volume where the case is reported, I will be very brief in my statement of it. It was a motion for an information in nature of a quo warranto against Alexander J. Dallas, who then being the district attorney of the United States, also held the office of recorder of the city of Philadelphia. The recorder is the law judge, or officer of the mayor's court of the city. It was alleged, in support of the motion, that the recorder was a judge, and that as such, it could not be held by a person holding at the same time an office of trust and profit under the United States. It was agreed, that if there were a fair doubt on the question, the court should grant the information, after which the case would be again argued. But it seems, the court had no doubt, and denied the information. opinion delivered, is long and elaborate, and the decision was, that the recorder of the mayor's court is certainly a judicial officer-and as such, as commissioned during good behaviour, and exercises judicial functions, but, that nevertheless, he is not a judge within the meaning of the Constitution; that the Convention has expressly denominated certain judicial officers by the appropriate name of judges, namely, the judges of the supreme court-of the common pleas, and no others; that justices of the peace are part of the judicial power, but are not included under the name of judges. Here (Mr. H.) yielded the floor. The On motion of Mr. INGERSOLL, the committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again; and, The Convention then adjourned. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1838. Mr. FULLER presented a memorial from citizens of Fayette county on the subject of amendments to the Constitution, which was laid on the table. Mr. WOODWARD offered the following resolution: Resolved, That the librarian of the State library be requested to keep the library open and lighted each evening until nine o'clock." The resolution was then read a second time and adopted. Mr. CUNNINGHAM, of Mercer, moved, that the Convention will to day dispense with the daily recess, and that when it adjourns, it will adjourn to meet on Monday morning at 9 o'clock. Mr FULLER, of Fayette, asked for the yeas and nays, and they were ordered. The question was then taken and decided in the affirmative, as follows, viz. YEAS-Messrs. Agnew, Ayres, Baldwin, Banks, Barclay, Bedford, Bell, Bigelow, not stand together on the same platform; they are not regulated by the same principles, and you may safely, or without any violation of principle, or any constitutional incongruity, alter the tenure of the one, and leave the other untouched. I will not detain you by any commentaries upon the points of difference, but be satisfied with stating them. The justices then differ from the judges, in the estimation of the Constitution in these particulars. 1. Their number is not limited. 2. Their jurisdiction is not defined, but left to the Legislature to make it more or less at their pleasure, and it has, accordingly, been greatly extended, both as to the amount or value of the controversy and the subjects of it. 3. The justices have no salaries, but depend entirely on their fees, for their compensation; whereas the compensation of the judges is to be fixed by law, and cannot be diminished during their continuance in office, and they are prohibited from receiving any fees or perquisites. This is a most important difference in their tenures, particularly in relation to the question of independence, which is secured in a much higher degree for the judges, than the justices. 4. The judges cannot hold any other office of profit under the Common. wealth; but this restriction is not extended to the justices; nor can a judge be a member of Congress, or hold any office of profit or trust, under the United States. The justices are not subject to this disability, which also has a direct application to the question of independence. 5. Justices are removable by a majority of each branch of the Legislature, but two thirds are required to remove a judge-a higher independence is here also given to the judge. And finally-6. No appeal is allowed from the judgment of a justice, in many cases which come within their jurisdiction. Is there not abundant evidence here, to show that the Constitution did not intend to place the independence of the justices of the peace, on the same ground-or to guard it with the same care, as that of the judges of the courts, and of course that this committee, and and every member of this Convention, may, without any inconsistency, with out the abandonment of the great principle of judicial independence, consent to limit the commission of a justice of the peace, to a term of years, while he adheres inflexibly to the tenure of good behaviour for the judges! It seems to me, to be impossible to consider these justices, spread over the Commonwealth without stint of number, or place, at the pleasure of the Executive; depending upon the Legislature for their power and emoluments, and upon constables for their popularity and business, to be a part of the