matter of no moment in the present question; as God's servants, as it respects our relation to him, and our zeal equally lax, indifferent, and for in either case there is some

for his cause, we are audacious in either case, thing which we think of before his will. Merely to carry God's will into effect, because it happens to consist with that rule of conduct which we had before marked out for ourselves, is no more to serve him than to run counter to his will, because it happened to disagree with this predetermined rule of conduct, would be to serve him. We no more make his will our rule and guide in one case, than in the other. In both cases we set it out of the account as to any influence which it has on us; it is a dead letter, and might as well never have been thought of at all. We cannot serve two masters, for either we shall hate the one, and love the other," or else, we shall hold to one, and despise the other." We cannot make God's will and the supposed good of our fellow creatures, both first motives. To say in so many words, that they set God's will at nought, though it would be an honest speech in the mouths of such men as I have been describing, is yet, I believe, a height of audacity which they will not venture upon. And yet to profess a general intention of serving God in our moral conduct, whilst we confess that no particular part of that conduct has resulted from the desire of serving God alone, this, I say, is truly to affirm that we set his will at nought. It is, moreover, to be guilty of an absurdity, for it is to assert that a thing may exist in its whole, which exists in none of its parts.

Lastly, to profess that we do in some instances, make God's will the rule of our moral conduct, whilst in others we do not, is surely a confession that we should be ashamed to make even in our service of an earthly master. I appeal to every honest man, whether, having entered into the service of an earthly prince, he would not, in all things lawful, make that prince's will and interest his first consideration, so far I mean as relates to

than of his master's interest; or that he did indeed, in some things consider his master's wishes first, but in others not; or that whilst he had a general intention to serve that master, he yet must acknowledge himself unable to point out any one particular act in the conduct of his master's affairs, in which such intention had been his paramount motive.

Yet thus absurdly, thus insultingly towards his Maker does he talk, who confesses that, in the conduct of his moral life, there is, either sometimes or always, something which he thinks of before his Creator's will, and which, therefore, he sets up as his first motive; that what he regards as the good of his fellow creatures, and not what he supposes to be the will of his Maker. forms the motive by which he regulates any or every part of his moral conduct.

Has he not

Are we not all the servants of God? placed us where we are? Are we not responsible to him for our conduct? Do we not receive from him the wages of life, and health, and ease, and so forth? And shall we dare to offer him in return, a sort of service that we' should be ashamed to offer to an earthly master? We cannot well think of any thing less flattering to such an one, than to make his will, as it relates to the administration of his own affairs, a secondary consideration; how, so to slight our heavenly Master's will, should recommend us to him, is a mystery which I confess myself perfectly unable to comprehend. Yet that it shall do so. is his assumption, who denies the necessity of a religious motive. Where it is possible to perform the same action from two motives, it is the part of wisdom to choose the best, and that is the best which shall most recommend us to him whe will judge the act. My friends, by whom shall our final portion be awarded, and how shall we best propitiate our

judge? If we are to be judged by men, let us consider them first in all that we do; we obviously can no otherwise recommend ourselves to them so well. But if it be God who shall judge us, and if we think that to give any being the first place in our thoughts, is to honour him more than we could do by assigning that place to some other being or beings, let us, as we would retain the title of rational creatures, make God's will our first consideration in all that we do.

Let us consider the matter humbly, and ingenuously. That impotent, ignorant, dependant as we are, we should really, in the strict sense of the word, do God service, is out of all supposition. We can add nothing either to his greatness, goodness, power, or happiness; and if we make not his known or supposed will the rule and measure of our lives, we are without even the simple merit (sole merit man can have) of good intention. We are without that part of obedience which must precede every other part, the wish to serve. A benevolent ruler, seeing our weakness, asks but this from us, and this we deny him.

CHAP. IV.

On the Nature of Divine Mercy, as deducible by the inferences of Reason, from the necessary character of an all perfect governor of free and intelligent beings.

GOD has created, throughout the universe, innumerable

orders of intelligent beings. To suppose that man is the sole order of intelligent beings, is to suppose, either that the Almighty has not peopled the immensity of space with animated natures, or else, that he has peopled it with liv ing beings, lower than poor, feeble, insignificant man.

preciating their obligation to him for the gift of existence, and of offering to him some sort of service. To avoid an absurdity then, we must believe, that there exist, besides man, very many orders of intelligent beings, orders infinite in number, as the space they inhabit is infinite in extent. And to suppose none of these beings more excellent in nature, more perfect in wisdom, and virtue, than man, is to suppose that creative power has made, as its highest work, a creature but a few steps higher," half reasoning elephant than thee."

Preposterous thought, that there should be a sudden jump in intellectual life from such a being to his Maker! Absurd supposition, that omnipotence, which had made an universe, should have.deformed its face with beings so weak, so helpless as man, when he might have ornamented it with creatures full of honour, and glory, and power! And it is as necessary to suppose all orders of intelligent beings free agents, as to suppose their existence; for to have made creatures unable to act but in a certain inevitable mode, no more capable of rendering God acceptable homage, than a clock is capable of rendering such homage to its maker; this, I say, would surely be an employment of supreme power, too ridiculous to be tolerated for a moment.

God has created then, to people infinite space,endless orders of free and intelligent beings, and (for he is a God of perfect justice, and impartiality) has placed them all originally on the same terms. I do not mean to say that he has endowed all with equal wisdom, power, majesty, and so on, in a long series of orders, some must evidently be higher,and some subordinate) but merely that he has made to all, the fulfilling of his will, one and the same service; that to all he has made obedience equally possible, and equally profitable; disobedience equally ruinous :

he did something less perfectly than he might

done it.

God must have made all his intelligent crea originally pure; he could not make them otherwise could not impart to them what he did not himself sess; he could not transfer to them what formed no of his own nature; if sin exist in the universe, it have been introduced there by some other being God. If we are other than pure, we have made ours so; and if we have made ourselves impure, we must the consequences; amongst which, one must be e alienation from God; an infinite separation from Maker. Unexpiated sin and perfect purity must be from each other, as the north is from the south, equally unable to approach, or assimilate, for by: approach, or assimilation, each would lose its pro character; two things more distinct than" nature's r fixed antipathics" must be blended together. If we willing to suspect that there are other of God's intelli creatures, who, as being more pure than ourselves, called to an easier service than ours, let us blame, that power who exacts the service, but that wilful gradation of ourselves, which has made difficult w must once have been easy. Let us not say that to pur us implies want of mercy in God, but that punishm is the fit consequence of our misconduct; of that conduct which, as free agents, we might have avoid Let us not say that God is a hard task-master, but t we are sinful fools. Free agents, forewarned of the c sequence of any act, can never justly complain of t consequence if it arrive, for they were both forewar of, and might have avoided it. If then man be f nished by the light of nature, with intimations of fut