the point where this railroad and the Pamunkey River meet the Aquia Creek line at Richmond. This was to designate the vicinity of Hanover Court-house, a name already well known to the reader. Stoneman would thus reach the principal line of the enemy's communications-a line he was especially ordered tc destroy-while a portion of his corps was intended to take the chord of the arc he was directed to describe, so as to protect his left flank. The object of this large détour was to cut off at once the two lines of communication from which Lee's army received its supplies-one coming from the west and the other from the south; but the whole expedition had been conceived on the supposition that the enemy, being either beaten or driven back, would be in full retreat, for Hooker had directed his lieutenant to bar as much as possible the passage of either of the two routes he might follow. But if, on the contrary, the Confederates held their ground around Fredericksburg, it was evident that the temporary destruction of either line of railway would lose all its importance. Hooker only left one small brigade of cavalry, under General Pleasonton, near Slocum, in order to clear his movements. It must be acknowledged that the intelligence, the determination, and the activity of this officer compensated to a certain extent for the insufficiency of the means at his disposal for the performance of so difficult a task.

The right wing executed with much precision and success the first part of the instructions of the general-in-chief. A floating bridge of boats was thrown over the river at Kelly's Ford on the evening of the 28th, and on the following morning the three Federal army corps, after having passed to the other side of the river, were already on the march toward the fords of the Rapidan. The Confederates had not anticipated this movement, and Lee did not seem to have foreseen it. At the very moment that Slocum was proceeding in the direction of Germanna Ford the engineers of the Southern army were at work at that point constructing a trestle-bridge in order to facilitate communications between Culpeper Court-house and the general head-quarters, situated above Fredericksburg. Early on the morning of the presence of the enemy on the

29th, Stuart was informed of the right side of the Rappahannock. He immediately assembled all

his forces that is to say, the brigades of the two Lees (that of Hampton having gone farther south and been dispersed for the purpose of recruiting and resting their horses)-and repaired at once to Brandy Station, with a view of occupying the positions in which he had held Averell in check a fortnight before. His habitual sagacity seems to have failed him on this occasion.

Enveloped in a dense fog, he quietly waited until noon for the attack of the Federals, while the latter, not being even aware of his presence, left him on their right and proceeded southward. When the mist had been dispelled, finally revealing to him their long columns in the distance, he at once fathomed their design and tried to outspeed them along the Rapidan, in order to dispute with them the passage of Germanna Ford. But he was too late, and the utmost he could do was to harass the rear-guard, while Pleasonton's mounted men surprised the enemy's pontonniers on the Rapidan, capturing some of them, and, crossing the ford, took possession of the right bank.

This rapid movement had separated Stuart from the rest of the Confederate army. He was unable to apprise the posts stationed en échelon along the Rappahannock below Kelly's Ford, which were taken in the rear and captured before they had even heard of the crossing of the river by the Federals; the couriers sent by him to put the troops posted at United States Ford on their guard were intercepted. It was on the afternoon of the 29th, in the vicinity of the Madden farm, where he had made his head-quarters during the winter, that he came up with the rear of Slocum's column with two or three regiments. He took a small number of prisoners and threw some detachments into confusion, but was unable to impede the march of the Federals. It was absolutely necessary for him to put himself once more in communication with the rest of the army in order to clear its way during the battle about to be fought, and it was also important to protect the dépôts at Gordonsville, a rich prey which could not fail to tempt the cupidity of the Federal cavalry. Stuart ordered W. H. F. Lee's brigade, which was to have the sole charge of watching Stoneman's movements, to move toward this point by way of Culpeper; and, taking with him Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, he undertook, notwithstanding the fatigue of his horses, to outspeed

the Federals, in order to pass from their right to their left, and go to the assistance of his chief.

While the small brigade of Fitzhugh Lee was crossing the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford, the numerous battalions of Slocum and Meade were crossing the river a little lower down, at Germanna Ford and Ely's Ford. The waters, which were still very high, rendered these fords rather dangerous, but it was impossible to wait for the bridge-equipage, and the soldiers, appreciating the importance of getting speedily over this river, which had already stopped their progress on several occasions, threw themselves cheerfully into the current, supporting each other, whilst the mounted men picked up those whom the waters were carrying off. Ways rapidly constructed gave the field-pieces and the wagons an easy access to the ford, and the crossing continued without interruption during the whole night by the blaze of fires kindled along both banks, whose lurid flames, agitated by the wind, threw a vivid light, now on the fantastically-shaped shadows of the tall trees which crowned the bank, and then over the numerous personages forming this strange and picturesque scene.