regular, permanent, independent judiciary of the State. They, indeed, depend upon the Legislature for their being, who having them wholly under their control, as to jurisdiction and emolument, may legislate them out of their existence. any I have said, that they are not within the prohibition of the eighth section of the second article of the Constitution, forbidding judges to be members of Congress, or to hold any office under the United States. In the first place, we know, that they have been and are elected members of Congress, as well as of the State Assembly, without forfeiting their commissions. But I am corroborated, if it be needed, in this opinion, by the decision of our supreme court, pronounced after full argument and with great deliberation. The case is reported fully in the third vol volume where the case is reported, I will be very brief in my statement of it. It was a motion for an information in nature of a quo warranto against Alexander J. Dallas, who then being the district attorney of the United States, also held the office of recorder of the city of Philadelphia. The recorder is the law judge, or officer of the mayor's court of the city. It was alleged, in support of the motion, that the recorder was a judge, and that as such, it could not be held by a person holding at the same time an office of trust and profit under the United States. It was agreed, that if there were a fair doubt on the question, the court should grant the information, after which the case would be again argued. But it seems, the court had no doubt, and denied the information. The opinion delivered, is long and elaborate, and the decision was, that the recorder of the mayor's court is certainly a judicial officer-and as such, as commissioned during good behaviour, and exercises judicial functions, but, that nevertheless, he is not a judge within the meaning of the Constitution; that the Convention has expressly denominated certain judicial officers by the appropriate name of judges, namely, the judges of the supreme court-of the common pleas, and no others; that justices of the peace are part of the judicial power, but are not included under the name of judges. Here (Mr. H.) yielded the floor. On motion of Mr. INGERSOLL, the committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again; and, The Convention then adjourned. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1838. Mr. FULLER presented a memorial from citizens of Fayette county on the subject of amendments to the Constitution, which was laid on the table. Mr. WOODWARD offered the following resolution : Resolved, That the librarian of the State library be requested to keep the library open and lighted each evening until nine o'clock." The resolution was then read a second time and adopted. Mr. CUNNINGHAM, of Mercer, moved, that the Convention will to day dispense with the daily recess, and that when it adjourns, it will adjourn to meet on Monday morning at 9 o'clock. Mr FULLER, of Fayette, asked for the yeas and nays, and they were ordered. The question was then taken and decided in the affirmative, as follows, viz. YEAS-Messrs. Agnew, Ayres, Baldwin, Banks, Barclay, Bedford, Bell, Bigelow, Chandler, of Chester, Chauncey, Clarke, of Beaver, Clark, of Dauphin, Clarke, of Indiana, Cline, Coates, Cochran, Cope, Crain, Cunningham, Curll, Darlington, Denny, Dickey, Donagan, Donnell, Dunlop, Farrelly, Forward, Foulkrod, Fry, Gilmore, Grenell, Hastings, Hays, Helffenstein, Henderson, of Dauphin. Hiester, Hopkinson, Houpt, Hyde, Ingersoll, Jenks, Keim, Kennedy, Konigmacher, Lyons, Maclay, Magee, Martin, M'Sherry, Meredith, Merrill, Myers, Overfield, Pollock, Porter, of Northampton, Read, Rogers, Russell, Serrill, Sill, Stevens, Sturdevant, Thomas, Todd, White, Woodward, Sergeant, President-74. NAYS-Messrs. Barndollar, Cleavinger, Craig, Crawford, Crum, Darrah, Dickerson, Dillinger, Earle, Fuller, Gearhart, Harris, Hayhurst, Henderson of Allegheny, High, Kerr, Krebs, Mann, M'Call, Merkel, Miller, Montgomery, Pennypacker, Purviance, Saeger, Scheetz, Scott, Sellers, Seltzer, Shellito, Smith, Smyth, Taggart—33. FIFTH ARTICLE. The Convention again resolved itself into a committee of the whole, Mr. M'Sherey in the chair, on the report of the committee, to whom was referred the fifth article of the Constitution. The question being on the motion of Mr. WOODWARD to amend the said report, by inserting the following to be called section second, viz: "The judges of the supreme court shall hold their offices respectively for the term of ten years, but may be re-appointed. The president judges of the several courts of common pleas and the judges of the several district courts, and of such other courts as now are or hereafter may be established by law, shall hold their offices for the term of seven years, but may be reappointed. The associate judges of the several counties shall hold their offices for the term of five years, but may be reappointed. For any reasonable cause which shall not be sufficient ground of impeachment, the Governór may remove any of the said