from the income of the receivership, if, in consequence of an increase of revenue, it could be done. The income of the receivership, instead of being applied in accordance with the order to pay the debts for the supplies and labor, was used, with the consent, and, it may fairly be inferred, at the request of the bondholders, to buy additional grounds, rolling-stock, &c., and to make permanent improvements, thus adding to the value of the property, which was afterwards sold. There is nothing whatever to indicate that in thus using the income it was the intention of the court to revoke the original order. It seems to have been found, in the administration of the cause, that by using the income to add to the value of the fixed property the interests of all parties would be promoted, and so the fund, which in equity belonged to the labor and supply creditors, was for the time. being diverted from them and put into improvements and additions, the proceeds of which are now in court. It is not to be presumed that this diversion would have been authorized if the value of the property added to and improved was not to be correspondingly increased. Clearly, therefore, on the face of the transaction, the fund in court represents in equity the income which belongs to the labor and supply creditors as well as the mortgage security, and there was no impropriety in appropriating it as far as necessary to pay the creditors specially provided for when the receiver was appointed. Such a practice, under proper circumstances, was approved in Fosdick v. Schall, ubi supra, and seems to us eminently just. There were other questions certified in the case, but as we answer the one which has been particularly stated in the affirmative, and nothing more is needed to sustain the decree, the others will not be considered further than has already been done incidentally. Decree affirmed. NOTE. Union Trust Company v. Fitzgerald, appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois, was submitted at the same time as the preceding case, by the same counsel for the appellant, and by Mr. Thomas C. Fletcher for the appellee. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The facts and questions certified in this case are in all material respects like those in Union Trust Company v. Souther, ante, p. 591. It is, therefore, unnecessary to answer the questions further than by reference to what was said in that case Decree affirmed. UNION TRUST COMPANY v. WALKER. An assignment of such claims as are mentioned in Union Trust Company v. Souther, ante, p. 591, passes the right of the original holder to payment out of the fund in the hands of the receiver. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois. Mr. S. Corning Judd and Mr. William F. Whitehouse for the appellant. Mr. Thomas C. Fletcher for the appellee. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. This case differs from Union Trust Company v. Souther, ante, p. 591, only in the fact that Walker, the present intervenor and appellee, is the assignee by purchase from the original holders of the claims he seeks to have paid, and one of the questions certified is whether, being an assignee and not an original holder, he is entitled to payment. We have no hesitation in answering this question in the affirmative. As was said in Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 253, these creditors are paid not because they have in law a lien on the mortgaged property or the income, but because in equity the earnings of the company constitute a fund for the payment of the expenses which their claims represent, before any income arises which ought to be applied to the discharge of the mortgage debt. Under such circumstances, it is a matter of no importance that the original creditor has parted with the claim. The right is one that attaches to the debt and not to the person of the original creditor. Consequently the right passes with an assignment of the debt. Decree affirmed. DAVIS. SOUTH CAROLINA. 1. Section 643 of the Revised Statutes, which provides for removing to the Circuit Court suits or criminal prosecutions commenced in a State court. against "any officer appointed under or acting by authority of any revenue law, or any person acting under or by authority of such officer," applies to marshals of the United States, their deputies and assistants, when engaged in enforcing a revenue law of the United States. 2. Where such a prosecution is duly removed, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court completely vests, and the subsequent action of the State court, forfeiting the recognizance of the defendant for his non-appearance there, is coram non judice and void. