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popular sovereignty, represented in a legislature. That the Declaration of Independence should be quoted for the constitutional tenure, infers a dearth of authority for it, since it is well known, that the author of that declaration, is the apostle of the opposite doctrines, and condemns the life tenure in the following strong terms, which I read from one of the letters published by his family, since his death:

"Let the future appointment of judges be for four or six years, and renewable by the president and senate. This will bring their conduct, at regular periods, under revision and probation, and may keep them in equipoise between the general and special governments. We have erred in this point by copying England, where certainly it is a good thing to have the judges independent of the king. But we have omitted to copy their caution also, which makes a judge removeable on the address of both legislative houses. That there should be public functionaries independent of the nation, whatever may be their demerit, is a solecism in a republic, of the first order of absurdity and inconsistency."

This retrospect brings us to the constitution of 1776, by which the longest judicial tenure was seven years. Having, on a former occasion, spoken somewhat at large of the judicial features of that constitution, I shall not dwell upon them now. And I yield, without reserve, what was labored by the honorable chairman of the judiciary committee, that a large majority of the framers of the present constitution, as well as of those who framed the constitution of the Union, partook of the sentiments so well maintained in the Federalist, No. 78, to which that gentle. man refers, that a tenure of good behaviour, according to the American experiment, was the best. On the other hand, I earnestly insist, that it was an untried experiment, of which mankind, under any form of government, had no former experience; and, upon that postulate, I proceed to show that the experiment has signally failed, and that we must go back again to something more like the British constitution, and more consistent with the acknowleged sovereignty of the people. We are in the midst of a revolution. Certainly we are. It is the element of our political existence, a revolution which I trust never will end, yet be always bloodless, a peaceable contest with antiquated establishments, and considerate trial of new ones, popular, economical, fiscal, jurisprudential, legislative, executive and judicial. I wish that James Wilson and Thomas M'Kean, two of the first and most distinguished signers of the present constitution, had voices in this assembly. For I feel confi. dent that they would be among the foremost to declare the failure of their judicial experiment, and to second that reformation of it which is to reinstate the rights of the mass to control all departments of govern

ment.

Distilled to a result, what are all the objections of Messrs. Hopkinson and Merrill, but apprehensions of the people, whom they fear to trust with perfect self-government? Montesqueiu is cited to warn us of the dangers of extreme democracy; Marius, Cromwell and Napoleon are paraded as the gorgons of a demagogue licentiousness. Even when the constitutional right of petition is appealed to, by the memorial from Fayette, couched in respectful terms, and praying for none but temperate, and I should say judicious reforms, we are told to deprecate town meeting authority, tavern instructions, and idle resolutions, signed by we

Like the general of an army, some unprincipled leader gives the watchword, and immediately his followers decry the best members of a commonwealth as aristocrats in one country or federalists in another. Lord George Gordon, at the head of a mob, is made to cry no popery, and rush upon destruction on the one hand, while disappointed suiters, impertinent lawyers, and noisy partisans, on the other, are clamoring against the administration of justice. All this is nothing more than an apprehension we do not feel, and a want of confidence we disown. It can hardly be called argument. It is indeed warning, perhaps wise warning; but it is advice we cannot take, because we have no faith in it. We trust the people. We believe in self-government. Thus far the experiment has never disappointed us.

On the contrary, the farther it has been carried, the better it has worked; and avoiding all rash, wild, and visionary undertakings, we cannot now be deterred, as experience teaches, to carry out, still farther, the great principle of popular sovereignty. We have seen, within the last few days, that in matters of conscience, and of honor, (brought under consideration by the provision against duelling) there are sentiments, and those perhaps among the strongest in human nature which cannot be argued down, or hardly reasoned with at all. Love and politics belong to this catagory. All that we can do, therefore, is to agree to differ with the venerable chairman of the judiciary committee, (Mr. Hopkinson) because our faith is totally different from his. We confide, without fear. He mistrusts, without confidence. We are for reforming back the judicial tenure to something like the English exemplar, and that of our colonial forefathers, satisfied that the first experiment of a less popular tenure has entirely failed, and that we must try another. I agree that we must demonstrate its failure, that we must show how the system may be improved by renovation, and that we do nothing unless we act with the will of the people. For my part, I religiously believe, that the voice of the people is a DIVINE Voice, which, once fairly ascertained, is unquestionable, not only in its power, but its good sense and good feeling. I only trust, therefore, because I have implicit confidence.

