in Salt Lake City and county. Affiant, on information and belief, states that one of the cardinal doctrines of said church is obedience to the teachings, utterances, and instructions of its prophet, seer, and revelator; that affiant is informed and believes that the said Joseph F. Smith, the president of said church and of respondent, at a secret priesthood meeting held at the Tabernacle in Salt Lake City on the evening of April 7, 1906, took occasion to instruct his religious followers as to their duties if called upon to serve as jurors in the trial of cases against corporations, and particularly street railway corporations, and that he stated, in substance, "that there were grafters in the country seeking by every possible trick to secure verdicts against corporations by means of damage suits; that people would step off street cars and pretend to fall or suffer injuries which did not exist, and lawyers would take such personal injury cases and by trickery secure verdicts against corporations." He further stated "that he regretted that Latter-Day Saints, sitting as jurors, have returned verdicts against corporations." It is further stated that if the utterances were not direct instructions to his followers to refuse to return verdicts against corporations, the purport thereof "was at least an inducement that they, as jurors, should look with great suspicion on suits against corporations." Affiant proceeds further to state the reasons why he cannot state the foregoing matters positively, and that five of the jurors trying this case are members of, and one of them an official in, such church.

It will be observed that there is not a single fact stated positively, nor is it claimed that any one of the jurors was present at the meeting or ever heard of what it is alleged was said by the president of the church. The claims made in this affidavit-and it was the only one filed-were manifestly insufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial. If verdicts should be set aside upon such statements made merely upon information, and which in no way connect the jurors or any of them with the alleged misconduct and things set forth, then but few if any verdicts would be permitted to stand. Courts in this regard follow strictly the policy of the law, which in

every possible way guards the purity of the jury box from undue influence and contamination. Every party who attempts to or does tamper with the jury does so at his peril, and if established he may not be heard to say that what he did had no effect upon the verdict. But, in order to constitute misconduct so as to affect a regularly returned verdict, it must in some way be made clearly apparent that the act or acts complained of reached the jurors or some of them. If we assume in this case that the president of respondent, as president of the church, said all that counsel states he said, how could it have influenced or in any way affected any one who did not hear of it or was not aware of what, if anything, had been said? Is it to be presumed that simply because a juror is a member of a certain religious organization and believes in its doctrines and tenets, therefore a court can assume that he hears and knows of all matters that may be said by any official of the organization upon any and all subjects, and further assume that he would follow and be controlled by what such official may have said of which the juror is supposed to be informed constructively merely? The things attributed to Mr. Smith he had a right to say at any proper time and place if he believed them to be true, or if he had any reason to believe them so. He had no right however to mention such matter to a juror, nor to any person who might become such, either for the purpose of influencing his judgment, or for any purpose. If he had discussed such matters in the presence of jurors the law would not permit him to say that he did not thereby intend to influence their judgment, but would require him to bear the consequences his acts may have produced. It is not alleged nor shown by any evidence that Mr. Smith did any of these things. The claim is based upon the theory merely that the expressed wish or desire of the president of the church, upon all subjects, will be implicitly followed by all of the members of the church. If we assume

this to be so in so far as it pertained to matters of religious doctrine, nevertheless it cannot also be assumed that it is true. with regard to all other matters. Indeed it is a matter of universal knowledge that in matters such as are set forth in the

affidavit, the effect upon the ordinary layman would be to arouse his opposition to them rather than cause him to meekly. comply therewith. But apart from all this, the jurors who were assailed filed counter affidavits in which they denied all knowledge of the alleged instructions by the president of the church, and alleged that they never had heard of them before their attention was directed to them by the affidavit of affiant. The trial court therefore had positive and competent proof before him that the alleged misconduct never reached the jurors or any of them, and hence would not have affected their verdict. All of the cases cited by counsel for appellant upon this point to support his contention in this case rather manifest and make clear that the misconduct which affects a verdict must in some way reach the jurors or some of them. It may consist in what is termed "packing" the jury, or it may be by circulating papers or other documents to influence them, or by extending special courtesies to some of them, or by direct communication with one or more of their number. It must however affect a juror who sits in the case or some one who may act as a juror in a particular case. The principles involved here are fully discussed in Thompson & Merriam on Jurors in chapter 21, where the rule we have stated above is fully sustained by the authorities. Any other rule would destroy the integrity of verdicts and make a mere farce of jury trials. If all matters that may be published in a newspaper, or that may be said by men in authority at any time or place about courts, litigants, and the matters in litigation are to be presumed as having influenced or controlled verdicts, then no verdict in any case of any public interest can be permitted to stand. In all such cases a showing, perhaps much stronger than the one in this case, could be made that somebody who in some way is related to the case or to a juror has said or published something which may have influenced him or some of the jurors sitting in the case. The court was clearly right in refusing a new trial upon this ground.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs to respondent.

MCCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

EDLER v. EDWARDS, State Auditor.

No. 1929. Decided April 6, 1908 (95 Pac. 367).

1. STATUTES SUBJECTS AND TITLES CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION-AMENDATORY ACTS. Constitution, art. 6, sec. 23, providing that no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, in SO far as it applies to amendatory acts, should be liberally construed SO as to guard against the real evil which it was intended to meet, and applied so as not to hamper the Legislature in adopting comprehensive measures covering a whole subject, the branches of which may be numerous, but all have some direct connection with or relation to the principal subject treated.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

STATUTES VALIDITY-CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR. A statute will not be held unconstitutional unless its invalidity is clearly and manifestly established.

3. STATUTES

SUBJECTS AND TITLES

NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISION. The provision of Constitution, art. 6, sec. 23, providing that no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, is mandatory.

4. SAME AMENDATORY ACTS. If an amendatory act contains matter which might appropriately have been incorporated in the original act under its title, and identifies the original act by its title and declares the purpose to amend or supplement it, the provision of Constitution, art. 6, sec. 23, that no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, is sufficiently satisfied.

5. SAME AMENDMENT OF SECTIONS OF A CODE. Any one or more sections of a Code or Compilation may be amended by simply stating in the title of the amendatory act that it is to amend the sections designated, and all sections, the subject-matters of which are germane or related to each other, may be included in one amendatory act.

6. SAME SUBJECT OF AMENDATORY ACT. The subject of an act amending certain sections of a Code or Compilation, within the constitutional provision that no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, is contained in the statement which refers to the sections by numbers, and asserts a purpose of amending them.

7. SAME SUBJECTS AND TITLE OF ACT. An amendatory act was entitled, "An act to amend section 2583, Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, as amended by chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1901, and section 2050, Revised Statutes of Utah 1898," Laws 1907, p. 30, c. 28, and the title contained, in addition, a synopsis of what the two

sections contain. Section 2583 was referred to as creating a State Board of Equalization, including its organization and duties, and fixing the salaries of its members, and section 2050 was said to fix the salaries of certain other state officers. Held, that the whole title was contained in the quoted words, and the statement of the contents of the sections to be amended being a mere explanation, and not a restriction of the amendment to any particular part of the sections, left any part of them open to amendment under the general title, the matters therein contained being all correlated.

8. SAME AMENDMENT OF PROVISIONS OF CODE-PLURALITY OF SUBJECTS. A statute amended one section of a Code by increasing the salaries of the members of the State Board of Equalization, and amended another section by either increasing or diminishing the salaries of other appointive state officers named therein. Held, that the matters in the two sections amended were not incongruous, and did not make the subject of the amendatory act plural within Constitution, art. 6, sec. 23, providing that no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, but it embraced the single subject of salaries or compensation.

9. SAME. A section of the Code related to "the State Board of Equalization, and its duties and organization," and also dealt with their salaries. An amendatory statute increased the salaries of the members of the board, and also contained a provision requiring the board to inspect and examine annually all property it is required to assess. Held that, in view of the facts that the requirement as to inspection while not expressed in the original section was clearly implied from the quasi judicial character of the board, and that the provision was directory merely though mandatory in form, the assessment being equally valid with or without the inspection, the provision for inspection in the amendatory statute was immaterial, and did not render the statute objectionable, as embracing a plurality of subjects.

APPEAL from District Court, Third Dictrict; M. L. Ritchie, Judge.

Proceedings by the state, on the relation of A. B. Edler, against J. A. Edwards, as State Auditor, to determine the validity of a statute. Judgment for respondent, and relator appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Goodwin & Van Pelt for appellant.