It became, therefore, in the opinion of General Jackson, indispensably necessary to take from the Governor of Pensacola the means of carrying his threat into execution. . . . He took possession therefore of Pensacola and of the fort of Barrancas, as he had done of St. Mark, not in a spirit of hostility to Spain, but as a necessary measure of self-defence; giving notice that they should be restored whenever Spain should place commanders and a force there able and willing to fulfil the engagements of Spain towards the United States, or of restraining by force the Florida Indians from hostilities against their citizens. . . . The obligation of Spain to restrain, by force, the Indians of Florida from hostilities against the United States and their citizens, is explicit, is positive, is unqualified. The fact that for a series of years they have received shelter, assistance, supplies, and protection in the practice of such hostilities, from the Spanish commanders in Florida is clear and unequivocal. If, as the commanders both at Pensacola and St. Mark's have alleged, this has been the result of their weakness rather than of their will; if they have assisted the Indians against the United States to avert their hostilities from the province which they had not sufficient force to defend against them, it may serve in some measure to exculpate, individually, those officers; but it must carry demonstration irresistible to the Spanish Government, that the right of the United States can as little compound with impotence as with perfidy, and that Spain must immediately make her election, either to place a force in Florida adequate at once to the protection of her territory, and to the fulfilment of her engagements, or cede to the United States a province, of which she retains nothing but the nominal possession, but which is, in fact, a derelict open to the occupancy of every enemy, civilized or savage, of the United States. . . . You are authorized to communicate the whole of this letter, and the accompanying documents, to the Spanish Government. I have the honor, etc., etc. John Quincy Adams The famous paragraphs in President Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823, which 61. The Monroe Doctrine, 1823 [242] announced the policy of the United States in regard to the interference of the European powers in the affairs of this December 2, continent, either for the acquisition of new colonies or for the disturbance of existing governments, have gained an added interest in the last few decades, by reason both of our entrance into the ranks of the great naval powers which have conquered and colonized distant lands, and of our increasing concern in the fortunes of the republics of Central and South America. Although the Monroe Doctrine is the only official pronouncement in our history that bears the name of a president, it was not Monroe's, nor any other man's, doctrine. It was simply a clear statement, at a critical moment, of our policy, asserted repeatedly from the days of Washington down, to keep America as remote as possible from the complicated quarrels of the courts of Europe. A precise knowledge of our relations with foreign powers as respects our negotiations and transactions with each is thought to be particularly necessary. Equally necessary is it that we should form a just estimate of our resources, revenue, and progress in every kind of improvement connected with the national prosperity and public defense. It is by rendering justice to other nations that we may expect it from them. It is by our ability to resent injuries and redress wrongs that we may avoid them. . . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the north-west coast of this continent. . . . In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated.1 Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers 2 is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments and to the 1 In the midsummer of 1822 the revolutionists of Spain had gotten the upper hand and compelled the absolute Bourbon king, Ferdinand VII, to acknowledge a constitutional régime. Then French forces under the Duke of Angoulême invaded Spain (April, 1823) and restored the absolute king in a violent civil war. Riego, the leader of the revolutionists, was hung from a gallows forty feet high, just a few days before Monroe sent his message (November 7, 1823). 2 The Holy Alliance was concluded between the sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia in 1815 for the alleged purpose of ruling the peoples whom they were "delegated by Providence to govern❞ according to the "principles which the Divine Savior has taught to mankind." Three years later, however, these sovereigns embarked on the policy of armed intervention in the other states of Europe for the sake of quelling rebellions and supporting "legitimate" thrones. The fear that they would extend their operations to restore the authority of Spain in the American republics called forth the Monroe Doctrine. defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it therefore to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. . . . Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. . . . CHAPTER IX SECTIONAL INTERESTS FACING WESTWARD America, [245] In the two decades following our second war with 62. British England, when the land between the Alleghenies and the opinions of Mississippi was rapidly filling up, America was most con- 1820-1837 spicuously a pioneer community. Social amenities, polished manners, literary and artistic ambitions were all in abeyance before the stern necessity of coping with the actual physical task of building a home, a city, an empire of the West. Our many British visitors and critics in this period judged our pioneer community harshly- the more harshly, perhaps, as it supplemented a rather breezy confidence in Yankee push and shrewdness with the boastful, persistent reminder that America had twice brought Great Britain to treat for peace. In a review of Adam Seybert's "Statistical Annals of the United States," published at Philadelphia in 1818, Sydney Smith writes in the Edinburgh Review for January, 1820: Jonathan must not grow vain and ambitious; or allow himself to be dazzled by that galaxy of epithets by which his orators and newspaper scribblers endeavor to persuade their supporters that they are the greatest, the most refined, the most enlightened, and the most moral people upon earth. The effect of this is unspeakably ludicrous on this side of the Atlantic — and even on the other, we should imagine, must be rather humiliating to the reasonable part of the population. The Americans are a brave, industrious, and acute people; but they have hitherto |