I think it stands to reason, and is an ordinance of the Creator, that a mass of men must be more rational and less selfish, than any one man; that they are less liable to bad passions, than any individual, and better endowed with instincts of salutary regulation and self preservation. A community must be, a higher oracle of wisdom than any individual, even though that individual, come to be canonized for his virtues, as the father of a country, like Washington himself. And so do my respected friends, the members from Philadelphia, Union, and Chester, (Messrs. Hopkinson, Merrill, and Bell) in all matters of law, for it is only when they come to politics, that they gainsay popular sovereignty. The common law, to which they are all so much attached, is nothing but the common sense of the common people, whose canons and very rudiments every lawyer is obliged, by his professional religion, to prefer, to whatever may be said to the contrary, by the wisest man that can be appealed to. All goverment is but relative good. Much of it is positive evil. Wisdom is often mere foolishness: and, among the little we know, with any certainty, if there be one thing which, above all others, we may be assured

it is that too much government is an evil, and too much self-government little to be feared,

The learned and venerable member from Philadelphia, with many others, whose superiority I unfeignedly confess, deny or doubt this doctrine, and I cannot say they may not prove to be right at last. He says that man must be a slave, who in his representative capacity, suffers others to think for him; and to him political pledges are, as he says, inconceivable.

Yet, said Mr. I., the 20th section of the 1st article of the constitution of Michigan, one of the last and best that has been framed, consecrates what is to be found in equally explicit terms, in many of the constitutions of New England, the right of popular instruction, which that gentleman denies to be a right at all. When, therefore, he warns us not to be wiser than Aristotle, Cicero, Bacon and Locke, we differ upon a dividing principle, for I insist that my friends, the three youngest members of this body, (Messrs. Purviance, Butler and Rogers,) are better informed politicians, more practically conversant with the principles of free government, than any of those celebrated personages.

In short, we reformers go by the mass, when their opinion is well ascertained, while the learned and venerable Judge goes by the man, and relies on his individual wisdom. He is for self confidence. We are for self government. And although deference to his better judgment is habitual with me, yet do I feel an unconquerable prepossession that there is more intelligence and patriotism in the state than in this convention, and in any large body of people, than in any select class, or chosen number.

As to Aristotle, I have carefully studied all that he has written, as far as it has been translated into our language, and I brought with me, to this place, to read in the original, for my edification, that fragment which has been preserved to us of Cicero's treatise on a republic. Still I deny the capacity of either Aristotle or Cicero, to teach the youngest American as much as he already knows of the practice of representative government; for neither of those wise men of antiquity had even the most remote idea of that representative principle, which is now so familiar to every child. I deny their authority as a christian, for neither of them could conceive of christian charity; and I deny their authority as an American, for neither of them believed that there was any world west of the straits of Gibraltar.

A lady of my acquaintance frequently reproaches that vulgar sailor, Columbus, for having discovered this democratic continent, and cast her lot so far from those more fashionable regions of Europe, which are large enough, she thinks, at all events, for all ladies and gentlemen.

In short, Mr. Chairman, I demur to the authority of Aristotle and Cicero, because as neither of them was aware of the true solar system, the mariner's compass, the circulation of the blood, the art of printing, or a common newspaper, gunpowder, or the society of friends-whose wives had not a chemise to their backs, nor even had a common pin for their clothes-I am vain enough to believe that we are better American politicians than we could learn to be from their works. Locke

Carolina; and Judge Bacon, I submit, is not the man whose name should be held up for imitation, on a question of judicial integrity, and independence.

Last, in this list of personal authorities, a name was introduced, which I have already said, I think should have been left out of view on this occasion. But, as it has been made the subject of an eloquent appeal to the emotions and reverence of this assembly, I shall not hesitate, as I do not fear, to meet such eloquence by simple argument, and plain fact. I, too, sir, like the learned judge, have seen that god-like man.-God-like, he was, in size, aspect, presence, and behaviour, as much as in the noble properties of his spirit, and the admirable discipline of his temper. I can see him now, with a vivid recollection of his personal appearance, as eloquently described by the venerable judge, when he stood up in congress, with, if I mistake not, a sword by his side, and what in Europe is called, a court dress, that is, the garb worn by persons who appear in the presence of monarchs. I never can forget the impressions of such a scene, which might effect a youthful imagination with sentiments that maturer years may somewhat change. Without pretending to determine what is right on such occasions, I shall simply state the fact, that when WASHINGTON's first and favorite secretary, succeeded him in the American chief magistracy, he abolished the royal custom of personal address, and sent a message to congress, which reform whether right or wrong and I give no opinion on the subject, but, resting my argument on the mere fact, has probably, proved acceptable to fourteen hundred thousand, of the sixteen hundred thousand voters in the United States.

