that I have been unifomly and utterly opposed to the life tenure; my views on this subject appear in the resolutions and reports on your files. In one of them is asserted the doctrine that the term should be limited to five years. The difference between this proposition and my resolution is in the length of the term proposed. The gentleman from Beaver proposes a term of fifteen years, while my proposition was a term of five years. But I am willing, rather than to lose all-and rather than to forego the opportunity now afforded for establishing the principle of limited tenures, to take the term of fifteen years. Though I do not approve of the proposition, in all its length and breadth, yet I am willing to accede to it, so far as it does suit my views. The principle being once established, it may be safely left to the wisdom of the people, to extend it hereafter as far as they please. By the provision for future amendments, which we shall make, they will have this opportunity. Reserving to myself, therefore, the right to express my views, hereafter, in the form of an amendment to the new Constitution, I am willing, for the sake of compromise, to vote for the term offered by the gentleman from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey.) We will now see who, of the devoted and steadfast friends of a reduced and limited tenure, would go for the amendment. If they will go with us for this compromise, they will gain the principle for which all along we have struggled and contended. The question presented is a plain and practical one. Shall we take this or get nothing? Shall we say to gentlemen who are in favor of the unlimited and life tenure,-"we are better and wiser than you, and we will surrender nothing to your judgment and wishes, but hold to our own propositions, though we cannot carry them?" I am willing to take the best offer I can get, and, therefore, will vote for the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver. Mr. BELL felt himself, he said, in an awkward position in regard to this question, especially after the remarks of the gentleman from Mifflin. The gentleman from Indiana has told us that, if we vote for the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver, we give up every thing; that if we accede to that term of fifteen years, we surrender all the principles for which we have contended. He (Mr. Bell) was really afraid that it was so, and, therefore, he had something to say by way of complaint, on account of the gentleman having put the proposition in, at this time. He wished to speak upon the subject, and, could he speak against the proposition, and vote for it? After the honest declaration from the gentleman from Philadelphia, (Mr. Earle) that he wished and intended to destroy the independence of the judiciary,—and he thanked him for so freely and candidly expressing his opinion upon the question-it could not be expected that the proposition would suit all parties. That gen tleman (Mr. Earle) was opposed to any judicial system which would restrain the sovereignty of the people-and, in that phrase, the sovereignty of the people, there was great danger, especially in the county of Philadelphia. He had a few words to say upon the question, whether limited tenures would destroy the independence of the judiciary. The gentleman from Luzerne had sustained the doctrine that the change would not destroy the judicial independence, but plant it on a rock, and he said he would pledge himself to prove that, instead of destroying the indepen dence of the judiciary, the adoption of the system of limited tenures was his (Mr. Bell's) wish, to take up this argument and follow it out, and he felt it to be his duty to do it, and to show where the doctrine maintained by the gentleman failed. He was sorry to be deprived of this opportunity, at present, by the shape in which the question had been presented by the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver. But the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia, who is called the father of the Convention, and for whom all due veneration was felt, had laid down the position, that the judiciary must be improved by substituting for it the sovereignty of the people; now, what was this popular sovereignty? Was it mere popular clamor? It was so in one sense; but, in another, it was democracy. That popular sovereignty which consists of popular opinion, regulated by reflection and instruction, was entitled to great deference. But I wish to know, said Mr. Bell, if the gentleman wishes to submit the decisions of the judges of Pennsylvania, which decisions operate upon the property, the prosperity and the liberty of all the citizens of the Commonwealth, to the sovereignty of the people for revision, to be approved or reversed, according to popular whim and impulse, without any responsibility or any definite knowledge of the merits of the cases to be thus finally decided? I dare say, (said Mr. Bell) that I shall make myself very unpopular in the county of Philadelphia, if I suggest a doubt as to the feasibility of such a judicial system. He was now placed in a singular position by this amendment. If he voted for it, he might be ranked among those who are in favor of destroying the independence of the judiciary, or of subjecting it to the sovereignty of the people. We had before us the example of the English judiciary, and the learned judge from Philadelphia, had already exhibited to us there, the example of an independent judiciary established by the tenure of good behaviour, before civil liberty was