a privilege here, Mr. Chairman, which belongs to every man on this floor, to express his views on all subjects which may be brought up for the deliberation and decision of this Convention, and to be able to place on the same record as well his name, as his reasons for any vote which he may give. And, I could not, Mr. Chairman, consent to change this important feature in the constitution of our state-a feature on which so many great and vital interests of the people of this commonwealth are suspended-without, in the first place, giving my views, and the reasons which have suggested themselves to my mind, why it is right and proper that this change should be made.

I confess, sir, that I have been almost persuaded to vote on this question, in a manner different from that which my reason dictated. I confess that I have been almost persuaded to rank as one among the number of those, who would stand by the constitution under which we have lived and prospered during so long a series of years, and it is with a sincere reluctance that I am compelled to change my opinion. It is with sincere reluctance that I am compelled to vote for a change of that constitution, which has been handed down to us by our fathers, and which was originally the product of minds capable of forming a constitution suited to the wants and happiness of our people, and abundantly capable, also, to judge of the effect of the constitution which they offered to us. I have been taught from my infancy, Mr. Chairman, to revere the early institutions of my country. I have been taught to frown upon any attempt at encroachment upon them—and to defend them from any innovation which might have a tendency to take away from the citizen any portion of his liberties, or his rights. It is, therefore, with great diffidence that I have been induced, on a full investigation of the merits of this question, to sanction in this Convention, or to record my vote, as a member of this Convention, in favor of, any change in any feature of the constitution of 1790. Sir, the constitution of 1790, has been very justly eulogized - not more justly nor properly, than the men who formed it, have been eulogized. There were, indeed, great names attached to that constitution. It was formed at a time when we were in a measure free from party bias, and from those angry influences, which are so apt to distract the councils of men. It was formed, too, at a time when we could bring into requisition the services of men who had had much experience in life. They had lived, for years, under a constitution different from that which they sent forth to the people. They had lived under a constitution which was very similar, in this feature of the judiciary, to the one which the majority of this Convention is now inclined to give to the people. They had tried, fully tried, the constitution of 1776; they had most unquestionably become dissatisfied with it, and they desired that a change should be made. Under all these circumstances, I am compelled to acknowledge that the constitution of 1790, was formed with the best of motives, for the security and the happiness of the people. I cannot justify myself in coming to any other conclusion. It was thought that that constitution would continue to be entirely satisfactory to succeeding generations, that we should continue to prosper under it, and that we should with great reluctance consent to change it.

However, Mr. Chairman, from the beginning-or, at least, very soon

the people, as the constitution framed by this body must be, for their approval or rejection-I say, soon after it went into effect, there was a difficulty in relation to it. There were those who made strong objections to it—and there were some, I believe, who went so far as to say, that portions of it were not congenial to the people. There were some who went so far as to say, that this part of the judiciary would not act satisfactorily on the people; and, from that time to this, not a year, not a day has passed, in which we have not seen petition after petition-remonstrance after remonstrance-and suggestion after suggestion-pouring into your halls of legislation, asking for a change in the constitution in this particular. The legislature have had ample experience, that the people. were dissatisfied at various times. Provisions have been made by the legislature to effect amendments to the constitution; but, in consequence of some unfortunate features in these provisions, it was not found practicable to carry them out. The people would rather submit to the constitution of 1790, with all its objectionable features, than they would give their sanction to one which might be formed, and over which they might afterwards have no control. But, sir, the voice of the people has, at length, been heard. I say, their voice has been heard-we are sent here as the representatives of the people, and we are bound to pay regard to it. We are bound to present a constitution differing in some material features from that, under which we now live. Objections have been made to the people having any influence in this matter; and, sir, we have been told by a gentleman in the course of this debate, (Mr. Forward) that the constitution was framed to protect the minority, and not the majority. And grievous complaints have been made against this majority, Sir, it has been my fortune to know what it is to be in a minority. I have nothing to learn on that score, but, I say, that wherever a majority is found, it is the duty of the minority to submit to it—and to submit even where the majority does wrong, because it is sure finally to do right.