One of the learned judge's illustrations, was remarkably characteristic of the intense directness, with which he goes straight, may I venture to add, and I might say, headlong, to any conclusion he believes in. His wish is, often father to his thought. He set up for our example, the constitution of Massachusetts, from which he read a part to bear the testi'mony, of such men as Mr. Adams, Mr. Webster, and Mr. Story, to the necessity of that judicial independence, which he thinks we should cherish. But we go to a different school. We do not worship at that shrine. We do not presume to desecrate it. On the contrary, I repeat my profound respect for it. But by instinct, I am unable to bow down before it. Its religion may be the true one. We, who deny it, may all come to repent our error. But till we do, such arguments, shall I be excused for saying, are in a vein of downright simplicity. At all events they fully justify, that by which I would shew, that on great principles, we must sometimes agree to differ.

Such, then, is the platform, on which we propose to place our contemplated reform of the judiciary-to bring that branch of government, in better acceptance with the sovereign power, according to what we believe, is its will. And, really, there is but one difficulty connected with this movement, which is, simply, to ascertain, what is that will. This is no party question, but, purely popular. To quote the learned judge, the people must be the democracy, and the democracy must be the people, in such a question. The candid and manly concession of the gentleman from Union, (Mr. Merrill) spares me much an argument in

it is that too much government is an evil, and too much self-government little to be feared,

The learned and venerable member from Philadelphia, with many others, whose superiority I unfeignedly confess, deny or doubt this doctrine, and I cannot say they may not prove to be right at last. He says that man must be a slave, who in his representative capacity, suffers others to think for him; and to him political pledges are, as he says, inconceivable.

Yet, said Mr. I., the 20th section of the 1st article of the constitution of Michigan, one of the last and best that has been framed, consecrates what is to be found in equally explicit terms, in many of the constitutions of New England, the right of popular instruction, which that gentleman denies to be a right at all. When, therefore, he warns us not to be wiser than Aristotle, Cicero, Bacon and Locke, we differ upon a dividing principle, for I insist that my friends, the three youngest members of this body, (Messrs. Purviance, Butler and Rogers,) are better informed politicians, more practically conversant with the principles of free government, than any of those celebrated personages.

In short, we reformers go by the mass, when their opinion is well ascertained, while the learned and venerable Judge goes by the man, and relies on his individual wisdom. He is for self confidence. We are for self government. And although deference to his better judgment is habitual with me, yet do I feel an unconquerable prepossession that there is more intelligence and patriotism in the state than in this convention, and in any large body of people, than in any select class, or chosen number.

As to Aristotle, I have carefully studied all that he has written, as far as it has been translated into our language, and I brought with me, to this place, to read in the original, for my edification, that fragment which has been preserved to us of Cicero's treatise on a republic. Still I deny the capacity of either Aristotle or Cicero, to teach the youngest American as much as he already knows of the practice of representative government; for neither of those wise men of antiquity had even the most remote idea of that representative principle, which is now so familiar to every child. I deny their authority as a christian, for neither of them could conceive of christian charity; and I deny their authority as an American, for neither of them believed that there was any world west of the straits of Gibraltar.

A lady of my acquaintance frequently reproaches that vulgar sailor, Columbus, for having discovered this democratic continent, and cast her lot so far from those more fashionable regions of Europe, which are large enough, she thinks, at all events, for all ladies and gentlemen.

In short, Mr. Chairman, I demur to the authority of Aristotle and Cicero, because as neither of them was aware of the true solar system, the mariner's compass, the circulation of the blood, the art of printing, or a common newspaper, gunpowder, or the society of friends-whose wives had not a chemise to their backs, nor even had a common pin for their clothes-I am vain enough to believe that we are better American politicians than we could learn to be from their works. Locke

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