Venezuela

an energetic statement of our claim to compel Great Britain, 114. Twisting the Britin the name of the Monroe Doctrine, to arbitrate its long- ish lion's standing dispute with Venezuela over the boundary of tail: the British Guiana. Olney's message, dated at Washington, affair, 1895 July 20, 1895, was delivered by Ambassador Bayard to [566] Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister, on August 7. After outlining the history of the boundary dispute since 1840, Secretary Olney continues:

The important features of the existing situation, as shown by the foregoing recital, may be briefly stated:

1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the one hand and the South American Republic of Venezuela on the other.

2. The disparity in strength of the claimants is such that Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only through peaceful methods through an agreement with her adversary either upon the subject itself or upon an arbitration.

3. The controversy with varying claims on the part of Great Britain has existed for more than a half-a-century, during which period many earnest and persistent efforts of Venezuela to establish a boundary by agreement have proved unsuccessful.

4. The futility of the endeavor to obtain a conventional line being recognized, Venezuela, for a quarter of a century, has asked and striven for arbitration.

5. Great Britain however has always and continuously refused, and still refuses, to arbitrate except upon the condition of a renunciation of a large part of the Venezuelan claim, and of a concession to herself of a large share of the territory in controversy.

6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, by pressing for arbitration of the disputed boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, by expressing its grave concern whenever new alleged instances of British aggression of Venezuelan territory have been brought to its notice, the Government of the

United States has made it clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy is one in which both its honor and its interests are involved, and the continuance of which it cannot regard with indifference. . . .

Those charged with the interests of the United States are now forced to determine exactly what those interests are and what course of action they require . . . to decide to what extent, if any, the United States may and should intervene in a controversy between and primarily concerning only Great Britain and Venezuela, and to decide how far it is bound to see that the integrity of Venezuelan territory is not impaired by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist. . . .

The Monroe doctrine . . . does not establish any general Protectorate by the United States over other American States. It does not relieve any American State from its obligations as fixed by international law nor prevent any European power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them.... The rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is that no European power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American State of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies.

...

It is manifest that if a rule has been openly and uniformly declared and acted upon by the Executive Branch of the Government for more than seventy years without express repudiation by Congress, it must be conclusively presumed to have its sanction. . . . It rests upon facts and principles that are both intelligible and incontrovertible. . . . Europe, as Washington observed, has a set of primary interests which are peculiar to herself. America is not interested in them, and ought not to be vexed or complicated with them. Each great European power, for instance, today maintains enormous armies and fleets in self-defence, and for protection against any other European Power or Powers. What have the United States of America to do with that condition of things, or why should they be impoverished by wars or preparations for wars with whose causes or results they can have no direct concern? ...

The people of the United States have learned in the school of experience to what extent the relations of States to each other depend not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget that in their hour of distress all their anxieties and burdens were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against their national life on the part of Powers with whom they had long maintained the most harmonious relations.... Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why?... It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.... The advantages of this superiority are at once imperilled if the principle be admitted that European powers may convert American States into colonies or provinces of their own. . . .

The territory which Great Britain insists shall be ceded to her as a condition of arbitrating her claim to other territory has never been admitted to belong to her. It has always and consistently been claimed by Venezuela. Upon what principle — except her feebleness as a nation is she to be denied the right of having the claim heard and passed upon by an impartial Tribunal? No reason or shadow of reason appears in all the voluminous literature of the subject. "It is to be so because I will it to be so❞ seems to be the only justification Great Britain offers....

In these circumstances, the duty of the President appears to him unmistakable and imperative. Great Britain's assertion of a title to the disputed territory, combined with her refusal to have that title investigated, being a substantial appropriation of that territory to her own use, not to protest . . . would be to ignore an established policy [the Monroe Doctrine] with which the honor and welfare of this country are closely identified. While the measures necessary or proper for the vindication of that policy are to be determined by another branch of the Government,1 it is clearly for the Executive to leave nothing undone which may tend to render such determination unnecessary.

1 A veiled threat of war, in reference to the powers of Congress, enumerated in Article I, Sect. VIII, par. 10-13, of the Constitution.

You are instructed, therefore, to present the foregoing views to Lord Salisbury.... They call for a definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain will consent or will decline to submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It is the earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will be on the side of arbitration. . . . If he is to be disappointed in that hope, however a result not to be anticipated, and in his judgment calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations between this country and Great Britain — it is his wish to be made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will enable him to lay the whole subject before Congress in his next Annual Message,

I am etc.

Richard Olney

The reply to Olney's message was sent by Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote, British ambassador at Washington, on November 26, 1895, too late to furnish President Cleveland with material for his annual message to Congress the first week in December. The British premier's note was a polite but firm rejection of Olney's claims. In the course of the dispatch Lord Salisbury said:

The contentions set forth by Mr. Olney . . . are represented by him as being an application of the political maxims which are well known in American discussion under the name of the Monroe doctrine. As far as I am aware, this doctrine has never been before advanced on behalf of the United States in any written communication addressed to the Government of another nation; but it has been generally adopted and assumed as true by many eminent writers and politicians in the United States. ... But during the period that has elapsed since the Message of President Monroe was delivered in 1823, the doctrine has undergone a very notable development, and the aspect which it now presents in the hands of Mr. Olney differs widely from its character when it first issued from the pen of its author. . . . The dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe

have no relation to the state of things in which we live at the present day. There is no danger of any Holy Alliance imposing its system upon any portion of the American Continent, and there is no danger of any European State treating any part of the American Continent as a fit object for European colonization. . . . Great Britain is imposing no system" upon Venezuela, and is not concerning herself in any way with the nature of the political institutions under which the Venezuelans may prefer to live. But the British Empire and the Republic of Venezuela are neighbors, and they have differed for some time past, and continue to differ, as to the line by which their dominions are separated. It is a controversy with which the United States have no apparent practical concern.

...

The Government of the United States . . . lay down that the doctrine of President Monroe . . . confers on them the right of demanding that when a European Power has a frontier difference with a South American community, the European Power shall consent to refer that controversy to arbitration; and Mr. Olney states that unless Her Majesty's Government accede to this demand, it will "greatly embarrass the future relations between Great Britain and the United States."

Whatever may be the authority of the doctrine laid down by President Monroe, there is nothing in his language to show that he ever thought of claiming this novel prerogative for the United States. . . . [Arbitration] has proved itself valuable in many cases; but it is not free from defects.... It is not always easy to find an Arbitrator who is competent, and who at the same time is wholly free from bias; and the task of insuring compliance with the Award when it is made is not exempt from difficulty. . . .

In the remarks which I have made, I have argued on the theory that the Monroe doctrine in itself is sound. I must not, however, be understood as expressing any acceptance of it on the part of Her Majesty's Government. It must always be mentioned with respect, on account of the distinguished statesman to whom it is due, and the great nation who have generally adopted it. But international law is founded on the general consent of nations; no statesman, however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of