to enter into any treaty with foreign powers or with each other, or to make laws or impose tariffs that should conflict with any treaty made by Congress. Congress was to have sole control over all foreign relations; and, for internal matters, it was to manage the postal service and regulate weights and measures and the coinage.

The final article read: "Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual. But a previous article provided, "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled."

331. The" Articles of Confederation" was not a crude or clumsy document of its kind. Probably it was the best constitution for a

1 For this rule in 1774, cf. Source Book, No. 130, a. For the contest over the matter in forming the Articles of Confederation, cf. ib., No. 146.

confederacy of states that the world had ever seen. Certainly it had marry improvements over the ancient Greek confederations and over the Swiss and Dutch unions. The real trouble was, no mere confederacy could answer the needs of the new American people. That people needed a national government.

The inadequacies of the Articles may be treated conveniently under four heads: (1) poor machinery of government; (2) insufficient enumeration of powers; (3) impossibility of amendment; and (4) the fact that the government could not act upón individual citizens, but only upon States.

a. The requirement that nine States in Congress must agree for important business hindered action unduly, — especially when for long periods not more than nine or ten States were represented. Moreover, the union had no executive and only a feeble germ of a judiciary.

b. No federal government had ever had a longer list of important matters committed to its control, but the list should have contained at least two more powers: power to regulate interstate commerce would have prevented much civil strife; and authority to levy a low tariff for revenue would have done away with the chief financial difficulties.

c. After all, the defects discussed in a and b were matters of detail. They might have been remedied without giving up the fundamental principle of the union as a league of sovereign States. And the States would have corrected them, in part at least, had it not been for the third evil. The amending clause (in the Thirteenth Article) demanded the unanimous consent of the thirteen State legislatures for any change in the Articles. In practice, this prevented any amendment.

In February, 1781, Congress submitted to the States an amendment which would have added to its powers the authority to put a five per cent tariff on imports, -the proceeds to be used in paying the national debt and the interest upon it. This modest request for an absolutely indispensable power roused intense opposition. "If taxes can thus be levied by any power outside the States," cried misguided patriots, "why did we oppose the tea duties ?" After a year's discussion, twelve States con

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281 sented; but Rhode Island voted that such authority in Congress would "endanger the liberties of the States," and the amendment failed.

Another attempt was made at once (1783), similar to the former except that now the authority was to be granted Congress for only twentyfive years. Four States voted No.1 Congress made them a solemn appeal not to ruin the only means of redeeming the sacred faith of the Union. Three of them yielded, but New York (jealous now of her rapidly growing commerce) maintained her refusal; and the amendment again failed (1786), after three years of negotiation. Farseeing men then gave up hope of efficient amendment by constitutional means. Revolution (peaceable or violent) or anarchy, these were the alternatives.

d. The fourth evil (the failure to act upon individuals) was fundamental. It could not be corrected except by changing the confederation of sovereign States into some kind of national union. For three millions of weak subjects Congress might have passed laws. On thirteen powerful subjects it could merely make requisitions. John Smith or Henry Jones would hardly think of refusing obedience to a command from a Central government; but New York or Virginia felt as strong as Congress itself, and would do as they pleased. A confederation of states is necessarily a "government by supplication."

332. In the final outcome it was fortunate that constitutional amendment was impossible. Otherwise, reasonable amendment might have patched up the Articles and kept the defective union alive. But no ordinary amendment could have cured the fundamental evil. The Constitutional Convention of 1787, when it came, perceived the need clearly and met it courageously. For several years, from 1781 to 1787, thinkers had been groping towards the idea that we must have a new kind of federation, such that the central government could act directly upon individual citizens; and in that final year Hamilton wrote:

"The evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure, which cannot be

1 Virginia was one of the four States that at first refused. "This State," said Arthur Lee, "is resolved not to suffer the exercise of any foreign power or influence within it." And Richard Henry Lee affirmed that if such an amendment prevailed, Liberty would "become an empty name."

amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric. The great radical vice of the existing confederacy is the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES in their corporate or collective capacity, as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they con、 sist."- Federalist, XI. (The variety of type was used by Hamilton.)

In

333. This fundamental defect of the Confederation had been found in every federal union in earlier history. All had been confederations of states. The American Constitution of 1787 was to give to the world a new type of government, a federal state. the old type the states remained sovereign states confederated. In the new type they are fused, for certain purposes, into one sovereign unit.

This new kind of federal government was "a great discovery in political science." It was adopted by Switzerland in 1848, by the Dominion of Canada in 1867, by the German Empire in 1871, by Australia in 1900, and by South Africa in 1909.

1 Tocqueville, a shrewd and friendly French observer. His Democracy in America (1835) was the first careful and sympathetic study of our institutions For sixty years it remained the best textbook on our government, until superseded, in a measure, by the work of an English statesman (Bryce's American Commonwealth). Both works may be used to advantage by high school students.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

334. WHEN the second revenue amendment failed, in 1786 (§ 331), a Continental convention had already been called to consider more radical changes.

Suggestions for a convention to form a stronger government had been made from time to time by individuals for several years. As early as 1776 Thomas Paine had urged: :

"Nothing but a continental form of government can keep the peace of the continent. Let a continental conference be held to frame a con

tinental charter. Our strength and happiness are continental, not provincial. We have every opportunity and every encouragement to form the noblest and purest constitution on the face of the earth."

Twice Hamilton had secured from the New York legislature a resolution favoring such a convention. No concrete result followed, however, until these proposals became connected with a commercial undertaking.

1

Washington had long been interested in Western lands, and at the close of the Revolution he owned some thirty thousand acres in the Virginia Military Reserve (§ 311). A visit to the West impressed him powerfully with the need of better communication with that region, both for business prosperity and for continued political union; and he urged Virginia to build roads to her Western possessions. In pursuance of this idea he became president of a company to improve the navigation of the Potomac. This matter required assent from both Virginia and Maryland. These States were also in dispute over the tariffs at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay. At Washington's

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1 Referring to the danger that the Westerners might join Spain (§ 304), he wrote: They stand, as it were, upon a pivot. The touch of a feather would turn them either way."