"I will, or starve," was the answer.

Grant arrived at Chattanooga in October, 1863. Missionary Ridge, three miles away, covered the place. The rebels outnumbered Grant, and were in the full flush of a late victory. Hills in front, a river at their back, rescue or escape alike improbable, such was the deplorable state in which Grant found his cooped-up army at Chattanooga. His forces under Hooker, as usual in advance, had seized the most commanding situation, which held fast the railroad communicating with the supplies. This sharp, quick action put Bragg on the defensive, and gave Grant an opportunity for aggressive movement. The former had sent Longstreet to attack Burnside. "Lose most of your army before retreating: hold the line from Knoxville to Clinton seven days, and the Tennessee Valley can be saved," was the message sent to Burnside. Then Grant concluded to save Knoxville by fighting Bragg. The only defence Grant believed in was attack. There were few darker days in the history of our struggle than these before Chattanooga. Grant, however, had faith that Burnside would hold on, and that Sherman would make connection in time. In both opinions he was correct. The gallant fighting and the glorious victories at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge are too familiar to need description here. The battle of Chattanooga is regarded as a most remarkable military contest. Such was the strength of the enemy's position, that Grant said, "A line of skirmishers.

properly handled should have held it." The field of operation was an amphitheatre, and in all probability "no battle was ever fought more completely under the eye of the commander." As one historian says, "Hooker drew attention to the right. Sherman compelled the enemy to mass just as had been designed, and Thomas was made to attack the centre at the critical moment; and more than the results hoped for were accomplished. Armies were moved to fight this battle from the Mississippi and the Potomac, and came upon time; mountains were climbed; rivers bridged and crossed under fire; ridges scaled, though held by hostile armies; and the enemy himself took his part in the plan exactly as had been foreseen, as if he had been under the orders of Grant." sent Bragg flying in retreat, and was the last heard of him. It closed every avenue then open to invasion, shut up the "last gap," and delivered the border from danger by raising the siege of Knoxville, and, relieving the hard-pressed forces of Burnside, drove the last hostile flag in that vast section forever beyond the sight of loyalty. Recognizing that he had gone on in an unbroken march of triumph from the first great national victory at Donelson; had liberated the great inland highway of waters and all its important tributaries; and had annihilated three separate rebel armies, the nation demanded that Grant should be raised to the chief command with a military title never given by the republic but to one, "and that one,

It

Washington." Grant was esteemed by his grateful countrymen the only soldier worthy to bear for the second time the honors of Lieutenant-General of the Armies of the United States.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRE IN THE REAR.

It was said by an influential Northern Democratic paper, "If troops shall be raised in the North to march against the people of the South, a fire in the rear will be opened on such troops, which will either stop their march altogether or wonderfully accelerate it." Later this treasonable "fire in the rear" came. The rebellion would never have touched the point of armed resistance, but for the expectation of sufficient Democratic support to forbid actual war. The doctrine of State rights, the corner-stone of American Democracy, led legitimately to the principle of ultimate supremacy in local government. Secession was the logical result of the theory that final authority was with the State. If the Democratic school was constitutionally correct in holding that the dissolution of government was in the hands of a section rather than of the nation, if a part could break up the whole, then every shot fired by the South was right, and every shot sent back by the North was wrong. The sole difference between the Northern and the Southern Democrat was, the one had the courage to fight for his convictions; the other

had not. The South's glaring mistake was in trusting the pledges, and relying on the co-operation, of Northern Democracy. When it came to the pinch, the Northern end gave out. The action of the South was honorable and pure in comparison with the craven behavior of its allies in the North. The peace men in the loyal States were poltroons as well as traitors.

The South risked

Peace men in the idea, without care

lives and property for an idea. North, sympathizing with that or thought for the country in its struggle for existence, were simply white-livéred re-actionists: keeping out of bodily harm, they were content to smirk with joy when the national flag trailed in the dust. The course of the government in emancipating and in arming blacks gave the peace Democrat opportunity to style the contest "a nigger war." The negro of that day, as is the Chinaman of this, was the special object of hatred by the naturalized alien race which makes so large a part of the Democracy of the North. To such prominence had the peace party risen in 1863, that it became the main auxiliary of the rebellion. Vanquished at the front by veteran, loyal legions, disloyalty saw that its drooping fortunes must be revived in the treason which worked to divide politically the North. By secret orders parading nightly as "Sons of Liberty" and "Knights of the Golden Circle;" by boldly forming and arming military bands wherever Democratic sentiment was in the ascendant; by mobocratic resist