To whom are we indebted for our glorious revolution? Are we not indebted to a majority? To whom do we owe our success in that sacred cause? Do we not owe it to a majority? To whom are we indebted for the constitution of the United States? Are we not indebted to a majority? To whom are we indebted for the wholesome laws under which we live? To whom are we indebted for the many rights and privileges which we now enjoy? Are we not indebted to a majority? We must submit at all times to the majority-and if they should go wrong this year, they will go right the next, or, in all probability, another majority will rise up and take their place. The members of this convention are entitled to the honor of their seats here, by the election of a majority; we are bound to respect and regard the will of that majority, and if the majority are dissatisfied with our proceedings here, we shall hear of it through the ballot box. We shall learn in time whether they are satisfied or not. I am, therefore, inclined to believe that the people have a right to be heard on this subject that their complaints, which have been so often repeated, and to which we have paid so trifling a regard, ought not to be disregarded-and that we shall find it absolutely necessary, however disinclined we may be to do so, to pay respect to this majority-to this voice of the people. I acknowledge, at the same time,

constitution of 1790-or make an experiment of a substitute, and ask the people to accept it. Sir, we live in days of experiment; if the people are desirous of a change, we must give them the opportunity of trying it, and if they find they have erred, they will finally correct the error themselves. Much, very much, has been said, and justly said, about this provision of the constitution of 1790. We have been referred to the history of almost every nation in the world-to the history of ancient as well as of modern nations. We have been asked to turn our eyes to examples here, and examples there; but, as it appears to me, it is not necessary to go beyond the limits of our own republic for any informrtion on this subject. It is not necessory for us to go to the country of Aristotle, or of Cicero, to gather the opinions of the men of those days. It is not necessary for us to go to France, nor to Spain, nor to Rome, nor to Italy, to gather information there. For my own part, I would give more for the opinion of a tenant of a thatched cottage, if he were a citizen of our own county, than I would for all the learned opinions of Aristotle. Sir, it is entitled to more respect, if for no other reason than that it is the opinion of experience. These great men lived in a different age of the world, when the genius of all human institutions was far different from that which predominates at the present day, and consequently, they had no means of forming a judgment calculated to direct our course. Our opinions are formed entirely from the circumstances attendant on the peculiar institutions under which it is our lot to live-and the opinions of men, living under far different institutions-however highly I may respect their judgment on other subjects-can not have any weight with me on this. I cannot be regulated by the opinions of men who never had any experience, nor even any opportunity of testing the practical effect of the opinions which they formed. I would much prefer to examine our own minds, and to take counsel of them. I would much prefer to ask of the experience of others who have lived, and felt, and been governed and proted by the constitution of 1790, than I would ask the opinions of those who can know but very little about the matter.

It has been said, Mr. Chairman, that the government of England, during the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, was somewhat similar to this; that it was a democracy-and that, as the system which we are now about to introduce into the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, was the same as that, we should draw from the history of those times, a lesson that it was unwholesome, and not adapted to the good of the people. Sir, this argument would have been good enough, if the comparison between_the two countries could have been kept up. But we are not able to make a comparison between the government of Oliver Cromwell and the government of our own country. It certainly does appear to me, that the history of the protector Cromwell, whatever he may have done in the exercise of his power-however he may have removed the judges-or however many innocent persons he may have sent to prison, cannot or should not, throw a shadow of doubt over our minds on this subject. It is our design, by the amendment which we propose to the constitution, that our judges should be appointed for a certain number of years, instead of securing their appointments during good behaviour-or, in other words, for life-for it amounts to that-as is provided under the existing constitution

one, do not feel very solicitous. It is desired that the judges of the court of common pleas should hold for a term of years shorter than that of the judges of the supreme court; but on this point, also, I do not feel very anxious. To my mind, sir, it appears, that a judge appointed to office during a limited term of years, and appointed, too, "by and with the advice and consent of the senate" of our state, cannot well be compared with a man who held his office at the will and pleasure of Oliver Cromwell; and I think that so far, therefore, the argument must fall to the ground.