judges on the address of two-thirds of each branch of the Legislature. The said judges shall at stated times receive for their services adequate salaries to be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, but they shall receive no fees, travelling expenses, per diem allowances or perquisites of office, nor hold any other office or profit under this Commonwealth: Provided, That after the ratification and adoption of this Constitution, the Governor shall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, reappoint one of the then existing judges of the supreme court for the term of two years, one of them for the term of four years, one of them for the term of six years, one of them for the term or eight years, and one of them for the term of ten years. And whenever any vacancy occurs on the bench of the supreme court by the death, resignation or removal of any judge thereof, the Governor shall, in the manner aforesaid, fill such vacancy by the appointment of a judge for the unexpired term of the judges so deceased, resigning or removed." Mr. HOPKINSON resumed his remarks. Allow me Mr. Chairman, to refer to one other authority, to show to you, that the independence of the judiciary, in relation to the tenure of the offices of the judges, is by no means identified with that of the justices of the peace. Their character and positions are very different. In the Constitution of Massachusetts, part 1, section 29, it is declared to be "essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life, of the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent, as the lot of humanity will admit. It is, therefore, not only the best policy, but for the security of the rights of the people, and of every citizen, that the judges of the supreme judicial court should hold their offices as long as they behave themselves well, and that they should have honorable salaries ascertained and established by standing laws." In chapter 3d, article 1st, it is declared, that "all judicial officers duly appointed, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, excepting such concerning whom there is a different provision made in this Constitution." In the third article of the same chapter, it is provided, that " in order that the people may not suffer from the long continuance in place of any justice of the the peace, who shall fail of discharging the impotrant duties of his office with ability and fidelity, all commissions of justices of the peace shall expire and become void in the term of seven years from their respective dates." I leave this part of the case here, and proceed to the more important subject of our consideration. Whenever a real, effectual judicial independence has been sought for, it has been found in the tenure for good behaviour and fixed salaries, that the judges may not be at the mercy of the Legislature, or any other branch of the government, either for their offices, or their compensation. There was no such thing as an independent judiciary in England, until it was thus protected. The history of this independence in England is recent and brief. The gentleman on my right, (Mr. Ingersoll) has truly said, indeed it has become an historical_ axiom, that English liberty is dated from the revolution of 1688, but I aver, that neither that, or any other revolution could secure the liberties of a people, unless their laws were administered with true impartiality and unflinching fidelity, without fear of, or favour to, any human power; and for this administration, you must depend upon your courts; and to be assured of it from them, you must make your judges independent of every power and influence, that might press too hard upon them, and put their judgment and integrity to an unreasonable and unnecessary trial. How is it, but by the increased security and independence of the courts of justice, that English liberty is more firm and safe now, than before the revolution? The Executive authority is under no more restraint than before, except in its power over the judiciary; the Legislative authority is the same; but the judges have been made more independent of both the other branches, by giving them certain and established salaries, and making their commissions continue during their good behaviour. By a statute passed in the 13th year of William III, the tenure of the judges was changed from the pleasure of the king to good behaviour. But this tenure was not complete, until it was enacted in the 1st year of George the III, that the demise of the crown should not vacate the commission. The king himself recommen ded this law, declaring, that he looked upon the independence and uprightness of the judges, as essential to the impartial administration of justice; as one of the best securities of the rights and liberties of his subjects, and as most conducive to the honor of the crown." did he propose to obtain for the judges this essential independence and uprightness? By established salaries, and the tenure of good behaviour. And he did thus obtain them; and the justice of an English court, its And how |