established. He (Mr. Bell) had intended to travel into that argument, and to deduce from it some considerations in favor of the tenure of good behaviour. attention had also been directed to the Constitution of the United States, which was penned by wise, prudent, and honest men, and to the fact that they put in that Constitution the tenure of good behaviour. How was this argument met? Doctor Franklin, whose views of government in 1776, were somewhat Eutopian, had introduced the short term system, and it was agreed to be a decided failure. But, after returning, with all the experience and the weight of character given him by his observation and intercourse in Europe, he become a member of the Convention which formed the federal Constitution, and agreed to the tenure of good behaviour. Have we heard a whisper against the tenure established by the Constitution of the United States? No sir. There sit the federal judges, clothed with life tenures, raised high above the people, and amenable only to impeachment. What is the answer to all this? Why, it is said, that there is a difference between the federal and the state government, in regard to the duties, power, and responsibility of the judiciary. Where is this difference? Gentlemen say that the federal judiciary has to pass judgment upon high political topics-on questions connected with the operations of the departments of the federal and state governments, and therefore, ought not to be subjected to any responsibility, except, through an impeachment. But, am I to be told that the judiciary of Pennsylvania, has no power to pass upon questions connected with His that I have been unifomly and utterly opposed to the life tenure; my views on this subject appear in the resolutions and reports on your files. In one of them is asserted the doctrine that the term should be limited to five years. The difference between this proposition and my resolution is in the length of the term proposed. The gentleman from Beaver proposes a term of fifteen years, while my proposition was a term of five years. But I am willing, rather than to lose all-and rather than to forego the opportunity now afforded for establishing the principle of limited tenures, to take the term of fifteen years. Though I do not approve of the proposition, in all its length and breadth, yet I am willing to accede to it, so far as it does suit my views. The principle being once established, it may be safely left to the wisdom of the people, to extend it hereafter as far as they please. By the provision for future amendments, which we shall make, they will have this opportunity. Reserving to myself, therefore, the right to express my views, hereafter, in the form of an amendment to the new Constitution, I am willing, for the sake of compromise, to vote for the term offered by the gentleman from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey.) We will now see who, of the devoted and steadfast friends of a reduced and limited tenure, would go for the amendment. If they will go with us for this compromise, they will gain the principle for which all along we have struggled and contended. The question presented is a plain and practical one. Shall we take this or get nothing? Shall we say to gentlemen who are in favor of the unlimited and life tenure, we are better and wiser than you, and we will surrender nothing to your judgment and wishes, but hold to our own propositions, though we cannot carry them?" I am willing to take the best offer I can get, and, therefore, will vote for the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver. Mr. BELL felt himself, he said, in an awkward position in regard to this question, especially after the remarks of the gentleman from Mifflin. The gentleman from Indiana has told us that, if we vote for the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver, we give up every thing; that if we accede to that term of fifteen years, we surrender all the principles for which we have contended. He (Mr. Bell) was really afraid that it was so, and, therefore, he had something to say by way of complaint, on account of the gentleman having put the proposition in, at this time. He wished to speak upon the subject, and, could he speak against the proposition, and vote for it? After the honest declaration from the gentle man from Philadelphia, (Mr. Earle) that he wished and intended to destroy the independence of the judiciary,-and he thanked him for so freely and candidly expressing his opinion upon the question-it could not be expected that the proposition would suit all parties. That gen tleman (Mr. Earle) was opposed to any judicial system which would restrain the sovereignty of the people-and, in that phrase, the sovereignty of the people, there was great danger, especially in the county of Phila delphia. He had a few words to say upon the question, whether limited tenures would destroy the independence of the judiciary. The gentleman from Luzerne had sustained the doctrine that the change would not destroy the judicial independence, but plant it on a rock, and he said he would pledge himself to prove that, instead of destroying the indepen dence of the judiciary, the adoption of the system of limited tenures was his (Mr. Bell's) wish, to take up this argument and follow it out, and he felt it to be his duty to do it, and to show where the doctrine maintained by the gentleman failed. He was sorry to be deprived of this opportunity, at present, by the shape in which the question had been presented by the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver. But