Look at the constitution of the United States! Look at the men who formed the constitution of the United States! I believe that that instrument was formed by men, such as we have not in these days, in which we live men formed-chiselled out-if I may be allowed the expres sion-for the purpose of exercising over our land an influence which, even at this distant day, has not lost its power. I admire that instrument as much as any man-I admire the great wisdom and forecast which is there exhibited; but it is alleged (as an argument) that the same provision as to tenure which exists in the constitution of the state of Pennsylvania, is to be found also, in the constitution of the United States. I have not closely examined this point, but I will explain the idea which has occurred to my mind. The constitution of the United States declares, that the executive "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the "senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present "concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent "of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and con"suls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United "States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and "which shall be established by law." [See constitution United States second section, second article.]

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And it is declared in the second section of the third article of the constitution of the United States, that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of "the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under "their authority."

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me suppose a case by way of iltustrating the manner in which I dispose of this question in my own mind. Let us suppose, for example, that a favorite treaty or measure of general government, is made by and with the advice and consent of the senate. Suppose that some question should be raised as to the constitutionality of the words of the treaty, and which is to be decided by the supreme court of the United States. The question is brought before the judges of that court. Is it not necessary at the time that these judges should be independent of the senate, or of the appointing power? Sir, it is absolutely important and indispensable. Well-this is a case which can not arise under the constitution of the state of Pennsylvania, although it may very often arise under the constitution of the United States. And this case strikes my mind as a strong reason why the constitution of the United States should contain this provision for the tenure of the judges during good behaviour, and not for a limited term of years, as is now proposed

which exists in the one case, does not exist in the other; and, for that reason, the same arguments will not apply.

But again, Mr. Chairman: It has been alleged by members of this body, who are desirous that the constitution of 1790 should continue to be the fundamental law of the land in its present form, that it is necessary that the judges of our courts should be entirely independent of all external circumstances, which can possibly operate upon them; and the gentleman from the county of Franklin, (Mr. Chambers) not able to see any reason why, if we elected the justices of the peace, we should not, on the same principle, elect the judges of our court also. The gentleman said, and said with much truth, that the justices of the peace exercise great control over the people, that they were an important part of the judiciary of our state, and that he saw no reason why we should not elect the judges, if we consented to elect the justices of the peace. I believe I did not misunderstand the gentleman.

Mr. CHAMBERS begged leave to explain: He had been misunderstood, he said, by the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Sturdevant). He (Mr. C.) had imputed inconsistency to the colleague of the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) in this respect; namely, that that gentleman and his friends had expressed the opinion that the justices of the peace were an important part of the judiciary, and not distinguishable from the judges—and yet they were in favor of the election of the justices, when they would not recommend an election of the judges. He (Mr. C.) considered the justices of the peace to be, nominally, a part of the judiciary, but as being distinguishable from the judges.

Mr. STURDEVANT resumed. I accept the explanation of the gentleman. However, although he might not have been in favor of the election of the justices of the peace, he could see no reason why the election should prevail in one case, and not in the other. The justices of the peace, for instance, are elected from among the people. The people are personally acquainted with them. They form an opinion at once, how far a man is to be trusted, and he is to be elected only for a short term of years. Suppose the people should make the attempt to elect a judge in the same way as they would elect the justices of the peace, and that they should proceed in their several counties or districts, to the election. Is it not of the greatest importance that a judge who sits in particular district should come from some other portion of that district? Take a lawyer, for instance, from the midst of his clients and cases, with which he has been connected for years, and place him on the bench in that particular place. Would not this be highly improper? Would it not be highly improper to take a lawyer right from among them, and to make him a judge, when, probably, he might be concerned in the very cases which are down on the list for trial? This, in my view, is an insurmountable difficulty, although it is a difficulty which will not prevail in the election of the justices of the peace. And it is absolutely necessary that this feature in the judiciary should continue in its present form. I am persuaded that an alteration in this respect would not answer any beneficial purpose.

But, Mr. Chairman, it has been said that, if your judges are appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, they will be under some political influence and excitement, that they will, in all