But even this statement is not complete. The nominal balance of $1,792,109.52 is subject to certain debits and credits, among them a "trust fund" of $90,533.11, of which $80,900.14 was postal money order funds, and none of which is properly to be included in a statement of available assets. There is also a debit item in the form of current liabilities, outstanding on May 20, which, so far as I have been able to learn from authoritative sources, has never been made up.

From all that I have been able to learn, I am disposed to

accept the figures of $57,197,140.80 as a correct statement of total receipts. For a statement of the exact amount left to the Cuban Government as an unencumbered cash balance on the day when it began business on its own account, there should be added to the $55,405,031.28 an unknown sum which may be small or which may be considerable. It would have been better had the account been brought to a state which would have warranted a probate court in discharging an administrator from the duties and responsibilities devolving upon him. As trustees of the Island of Cuba, pending a pledged transfer to a Cuban Government, we handled more than $57,000,000. We should have rendered an account of our stewardship to the last cent.

CHAPTER XXI

CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE

THIS experiment of the United States in colonial government was far from a failure, and perhaps equally far from an unqualified success. Much was accomplished which will be of lasting benefit to the Island of Cuba. The mistakes that were made were, in the main, individual. A fundamental error undoubtedly lay in the manner in which state-building was entrusted to hands untrained in the work and imperfectly qualified for it. Yet, in spite of all that lies open to criticism or to condemnation, it is entirely beyond question that, when it withdrew on May 20, 1902, the United States left in Cuba an immeasurably better and surer foundation for a Cuban Republic than any upon which the Cubans could have built had they succeeded, without American aid, in expelling the Government of Spain.

This book would be incomplete without a brief comment on the structure which the Cubans have erected on the foundation thus laid. At the time of the withdrawal, there were many predictions of Cuban disaster and an early return of American authority, to assume a permanent control over a people incapable of proper conduct of their own affairs. There were even predictions of anarchy to come before the topmasts of the homeward-bound American transports had sunk below the horizon line.

Of Cuba's experience during the elapsed period, now somewhat more than two years, it may be said that it has,

in its success, surpassed the expectations of her most ardent friends, and that it has completely refuted the arguments of critics and doubters. The Cuban Government has not been ideal, and there has been much in its processes which is open to criticism and even to censure. But precisely the same is to be said of any and all governments, past or present. The histories of Rome, France, England, or the United States are by no means so clean that they are unassailable. Cuba has done well, wonderfully well, and her officials and her people are alike deserving of high commendation.

Peace and order have prevailed in the Island with perhaps even less of interruption than during the Intervention. This is due in part to the fact that the Cubans are a peace-loving and orderly people, indisposed to turbulence, and in part to their attention to that police protection which is a necessary institution in all communities. (The sanitary work established during the Intervention has been so continued and maintained that the mortality list rivals in its low percentage the records of the most healthful lands.) The school system, although a heavy financial burden, has shown no decadence.

In the Department of Public Works, even American energy has been outstripped. The report of the secretary of that department, for Cuba's first full fiscal year, shows that the American authorities, during the entire term of the Intervention, constructed sixty miles of new country roads. During their first year, the Cubans built forty-nine miles, with forty miles more in process of construction. The Americans built thirty-nine bridges of all classes during their occupation. During her first year, Cuba built twenty bridges, and prepared plans for twenty-five more. The records of the Island show that the work done has been done more economically than similar work was done under Ameri

can direction, and that it has been done quite as effectively. Two factors have prevented an even wider achievement. These are lack of money, and shortage in the labor supply.

A consideration of Cuba's financial situation and policies presents many difficulties because of seeming incongruities. I refer above to a lack of money. Yet out of a total revenue only a little exceeding $35,000,000, for two years, Cuba stored up in her national cash box several millions of dollars. Her Congress has manifested no disposition to plunge into extravagant expenditure, and no effort has been made to raid the Treasury. The general economy of administration, and the treasury accumulation, are attributable in large measure to the personal ideas and the personal opinions of President Palma. It was his belief that Cuba's general credit would be strengthened by a surplus on hand. He believed also in the wisdom of a comfortable balance for use in case of an emergency.

A con

The national credit was a matter of moment. siderable sum was wanted for the discharge of certain special obligations. These were in the form of bonds issued by the revolutionary government, and an agreement made by that government to pay the soldiers of the revolution for their time and services. These bonds, known as the '96 bonds, with accrued interest, represented an obligation of about $3,000,000. The obligation to her soldiery has not yet reached a full determination.

When General Gomez decreed the industrial paralysis of the Island, thousands of laborers were deprived of all means of livelihood. It was then proposed and agreed that all who joined the insurgent ranks should receive payment for their services at a rate corresponding to the daily wage rate for labor on the plantations. This was set at one dollar per day. Our own experience in the various wars in which we