President, in his discretion, to intervene for the termination of hostilities and the establishment of Cuban independence. Joint Resolution No. 142, for the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Cuba.

Joint Resolution No. 145, authorizing the President to take such steps as are necessary to put an end to hostilities in Cuba and to establish a republican form of government.

These formed the subject of frequent and prolonged debate, but no definite action was taken upon any of them. In his message of December, 1897, President McKinley

said:

"Of the untried measures (regarding Cuba) there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.")

These extracts form only a small fraction of the mass of correspondence, reports, and other utterances dealing with the subject of Cuba during the past century. The diplomatic negotiations at different times within that period, called out by special incidents, form volumes in themselves. The trend of all our relations with Spain for a hundred years, notwithstanding frequent provocation and proposal to act otherwise, was toward non-interference with her affairs in Cuba except in the case of some dire emergency. The beginning of 1898 showed that unless a change came speedily, American intervention would become little short of imperative.

Recognition of the Cubans as belligerents, by the United States, would have effected a radical change in the whole

situation. It would have given the Cubans equal rights and privileges in the American market for arms and supplies, and the same privileges in American ports and upon the high seas, as those possessed by Spain. Naturally, it would have strengthened greatly the position of the insurgents, and that in itself would, in all probability, have been regarded by the Spanish Government as an unfriendly act. Yet, under all established laws and precedents, the claim to belligerency and the recognition of belligerent rights rest upon the establishment of certain facts. Granting the existence of certain definite conditions, the claim is warranted and the recognition justified if not actually demanded. Those conditions did exist in Cuba at this time. The American refusal to recognize those conditions and to act in accordance with the facts, turned not upon the recognized law governing such cases, but upon a question of domestic politics and expediency. The arguments advanced by the American authorities in support of their position were answered and refuted, categorically, in an able reply submitted by Horatio S. Rubens, Esq., the counsel of the Cuban Junta in New York. This reply has received legal recognition, and is to be found as a document of reference in law libraries, including that of the Bar Association of New York. A review of the proceedings of the period clearly indicates that, had it suited the purposes of the United States, very much the same arguments would have been used to support a recognition of Cuban belligerent rights as those which were used to support denial of those rights.

CHAPTER V

THE YEAR OF THE WAR

I Do not deem it important to this work to review the story of the ill-fated Maine, or to analyze the influence of that disaster upon the events which followed. All is still fresh in the public mind, and full details, too long for inclusion here, are readily obtainable through other channels. The sympathies of the American people had long been extended to the people of Cuba. Some feeling of animosity toward Spain, who was regarded as the oppressor of our Island neighbor, was inevitable. This was only accentuated by the disaster to an American ship of war, whose destruction was generally charged to Spaniards if not to Spain. The wrecked vessel still lies (1904) in the mud and slime of the harbor of Havana, and the years have revealed no new facts regarding the cause of her destruction.

Although a goodly number of the American people have withheld their judgment upon so important a question until some more conclusive proof of Spanish action in the matter might be made available, there is no doubt that popular sentiment was expressed in that report of the Committee on Foreign Relations which concludes with the terms of the Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898. That report says:

"The event in itself, though in a certain sense a distinct occurrence, was linked with a series of precedent transactions which

cannot in reason be disconnected from it. It was the catastrophe of a unity of events extending over more than three years of momentous history. . . . Considered, as it must be, with the events with which reason and common sense must connect it, and with animus by Spain so plainly apparent that no one can even plausibly deny its existence, it is merely one reason for the conclusion to which the investigating mind must come in considering the entire subject of the relations of the United States with that government. . . . It is the opinion of your committee, having considered the testimony submitted to the board of inquiry, in connection with further testimony taken by the committee and with the relevant and established facts presented by the events of the last three years, that the destruction of the Maine was compassed either by the official acts of the Spanish authorities, or was made possible by a negligence on their part so willing and gross as to be equivalent in culpability to positive criminal action.”

Be the facts what they may, this was unquestionably the attitude and the sentiment of a great mass of the American people during the weeks which succeeded the explosion in the harbor of Havana. A sensational press, and equally sensational members of Congress, clamored for immediate war. This sentiment was resisted by President McKinley with all the force of his high position. Washington and Madrid were engaged in an active diplomatic correspondence, and there is now no doubt that Spain was disposed to yield the ground upon which she had stood for so long a time. President McKinley sought to secure an armistice during which terms of honorable peace might be effected.

A conference at the White House resulted in the submission, on March 27, of the following demand upon Spain:

(a) An armistice until October 1, during which negotiations looking toward a permanent peace should be undertaken.

(b) The immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration, and relief measures for those in the camps.

(c) If possible, if terms of peace not satisfactorily settled by October 1, the President of the United States to be the final arbiter between Spain and the insurgents.

These terms were cabled to Hon. Stewart L. Woodford, then American Minister to Spain, for submission to the Spanish authorities. It is of interest and importance to note that this communication contained no reference to Cuban independence. Nor does it appear that at any time during the negotiations of that period, the United States officially demanded from Spain the independence of Cuba. The statement of the Joint Resolution, that "Cuba is and of right ought to be free and independent" is the assertion of a fact, and not an official demand that Spain establish the fact.

To the American proposition of March 27, Spain submitted a counter-proposition, as follows, on March 31:

(a) Arbitration concerning the Maine.

(b) Revocation of the order of reconcentration, and permission to the United States to relieve the needs of the sufferers.

(c) Preparation for honorable and stable peace through the insular parliament, "it being understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the central government are not lessened and diminished."

(d) No truce until after the meeting of the Cuban Chambers on May 4.

These proposals were unacceptable to the authorities in Washington. On April 9, General Woodford cabled to Mr. Day, Secretary of State, that at the request of the Pope and six of the leading nations of Europe, an armistice had been proclaimed in Cuba. On the tenth, the administra