On the morning of the 30th the three Federal corps were on the right side of the Rapidan. Without wasting one moment, they continued their march in the direction of Chancellorsville, which Hooker had indicated to them as the rallying-point. They only encountered the small parties which they had easily dislodged from the river-fords the day previous, and a single regiment of Stuart's cavalry, which, having reached the church of the Wilderness before them, had thus been able to cross over to their left flank. The remainder of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, arriving a little later, found the troops of Slocum in possession of this point.

By a vigorous charge it compelled the latter to come to a stop about noon, and to deploy in order to resist its attack; but Stuart, becoming soon aware that he would not be able to force a passage by way of the Plank Road, determined to make a circuitous move southward, by way of Spotsylvania Court-house, in order to join General Lee, who had sent for him in great haste, leading his column through cross-roads toward a point called Todd's Tavern,

On

situated four and a half miles south-west of Chancellorsville. the evening of the 30th most of the troops belonging to the Federal right wing were gathered near this latter point, those that had not yet reached it being within a short distance and on their way thither.

Up to this time the Confederates had not been able to throw any serious obstacle in the way of their march. If Stuart, with his cavalry, had not succeeded in heading them on their way to Chancellorsville, how could the infantry have attempted it? By withdrawing a portion of his army from Falmouth unknown to his adversary, and by masking his earlier movements behind the Rappahannock, Hooker had gained an advance the advantages of which he could have preserved to the end. About midday on the 29th, Lee had been informed by Stuart of the passage of the Rappahannock; it was only in the evening, however, after the skirmish at Madden, that his lieutenant was able to give him any positive details regarding the strength and direction of the Federal columns. But the magnitude of the demonstrations made around Fredericksburg having proved to him that a considerable portion of the enemy's army was still in front of him, he understood that it would be impossible for him to divide his forces as his adversaries had done; that in order to conquer it was essential to keep all his troops together; and that it was yet too soon to go with his forces to meet Slocum. He therefore merely directed General Anderson on the evening of the 29th to take Wright's brigade along with him to Chancellorsville, in order to watch the movements of the enemy, and to send for Mahone's and Posey's brigades of his division, then holding United States Ford. Anderson, having arrived with Wright during the night, found these two brigades already in position at Chancellorsville, on which place they had fallen back at the news of Meade's passage at Ely's Ford. He only remained there a few hours; on the morning of the 30th, at the approach of the enemy's columns, he left his positions, followed closely by Pleasonton's cavalry, with which his rear-guard had some sharp engagements. Having emerged from the forest without waiting for the Federal infantry, he proceeded to take position around Tabernacle Church, resting on the two roads leading to Fredericksburg. Lee had

been informed on the evening of the 29th of the march of three Federal corps toward the fords of the Rapidan. From that moment he became convinced that these forces would speedily cross that river, unless their object was to draw him away from the real point of attack by a simple demonstration. Their arrival at Chancellorsville could alone reveal their intentions, and he was waiting for news from Anderson, which only reached him during the day of the 30th, in order to satisfy his doubts. The passage of the Rappahannock by a portion of Sedgwick's forces below Fredericksburg therefore engrossed for the time being all his attention. The three corps composing the Federal left wing were, in fact, so disposed as to be able to attack the Confederate lines as soon as the latter had been weakened by the retreat of a portion of their defenders. On the 28th, Sedgwick made them occupy the positions which had been assigned to them, taking care to conceal this movement, as much as possible, behind the slopes of Stafford Heights; the bridge-equipage was brought down during the night to the edge of the river, and at daybreak some Federal detachments crossed in boats at Franklin's Crossing and in front of Smithfield. At the latter point General Wadsworth, who had been the first to land in person, had to sustain a very brisk fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, which held his command for a moment in check. But the Federals, having soon become masters of the right side of the river at the two points which had been designated to them, were enabled to erect two pontonbridges at each place.. During the day two divisions crossed the river-that of Wadsworth of the First corps at Smithfield, and that of Brooks of the Sixth corps over the bridges located higher up. Such a display of forces might have been the prelude to the main operation: Lee must have been at a loss to guess where the feint was, whether on the Rapidan or the Rappahannock. As it was of greater importance to him to retain possession of Marye's Heights than Chancellorsville, he only ordered three brigades, as we have seen, to proceed toward the latter point, preparing himself to receive the attack with which Sedgwick seemed to menace him on the old battlefield of December 13th.

On the morning of the 28th of April the Confederate troops were still in the positions they had occupied after that battle, and