Page images
PDF
EPUB

States. In such cases there was of course no reason based upon federal governmental supremacy and efficiency, why the federal courts should not, in their discretion, leave the petitioners to set up such defense as they might have in the state courts, and on writ of error therefrom to the federal Supreme Court."

17 The law regarding the jurisdiction of the state courts over federal officers is discussed in a valuable article by Mr. James L. Bishop in the Columbia Law Review for May, 1909, entitled "The Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts over Federal Officers." Mr. Bishop suggests that the maintenance of the freedom of federal authority from state interference, and at the same time the preservation of the proper powers of the state courts could be secured by extending the right of removal of cases from the state to federal courts, now given under Section 643 of the Revised Statutes to federal revenue officers, to all officers acting under authority of the United States; and that the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus by federal courts be limited so as to be merely ancillary to such right of removal.

CHAPTER IX.

THE MAINTENANCE OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY; THE INDEPENDENCE OF FEDERAL COURTS FROM STATE INTERFERENCE.

§ 72. Independence of Federal Authorities.

A federal court having assumed jurisdiction over a person or piece of property, the state authorities are excluded from any interference therewith or from in any way assuming jurisdiction therein. This principle was violated by the authorities of the State of Wisconsin in the case of Ableman v. Booth' in annulling the proceedings of a commissioner of the United States and discharging a prisoner who had been committed by the commissioner for an offense against a federal law. The Supreme Court of the United States declared the impropriety of these actions in the following language: "The supremacy of the state courts over the courts of the United States, in cases coming under the Constitution and laws of the United States is now for the first time asserted and acted upon in the supreme court of a State." Protesting against this action, the opinion declares: " We do not question the authority of state court, or judge, who is authorized by the laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas corpus, to issue it in any case where the party is imprisoned within its territorial limits, provided it does not appear, when the application is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United States. The court or judge has a right to inquire, in this mode of proceeding, for what cause and by what authority the prisoner is confined within the territorial limits of the state sovereignty. But, after the return is made, and the state judge or court is judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further."

[ocr errors]

That a state court has no power to issue a mandamus or writ of certiorari to a federal officer is not questioned.2

121 How. 506.

2 M'Clung v. Silliman, 6 Wh. 598; 5 L. ed. 340; Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet. 524; 9 L. ed. 1181; U. S. v. Schurz (102 U. S. 378; 26 L. ed. 167).

The inability of the state courts by injunction or otherwise to control proceedings in federal courts is declared in Weber v. Lee Co.,3 United States v. Keokuk,* and Supervisors v. Durant." This inability arises not so much from the supremacy of the federal courts as because the state and federal judicial systems are inde pendent of one another. In Weber v. Lee Co. the court say: "State courts cannot enjoin the process of proceedings in the circuit [federal] courts; not on account of any paramount jurisdiction. in the latter, but because they are entirely independent in their sphere of action." The same reason is given in United States v. Keokuk.

§ 73. Injunctions from Federal to State Courts.

[ocr errors]

It is, however, not quite correct to say that the two judicial systems are entirely independent in their sphere of action." It is true that the state courts are wholly without power in any way to control the operations of the federal courts, but the reverse is not true. As has already appeared, a writ of error lies in certain cases from the federal Supreme Court to the state courts, and, when removal of a case is sought, the federal courts may issue a writ of certiorari to the state court demanding a copy of the record, and the clerk of the state court refusing compliance with this demand becomes, under an act of Congress, liable to fine or imprisonment. Furthermore the federal courts possess the right to protect their own jurisdictional rights or the rights of parties to suits before them by restraining orders forbidding proceedings in the state courts.

It is true that, actuated by a desire to preserve so far as possible the independence of the state judiciaries Congress, by act of 1793, which is still in force, has provided that "the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such an injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." But, in other than cases in bankruptcy, 36 Wall. 210; 18 L. ed. 781. 46 Wall. 514; 18 L. ed. 933. 69 Wall. 415; 19 L. ed. 732. 6 Rev. St., Sec. 720.

the federal courts have not hesitated to enjoin proceedings in state courts where this has been necessary to preserve their own jurisdictional rights, or to protect individuals in their federal rights. Thus in Dietzsch v. Huidekoper" it was held that the prohibition of Section 720 of the Revised Statutes would not prevent a federal court from issuing an injunction restraining proceedings on a replevin bond, the state suit being based on a judgment obtained in a state court after the defendant had removed the case to the federal courts and there obtained judgment in his favor. The court said: "The action on the replevin bond in that [the state] court was simply an attempt to enforce the judgment of that court in the replevin suit, rendered after its removal to the United States circuit court, and after the state court had lost all jurisdiction over the case. If no judgment had been rendered in the state court against the plaintiffs in the replevin suit, no action could have been maintained upon the replevin bond. The bond took the place of property seized in replevin, and a judgment upon it was equivalent to an actual return of the replevied property. The suit upon the replevin bond was, therefore, but an attempt to enforce a pretended judgment of the state court, rendered in a case over which it had no jurisdiction, but which had been transferred to and decided by the United States Circuit Court, by a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in replevin. The bill [for injunction] in this case was, therefore, ancillary to the replevin suit, and was in substance a proceding in the federal court to enforce its own judgment by preventing the defeated party from wresting the replevied property from the plaintiffs in replevin, who, by the judgment of the court, were entitled to it, or what was in effect the same thing, preventing them from enforcing a bond for the return of the property to them. A court of the United States is not prevented from enforcing its own judgments by the statute which forbids it to grant a writ of injunction to stay proceedings in a state court.'

7103 U. S. 494; 26 L. ed. 497.

[ocr errors]

8 In Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois Central R. Co. (203 U. S. 335; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; 51 L. ed. 209) it was held that the commission was not a court within the meaning of Rev. St., Sec. 720.

In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee," a case, it will be remembered, arising out of the refusal of the state court to obey a mandate from the federal tribunal, the court did not find it necessary to decide whether or not the federal court had the power to issue a mandamus to the Virginia court to enforce its former judgment. Instead, the court simply reversed the judgment of the Virginia Court of Appeals and affirmed that of the lower court. Justice Johnson rendered a concurring opinion in which he said: “The presiding judge of the state court is himself authorized to issue the writ of error, if he will, and thus give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court; and if he thinks proper to decline it, no compulsory process is provided by law to oblige him. The party who imagines himself aggrieved is then at liberty to apply to a judge of the United States, who issues the writ of error, which (whatever its form) is, in substance, no more than a mode of compelling the opposite party to appear before this court and maintain the legality of his judgment obtained before the state tribunal. An exemplification of the record is the common property of every one who chooses to apply and pay for it, and thus the case and the party are brought before us."

After pointing out that the court disavowed all intention to de cide as to the right to issue a compulsory process to the state courts, Justice Johnson, however, goes on to argue that the federal court might properly issue a mandamus only to the lower federal courts, and that in case a state court, whose decrees might be reversed by the federal court, should refuse to alter its action in obedience thereto, the federal Supreme Court, under authority granted by the Judiciary Act, where the case had once before been remanded, could itself proceed to a final decision of the case and

In French v. Hay (22 Wall. 250; 22 L. ed. 857) the court say: “The prohibition in the Judiciary Act against the granting of injunctions by the courts of the United States touching proceedings in state courts has no ap plication here. The prior jurisdiction of the court below took the case out of the operation of that provision. If the state courts should persist in proceeding a thing not to be expected - the wrong will be on the part of those tribunals and not of the court below."

91 Wh. 304; 4 L. ed. 97.

« PreviousContinue »