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. The Solicitor-General for the plaintiffs in error. MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court. Lemuel Davis was indicted for the murder of one Hall in the Court of General Sessions for the County of Spartanburg, in South Carolina, in July, 1876; and, being in custody, it was ordered by the court that he be enlarged on giving bail for his appearance at the next term of the court, it being required that the bond should contain a condition that it should be forfeited in case the prisoner should be ordered beyond the limits of the State by the proper authority of the army of the United States. He entered into a recognizance accordingly, the other plaintiffs in error being his sureties. The prisoner thereafter presented to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina a petition, which is set out in the record, as follows: "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "District of South Carolina, Fourth Circuit : "To the Judges of the Circuit Court "The petition of Lemuel J. Davis, corporal of Company K, 18th U. S. Infantry, shows: “That some time in February, 1876, he was detailed to serve as one of a guard of United States soldiers to aid Deputy Marshal James Jarrett in making the arrest of one Brandy Hall under a warrant issued by a U. S. commissioner, for violation of internal revenue laws as a distiller. "That said guard of U. S. soldiers consisted of two men under the command of First Lieutenant W. A. Miller, 18th U. S. Infantry. That said guard, under command of said Lieutenant Miller, proceeded with Deputy Marshal James Jarrett to the house of said Brandy Hall, for the purpose of arresting him. That for the purpose of making the arrest, the house of said Hall was surrounded. This petitioner was stationed at the back door of the house for the purpose of guarding the same, and preventing the escape of said Hall. That the deputy marshal, Jarrett, went to the front of the house for the purpose of effecting an entrance, and arresting said Hall. That at the time he did so, and while your petitioner was guarding the back door, said Hall made his escape through a hole in the side of the house near where petitioner was standing, sprang past him, frightening his horse, and accidentally discharging his piece. "That by the discharge of his said piece the said Hall was shot and mortally wounded, and subsequently died of said wound. Your petitioner shows that at the time of said accident he was in the discharge of his duty, and that said shooting of said Hall was purely accidental, and your petitioner is in no way responsible therefor. Your petitioner shows that he has been arrested and bound over for trial in the Circuit Court of the State of South Carolina for Spartanburg County for the murder of said Hall. "That an indictment by the grand jury of that county for murder was found at the August term of said court against your petitioner, and your petitioner was put upon his trial thereon. That the jury before whom he was tried found your petitioner guilty of manslaughter. That the court thereupon set aside said verdict and granted a new trial. Your petitioner shows that he is illegally and unlawfully held for trial under the order of said court, and prays your honors to grant a writ to remove said cause for trial in the Circuit Courts of the United States for the District of South Carolina, now being held at Columbia in said State. "Personally appears before me, Corporal Lemuel J. Davis, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says the above petition is true of his own knowledge. LEMUEL J. DAVIS." "Sworn and subscribed before me the second day of December, A. D. 1876. [SEAL OF COURT.] "J. E. HAGOOD, "C. C. C. U. S. Dist. of S. C." "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, "District of South Carolina, Fourth Circuit: “EX-PARTE, LEMUEL J. DAVIS, Petition for habeas corpus. "18th U. S. Infantry. "I certify that I represented the petitioner upon his trial at Spartanburg; that I have examined the proceedings against him, and have carefully inquired into all the matters set forth in the petition of the said Davis, and believe them to be true. "WM. E. EARLE." On the hearing of this petition, Dec. 4, 1876, it was ordered by the court that a writ of habeas corpus cum causa do issue, to be served according to law on the clerk of the Circuit Court for Spartanburg County, and that the marshal do take said Corporal Lemuel J. Davis into his custody, to be dealt with according to law. On March 12, 1877, an order was made by the circuit judge for the county of Spartanburg in the Court of General Sessions, reciting that the said Lemuel J. Davis had failed to answer when called according to his recognizance, and directing process against him and his sureties to appear and show cause why judgment should not be confirmed against them and their recognizance adjudged to be forfeited. The plaintiffs in error accordingly appeared and answered the rule, alleging the removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States by the proceedings recited, by reason whereof the said Lemuel Davis was not bound to appear for trial in the Court of General Sessions for the County of Spartanburg, and that consequently there had been no breach of the condition of the recognizance. Upon this return to the rule to show cause judgment was rendered against the plaintiffs in error, which, on appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, was affirmed. To reverse that judgment the present writ of error is prosecuted. The learned Attorney-General of South Carolina, who appears here on the part of the State, very properly waives all questions arising in this case which are covered by the decision in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257. He seeks to distinguish the present case, however, from that, |