to imagine, and the necessity which made it so came from the insufficient, unsystematic naval authorizations of Congress running back over many years. In the two essential qualities of the modern fleet, homogeneity of type and evenness of speed, they were painfully deficient. The squadron was composed of the most discordant types, and varied in speed from the twenty knots or more of the New York to the monitors' maximum of less than ten. The monitors, in fact, were nothing but a perilous incumbrance. Their low speed. and limited coal-capacity made it necessary to tow them, and they thus reduced the speed of the fleet to about seven knots. In any sort of seaway it was impossible to fight their guns, and if an enemy had been encountered in the open ocean, they would have been a binderance and a danger, not a help. Thus burdened with ships fit only for the smooth waters of a harbor, and with a fleet-speed of seven knots, Admiral Sampson, thanks to the parsimony of Congress, set forth in pursuit of a powerful squadron of homogene ous armored cruisers, with a uniform contract speed of twenty knots.

His departure was the end of the crude idea with which the war opened, that we were to batter down the Morro Castle and the Cabanas forts, land a few thousand troops, and take Havana out of hand. Before the war a high authority was reported to have said that in ten days we could have 40,000 men ready for operations in Cuba. April 23 the President called for 125,000 volunteers, and a month later for 75,000 more. It was at once discovered that but very few of the regiments furnished by the States were fully equipped, while most of them were only partially equipped, and many were not equipped at all. Instead of being able to mobilize 40,000 in ten days, it was found that it was not possible to even partially muster them in that time. While sundry blatant newspapers were clamoring for an immediate advance on Havana, it was becoming quite clear to all men, even in those confused days, that it would take weeks and months, rather than days, to make these really fine volunteers into an army; that the machinery of transportation, supplies, hospital service, and the rest was utterly inadequate for the strain suddenly put upon it, even if it had been good, and it was not good, but bad and rusty. On May 14, ten days after

Sampson's departure for Puerto Rico, there were only a little over 10,000 men at Tampa, and the wise men who had said from the beginning that we ought to move on Puerto Rico, the Spanish base, and not begin in early summer on Havana, ultimately carried their point because of facts more potent than the best reasoning.

But no military movement being possible until we had command of the sea, the pursuit of Cervera's fleet, from both the military and the naval point of view, was the one thing to which all else had to be subordinated. So while the generals and admirals of civil life were laying out and discussing campaigns in the newspapers, facts were putting the real war into the right channels; and while the prepared navy was off after Spain's sea power, the unprepared army was occupying the time thus fortunately given in getting ready with an energy and speed most remarkable when one understood the wretched system imposed upon it by Congress, and the weight of needless clerks, endless red-tape, and fear of responsibility which had grown up in choking luxuriance during the long, neglectful peace.

But although the direct attack on Havana so confidently looked for at the outset was thus practically abandoned, the work of blockading the island and cutting it off from all outside communication went diligently forward. Various expeditious were undertaken to open connection with the Cuban insurgents and supply them with arms and ammunition, as the exaggerated estimate then existing of their numbers and efficiency made the belief general that they could be developed into a powerful offensive force, and be used with effect against the Spaniards. Then and later various expeditions were sent forth in the Leyden, Gussie, and Florida, but they had no result. The earlier landings, managed and conducted in large measure by Captain Dorst of the regular army, a most gallant and accomplished officer, were effective sometimes in the face of a sharp fire. The first skir mishing took place on one of these expeditions, much courage was shown, some blood was shed, arms were landed, and communication opened with the insurgents, but that was the end of it. There was no trouble about the expeditions, but nothing was developed by them among the insurgents.

two cables they had been ordered to destroy. They also found a small cable, but the grapnel fouled the bottom and was lost. Meantime the Spanish fire grew hotter and hotter, pouring out from the batteries and machine-guns, and the boats began to suffer. The well-directed tire from the rifles of the marines and from the 1pounders kept the Spaniards from reaching the switch - house which controlled the submarine torpedoes, but launches could not contend with batteries at close range, and when the work for which they came, and which had all been performed under a heavy fire, was done, they withdrew to the ships. Nine men, including Lieutenant Winslow, had been wounded, some seriously, and three, as was reported later, mortally. It was a very gallant exploit, coolly and thoroughly carried through, under a galling fire, and it succeeded in its purpose of hampering and blocking in the enemy at the important port of Cienfuegos, which was the road to Havana from the southern coast. It was another twist in the coil which the United States was tightening about Cuba. Meantime the ill-assorted fleet under Admiral Sampson was making the best way it could eastward, and the pursuit of Cervera's fleet had fairly begun. It was known when the Spaniards had sailed, but whither they had gone could only be a matter of guess. They might be going to harry the New England coast, or at least, as has been said, some persons thought this possible. More reasonable was the theory that they intended to intercept the Oregon. The great battle-ship had arrived on March 9 at San Francisco, and on the 19th, with Captain Clark in command, she started on her long voyage round Cape Horn, to join the North Atlantic Squadron. On April 7 she left Callao, where she coaled, for Sandy Point, running steadily on through heavy seas, but maintaining high speed. On April 16 she reached the strait, and rode out a severe gale at her anchors, at Port Tamar. The next day the battle-ship was at Sandy Point, where she coaled again, and picked up the gunboat Marietta. On the 21st the ships ran through the strait by which Magellan passed to found Spain's empire in the East, and turned north ward in Atlantic waters. Here came the shadow of a new danger, for the Spanish torpedo-boat Temerario was at Montevideo, menacing an attack in the night. But

there was no change in speed or direction. On the ships forged, with guns shotted, the rapid-fires ready, and lights screened at night. Officers and men stood double watches, and those carried insensible from the fire-room begged to return as soon as they came to themselves. Luckily for her, the Temerario never became visible, and on April 30 the American ships were at Rio. Here they met a cordial reception, and once more were coaled. Here too came news of the existence of war, and of the sailing of the Spanish fleet with an unknown destination. Four powerful armored cruisers and three torpedo-boats, somewhere, perhaps on the track to the north: heavy odds these for one ship. But Captain Clark leaves Rio on May 4, drops his slower consorts, the Marietta and Nictheroy, off Cape Frio, and there is no quiver in his despatch of May 9, from Bahia. He says, quite simply, "The Oregon could steam fourteen knots for hours, and in a running fight might beat off and cripple the Spanish fleet," and those who read these words think of Sir Richard Grenville in the years gone by, and know that the sea spirit of the north, drawn from a far-distant past, is still burning strong and clear in this American captain and his crew. So he leaves Bahia, and on May 18 he is at Barbadoes, and then comes another space of anxiety, deeper among men on land than among those on the battle-ship, and then the country hears, on May 24, that the Oregon is at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, her great voyage done. A pause, and then the world knows that the Oregon, after her 14,000 miles through all seas and weather, is on her way to join the fighting-line, not a rivet, nor a bolt, nor a gearing broken or out of place. It appears very sharply in this fashion that, despite wise critics in Europe, American battle-ships can make great voyages and face the seas as well as fight, and that there is a capacity for true and honest workmanship in the United States very comforting to think on. Very clear, too, is the still greater fact that the American seamen, captain and crew, are filled to-day with the old spirit of the seaconquerors shining undimmed and strong.

So the Spanish fleet did not seek the Oregon, and would have been crippled and shattered if it had made the attempt, and the department very wisely left the battle-ship to take care of herself, and