only an ordinary part of the general unorganized national domain. Stress was also laid by the south upon the fact that concession to California of the right of statehood without slavery would disturb the equipose of the sections, as there was at the time no part of the inchoate national possessions that was capable, on the essential basis of population, of being erected into a State with slavery.

It was hoped by the southerners that President Taylor would take their view of the merits of the California matter and refrain from recommending admission. But the President felt that such a course, so palpably partisan on behalf of slavery, would be incompatible with his sworn duty to the whole country and also unjust to the people of California. In his message of December, 1849, he therefore informed Congress of his expectation that California would soon apply for admission as a State, and advised favorable action in the event that the State Constitution adopted should be found "conformable to the requisitions of the Constitution of the United States." In addition, he remarked that it was believed New Mexico would at no very distant period request admission. Without directly mentioning slavery as a subject pertinent to the case of either California or New Mexico, he said:

"Preparatory to the admission of California and New Mexico, the people of each will have instituted for themselves a republican form of government, laying its foundation in such principles and organizing its power in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. By awaiting their action all uneasiness may be avoided and confidence and kind feeling preserved. With a view of maintaining the harmony and tranquillity so dear to

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all, we should abstain from the introduction of those topics of a sectional character which have hitherto produced painful apprehensions in the public mind; and I repeat the solemn warning of the first and most illustrious of my predecessors against furnishing any ground for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations."

While this was neither anti-slavery nor pro-slavery doctrine, it put both the opponents and advocates of slavery on their mettle to seek substantive results without further delay. The outstanding facts were that the President would sign a bill to admit California as a free State; that, inferentially, for the sake of national harmony he would not refuse the south compensating advantages; but that he would not be likely to approve any embracing program for the exclusive interest of one side or the other. It was hence not the time for either the north or south to attempt to realize the full measure of its desires; but the conditions were propitious for bringing forward specific proposals of "give and take." Thus was established the situation from which the great Compromise measures of 1850 were evolved.

Clay, who was again in the Senate, was by common consent made the leader of the Compromise forces. He sincerely and ardently believed that only concessions by both sides could accomplish a solution of the country's troubles; that, in the nature of the case, the concessions would have to be conclusive as to certain practical details; and that, if mutually accepted, they would operate for an ultimate concord of feeling as to underlying questions so far as practical-minded men and true lovers of the Union were concerned. After

preliminary consideration of a tentative measure drawn by Clay, and of various amendments to it, the Senate appointed (April, 1850) a select committee of thirteen, with Clay as chairman, which, in the following month, reported the historic "Omnibus bill." Its provisions, in brief, were as follows:

Admission forthwith of California as a free State without reduction of its boundaries; division of the remainder of the Mexican cession into two Territories, New Mexico and Utah, both of which were to be entitled ultimately to admission to the Union without insistence by Congress for or against slavery; reduction of the boundaries of Texas so as to add a large portion of its area to New Mexico, for which a money indemnity (later fixed at $10,000,000) was to be paid by the United States to Texas; a more effective national Fugitive Slave law; prohibition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia, but no interference with the existing status of slavery in the District.

Attempts to pass the bill as a whole proved unsuccessful. Its provisions were then considered separately, and eventually both houses adopted them without change. During the debate President Taylor died (July 9, 1850). The Vice-President, Mr. Fillmore, had been in agreement with the spirit of the Compromises, and as President he signed all the bills.

Respecting the vital issue between the north and south, that of territory-control, the conclusion reached. gave the advantage to the north in present substance, but not in principle. California throughout its whole extent was admitted as a free State; but the Wilmot

HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Proviso-so aptly paraphrased in the Free Soil platform by the words, "No more slave States and no more slave territory"-was totally abandoned. The new Territories of Utah and New Mexico (which, on account of their size, were likely to undergo subdivision ultimately) were thrown open to slavery. True, no apprehension was felt on this point; it was indeed. ridiculous even to think of the possibility of an early application for statehood by either Utah or New Mexico that could for a moment be considered. But the deliberate recession by the north from the principle of the Wilmot Proviso was an exceedingly serious matter. It smoothed the way for the subsequent claim and concession of equal rights for slavery in all new Territories without exception; it led to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise; and by committing the government to a recognition of the legitimacy of slavery extension it made quite unnecessary for the future any timidity on that subject in national political conventions.

These things were of course not to be foreseen in 1850 by the anti-slavery Senators and Representatives, intent as they were on winning the fight for a free California. Yet the attitude of the southern leaders in the debate left no possible doubt of their unalterable feeling about the principle of slavery extension. A great speech was made by Calhoun (or rather, read for him he was too feeble to address the Senate, and died a few days after), in which he dealt with the foundation matter of southern right solely, from his well-known constitutional point of view. Jefferson

Davis, then a Senator from Mississippi, said: "Never will I take less than the Missouri Compromise line extended to the Pacific Ocean, with the specific recognition of the right to hold slaves in the territory below that line; and that, before such Territories are admitted into the Union as States, slaves may be taken there from any of the United States at the option of their owners." A strong effort was made by the ultra southerners to force a division of California into two States, north and south, so as to permit slave territory to stretch to the Pacific. When this failed they ceased to attach any value to the Missouri line for pro-slavery purposes. In fact, the old accepted principle of geographical delimitation for slavery on the basis of the Missouri Compromise was wholly destroyed by the act of 1850, which tacitly sanctioned the institution throughout the new Territories and consequently in an extensive portion of the country far to the north of the parallel 36° 30'.

The remaining Compromise acts, with the exception of the one establishing a more effective Fugitive Slave law, were rather inconsequential so far as the general question of slavery was concerned. Regarding Texas, the arrangement for a diminution of her territory in return for payment of a large sum of money by the United States, was mainly an accommodating financial transaction, in the interest of Texas and at the instance of the south. The provision for putting an end to the slave trade in the District of Columbia was merely a sop to northern sentiment.

Some pro-slavery measures offered during the Com