trial, and the justice after the filing of the affidavit can act, not judicially, but ministerially, merely in transmitting the papers. It is made his imperative duty to do so; he can do nothing else. It seems that in the state of Missouri the courts had to deal with a similar question, and it was there held under the old statute that if the justice refused to make the order for a change of place of trial, his error in so refusing was unavailing, except by a direct attack upon the judgment, for the reason that he had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and his acts were erroneous merely. To remedy this matter the legislature of that state adopted an amendment, which provided "that when such affidavit for a change of venue shall be filed, the justice shall have no further jurisdiction in the case, except to grant such change of venue." In passing upon this language, in the case of O'Reilly v. Henson, 97 Mo. App. 493, 71 S. W. 109, the court said: "It is plain that the mere application, in due form, ousts the justice of jurisdiction of the case." In that case, however, it was claimed that the justice had retained jurisdiction because the defendant, after filing his affidavit, and the denial of the justice to grant the change, had participated in the trial. But the Court of Appeals held otherwise. It held that under the amendment above quoted, upon the filing of the application for a change, the justice was ousted of jurisdiction, and that unless the application was withdrawn, he could not legally do anything in the action, and that the judgment was void for want of jurisdiction. The question has been before that court many times and in various ways, but it has uniformly held that the mere filing of the affidavit ousted the justice of all power to proceed, and that any judgment rendered by him after the application is filed is void, and subject to collateral attack. (Jones v. Pharis, 59 Mo. App. 254; State v. McCracken, 60 Mo. App. 650; Endicott v. Hall, 61 Mo. App. 185; Baskowitz v. Guthrie, 99 Mo. App. 304, 73 S. W. 227.) In State v. McCracken, supra, the justice refused to transfer the case unless the costs were paid, but the court compelled him to do so, notwithstanding the costs were not paid. In Endicott v. Hall, supra, it was held that the justice had no power to compel the payment of costs as a condition to making the transfer of the case. No other conclusion is either logical or permissible. If the justice is ousted of jurisdiction upon the filing of the affidavit, this ends his powers in the case. Even if costs were to be allowed against a defendant, such an allowance is not made a condition upon which the change is to be made by the amendment under consideration, and to hold that a change is not effected unless the costs are paid would, in our judgment, amount to a palpable disregard of a plain statutory provision, and would be in defiance of the manifest intention of the legislature. Counsel also vigorously assails the majority opinion because, as he says, we have given no reasons in support of the conclusions reached. In this regard we remark that the courts are not called upon to advance reasons why legislatures pass certain laws. We have neither the time nor the disposition to give reasons why the legislature may think proper to either pass a new law or to amend an old one. While to do this may be proper enough, still we must content ourselves, as a general rule, where the law is attacked, with a mere statement of the grounds upon which we hold the law either good or bad. Moreover, if we should attempt to argue and reason out all the questions that are presented by counsel, our opinions would grow to impracticable lengths. Some things admit of being reasoned out. Others do not. But what counsel want is not reasons, but a decision in their favor. This is what counsel wants in this case, and this we are unable to give him without doing violence to our own judgment and convictions. In all such instances we, not counsel, must assume the responsibility. After giving the matter further consideration upon counsel's application, we are firmly of the opinion that the conclusions reached in the former opinion are sound, and that counsel has advanced no valid argument why the judgment there announced should not be adhered to. The application for a rehearing therefore should be, and accordingly is, denied. MCCARTY, J., concurs. NOTE. At time case was decided (in 1908) W. M. MCCARTY was Chief Justice, and D. N. STRAUP, Associate Justice. Justice McCARTY'S term expired January 1, 1909, at which time Justice STRAUP became Chief Justice. Justice MCCARTY was re-elected, making him now, at the time of this denial of the petition for rehearing, Associate Justice. STATE ex rel. ROBINSON v. DURAND, Justice of the Peace. No. 1886. Decided April 14, 1908. Petition for Rehearing Denied November 9, 1909 (104 Pac. 760). 1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-CHANGE OF PLACE OF TRIAL-DISMISSAL OF ACTION-STATUTORY REMEDIES. A defendant in justice's court who specially appears in the action and moves for a dismissal as provided by Rev. St. 1898, section 3724, as amended by Sess. Laws 1905, p. 9, c. 11, providing that, when on the special appearance of defendant it is found from the affidavits that the action is brought in the wrong county or precinct, the action may be dismissed, etc., cannot also move to change the place of trial as provided by section 3669 as amended by Sess. Laws 1905, p. 108, c. 92, authorizing a change of place of trial; the remedies being alternative. (Page 98.) 2. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE DISMISSAL OF ACTION - AFFIDAVITS. Rev. St. 1898, section 3724, as amended by Sess. Laws 1905, p. 9, c. 11, authorizing the dismissal of an action in justice's court when on special appearance of defendant it is found from the affidavits that the action is brought in the wrong county or precinct, etc., contemplates that the parties may file affidavits, in support of and in opposition to the motion of dismissal, and that the court shall have jurisdiction to determine the facts, and the action of the court in denying the motion, though the affidavit of defendant is not controverted, even if error, is not in excess of jurisdiction. (Page 99.) 3. PROHIBITION-NATURE OF REMEDY. At common law the writ of prohibition prevents excess or usurpation of jurisdiction, and prohibition may not be resorted to when the ordinary remedies by appeal, writ of review, certiorari, or injunction, or other modes of review, are available. (Page 100.) 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JUDICIAL POWER. The power conferred on courts by Const., art. 8, sections 4, 7, giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, etc., and authorizing the district courts or any judge thereof to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, and other writs necessary to carry into effect their judgments, and to give them general control over inferior courts, cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legislature. (Page 100.) 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JUDICIAL POWER. The office of the writ of prohibition in Const., art. 8, sections 4, 7, authorizing the Supreme Court and the district courts or any judge thereof to issue the writ of prohibition, whether limited to the writ as known at common law or extended to the writ as defined by the territorial laws (Comp. Laws 1888, section 3743), providing that prohibition arrests the proceeding of any tribunal when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the tribunal, cannot be enlarged or abriddged by the legislature, and the legislature cannot enlarge the functions of the writ and convert it into a mere writ of review.1 (Page 102.) 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE POWER. The legislature, in exercising the power to provide a remedy to review the ruling of a justice's court other than on appeal, cannot encroach on the prerogatives of courts and cannot provide that the ruling shall be reviewed by the exercise of a prerogative writ, within Const., art. 8, sections 4, 7, authorizing the Supreme Court and the district courts to issue prerogative writs. (Page 105.) 7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF STATUTES. The court in determining the validity of Rev. St. 1898, section 3724, as amended by Sess. Laws 1905, p. 9, c. 11, providing that the ruling of a justice's court on motion to dismiss the action may be reviewed on appeal or by means of a writ of prohibition, cannot construe the act as though the legislature gave the mode of review a wrong name when it designated it "prohibition," where the proceeding under the act was in accordance with the practice applicable to prohibition. (Page 105.) 8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ENCROACHMENT ON JUDICIAL POWER Rev. St. 1898, section 3724, as amended by Sess. Laws 1905, p. 1 People v. House, 4 Utah, 382, 10 Pac. 843; People v. Hills, 5 Utah, 413, 10 Pac. 407. 9, c. 11, providing that the ruling of a justice's court on motion to dismiss may be by appeal or by writ of prohibition, makes the ruling reviewable by prohibition and does not create a new writ and is void because it enlarges the office of the writ of prohibition in Const., art. 8, sections 4, 7, authorizing the Supreme Court and the district courts to issue the writ of prohibition. (Page 106.) 9. PROHIBITION-REVIEW OF JUDICIAL PROceedings. The district court in reviewing on prohibition a ruling of a justice's court cannot try the matter de novo; but the inquiry must be confined to a review of the proceedings before the justice. (Page 107.) APPEAL from District Court, Third District; Hon. M. L. Ritchie, Judge. Application for a writ of prohibition by the State, on the relation of R. J. Robinson, against Charles F. Durand, Justice of the Peace of Murray City, Salt Lake County. Judgment for relator. Defendant appeals. REVERSED, WITH DIRECTIONS. E. A. Wallon for appellant. S. P. Armstrong for respondent. STRAUP, J. T. E. Laing commenced an action in the justice's court of Murray precinct, Salt Lake County, against R. J. Robinson, to recover a money judgment for sixteen dollars and seventyfour cents alleged to be due on account of a subscription to a certain newspaper, furnished the defendant in that action. After issuance and service of summons from the justice's court, the defendant, on the 20th day of July, 1906, specially appeared in that action and caused an affidavit of his attorney to be filed, wherein it was deposed that the defendant did not and never had resided in Murray precinct; that he was a resident of Salt Lake City; that he did not receive the newspaper in Murray precinct, but in Salt Lake |