the gentleman from the county of Philadelphia, who is called the father of the Convention, and for whom all due veneration was felt, had laid down the position, that the judiciary must be improved by substituting for it the sovereignty of the people; now, what was this popular sovereignty? Was it mere popular clamor? It was so in one sense; but, in another, it was democracy. That popular sovereignty which consists of popular opinion, regulated by reflection and instruction, was entitled to great deference. But I wish to know, said Mr. Bell, if the gentleman wishes to submit the decisions of the judges of Pennsylvania, which decisions operate upon the property, the prosperity and the liberty of all the citizens of the Commonwealth, to the sovereignty of the people for revision, to be approved or reversed, according to popular whim and impulse, without any responsibility or any definite knowledge of the merits of the cases to be thus finally decided? I dare say, (said Mr. Bell) that I shall make myself very unpopular in the county of Philadelphia, if I suggest a doubt as to the feasibility of such a judicial system. He was now placed in a singular position by this amendment. If he voted for it, he might be ranked among those who are in favor of destroying the independence of the judiciary, or of subjecting it to the sovereignty of the people. We had before us the example of the English judiciary, and the learned judge from Philadelphia, had already exhibited to us there, the example of an independent judiciary established by the tenure of good behaviour, before civil liberty was established. He (Mr. Bell) had intended to travel into that argument, and to deduce from it some considerations in favor of the tenure of good behaviour. His attention had also been directed to the Constitution of the United States, which was penned by wise, prudent, and honest men, and to the fact that they put in that Constitution the tenure of good behaviour. How was this argument met? Doctor Franklin, whose views of government in 1776, were somewhat Eutopian, had introduced the short term system, and it was agreed to be a decided failure. But, after returning, with all the experience and the weight of character given him by his observation and intercourse in Europe, he become a member of the Convention which formed the federal Constitution, and agreed to the tenure of good behaviour. Have we heard a whisper against the tenure established by the Constitution of the United States? No sir. There sit the federal judges, clothed with life tenures, raised high above the people, and amenable only to impeachment. What is the answer to all this? Why, it is said, that there is a difference between the federal and the state government, in regard to the duties, power, and responsibility of the judiciary. Where is this difference? Gentlemen say that the federal judiciary has to pass judgment upon high political topics-on questions connected with the operations of the departments of the federal and state governments, and therefore, ought not to be subjected to any responsibility, except, through an impeachment. But, am I to be told that the judiciary of Pennsylvania, has no power to pass upon questions connected with where there is a complaint that the legislative branch of the state government has transcended its power? Can this be denied? Have not the judiciary of Pennsylvania repeatedly passed over questions of Constitutional law? Where then is the difference between the federal and the state judiciary, which should render necessary and proper this difference of tenure? Why should independence be necessary for one, and not for the other? As both stand on the same ground, why should not independence of action and decision be as necessary to the judiciary of Pennsylvania as to the federal judiciary? The Convention then rose, reported progress; and, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1837. Mr. FLEMING, of Lycoming, submitted the following resolution, which was laid on the table for future consideration, viz: "Resolved, That this Convention will adjourn on the 30th instant, to meet in the city of Philadelphia, on Monday, the 4th of December next.” Mr. COCHRAN, of Lancaster, submitted the following resolution, which was laid on the table for future consideration, viz: "Resolved, That a committee be appointed for the purpose of ascertaining, and reporting to this Convention, previous to the instant, the most eligible place for the session of this Convention, during the session of the State Legislature." FIFTH ARTICLE. The Convention again resolved itself into a committee of the whole, Mr. M'SHERRY in the chair, on the report of the committee to whom was referred the fifth article of the Constitution. The question being on the amendment of Mr. WoODWARD, as amended by the substitution of the proposition of Mr. DICKEY, making it to read as follows: The "SECT. 2. The judges of the supreme court, of the several courts of common pleas, and of such other courts of record as are, or shall be, established by law, shall be nominated by the Governor, and by and with the consent of the senate, appointed and commissioned by him. judges of the supreme court shall hold their offices for the term of fifteen years, if they shall so long behave themselves well. The president judges of the several courts of common pleas, and of such other courts of record as are, or shall be, established by law,-and all other judges required to be learned in the law, shall hold their offices for the term of ten years, if |