It is estimated by men of judgment that the revolution is now three times as strong as it was at its height during the previous insurrection.

Any insurgent force that now attempts to enter Santiago will have to jump over, climb through, or cut down a three-stranded barbed wire fence which now surrounds the city.

For a fortification, I suppose.

Yellow fever, though still bad among Spanish soldiers, has not seemed quite so virulent during the past week. Deaths for week, 105. Yellow fever, 41; smallpox, 1.

Mr. GRAY. From whom is that?

Mr. MORGAN. That is from our consul at Santiago. I pass over a number of places which I had marked for the purpose of calling attention to them, but it would protract the story too much for me to undertake to give all these incidents as the narrative proceeds. On the 21st of August he writes to Mr. Adee:

SIR: I have the honor to report the situation in Cuba to be deeply interesting.

With perhaps the exception of Santa Cruz, the Government forces hold every important seaport town and a few large towns in the interior, while from Cienfuegos east, which constitutes three-fourths of the island, the insurgents hold the balance of the territory and some territory farther west.

Cuban leaders claim 25,000 men, mostly under arms, in the province of Santiago and 10,000 farther west. I think the number overstated by at least eight or ten thousand men, but I am inclined to the opinion that there are many more ready to join them when assured that they will be supplied with arms and ammunition.

That arms and ammunition are now coming quite freely to Cuba there seems little room for doubt. A paper published here called The Public Opinion has recently declared that if the Government would look more carefully after the large carrying companies and less for filibustering expeditions they would find the source of trouble.

Those who desire to see the island restored to peace are much depressed, as there is at present three times as large a force of insurgents as at any time in the previous insurrection.

Then he gives an account of more battles which occurred in his vicinity. Then, under date of October 10, writing to Mr. Uhl, he says:

SIR: Judging by results that tend to terminate a war, the situation in Cuba, from an American standpoint, might aptly be termed one of "masterly inactivity." But few engagements have occurred up to the present time that should be dignified by a higher title than a skirmish.

Cuban tactics are to fight only when they have the Spaniards at a disadvantage, and at other times small attacking parties will fire from ambush on the Government forces for the purpose of demoralization, or to induce the troops to follow them to a more advantageous place for battle; but the Spaniards seem to understand this, and thus far have declined to accept battle on such terms.

The Cubans assert that they can not afford to make a stand in an open field, or even behind ordinary breastworks, with their present quota of arms and ammunition, as every shot must count; while being themselves acclimated and thoroughly inured to Cuban climate, diet, and modes of living and traveling, they can kill more Spaniards by fatigue, exposure, and disease, and at less sacrifice to themselves, than by hand-to-hand battles, and by such tactics can continue the war indefinitely.

The Spanish forces can not long remain away from their base of supplies, as their quartermaster, commissary, ordnance, and hospital supplies are all carried on the backs of pack mules. No tents or shelter of any kind are provided for soldiers on the march, nor any ambulance service for the sick and exhausted.

The Red Cross tendered their services to go in there, but they have never heard from the Spanish Government upon the subject. Up to the present time Spain has put into the field about 80,000 soldiers, probably a little more than one-half of which are now available for active operations. The best-informed persons here estimate the active Cuban force at 25,000 or 28,000.

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Spanish agents, Spanish newspapers, as well as American newspapers, have for months openly declared that certain vessels carrying the British flag and

conveying iron ore from Cuba to the United States have on their return trips carried articles contraband of war, which they have disposed of through persons connected with the mines and landed at certain points along the coasts.

And thereupon the Government of Spain, through the CaptainGeneral, established fortifications at those American iron mines upon the avowed pretense of prohibiting or preventing those men from receiving what they called "contraband of war." They were obliged to receive powder in large quantities for the purpose of conducting their iron works and their regular business; but inasmuch as the Captain-General said there was a possibility of such things falling into the hands of the insurrectionists, they forbid their importation, under the doctrine of their being contraband. There is something which needs inquiry. I do not mean the special instance, for perhaps not much loss has occurred on that account, but as to a Government with which we are at peace, and that peace secured by treaty guaranteeing to us wide commercial privileges and providing rules and regulations by which contraband of war in time of war may be excluded from the island, how can that Government, while saying that peace prevails, contend that there is contraband of war when a merchant in the United States ships a keg of powder to his consignee in Cuba?

What right have they in a time of peace to interpose and examine the cargoes of our ships upon principles of war and declare these things contraband? They can not do it except when they make a declaration of war against the ports or places at which these articles are to be landed, establish a blockade, and interpose that declaration as creating the rights which are given by war of inspecting a vessel to see whether its cargo is contraband. But here, while they declare that a state of war exists in four provinces of Cuba, and put out their proclamation to that effect, and in virtue of that fact insist upon the existence there of war-while they are in that condition in regard to their own people, for the purpose of putting down a rebellion that they can not subdue, they hold out to us the relations of peace and amity and friendship, and say, "You must not import into Cuba powder or shot or any munitions of war, because they have become contraband."

That is a position which can not possibly be submitted to by the Government of the United States, and when they insist, as they do insist, that war obtains in their own provinces in Cuba, and so proclaim to the world, and follow it up by seizures of the cargoes of vessels because they are contraband, then of course what we have got to do, and all we can do, is to declare, along with them, that a state of public war exists in that country, and that these things are contraband; but that if our people can get through their blockaders, it is all right and no longer illegal to sell them to the recognized belligerents. Spain can not declare that one of our merchants shall have his property, his ship and his cargo, confiscated in time of peace by imposing upon that vessel a hostile characteristic because it has on board articles contraband. Spain must say that she is at war with another power, which is a part of her own provinces, and being at war, she has a right to declare those imports contraband which would assist the enemy in waging war.

Mr. Hyatt proceeds again on the 16th of October to say:

SIR: The Cubans assert that they could quickly double or treble their forces in the field if they could only equip them for service, in which case they would take the aggressive; but as it is they are obliged to husband their resources to the fullest extent to meet the Government forces that are armed

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with Mauser rifles and well supplied with ammunition, while they, the insurgents, are confined largely to such resources as by "hook or crook" they can obtain from the Spaniards.

On the 11th instant the insurgents captured between Santiago and Manzanillo 17 soldiers with personal arms and 4,000 cartridges, which were being conveyed to a fort 2 leagues from the coast. The Spanish soldiers were set free, but I learn that the lieutenant in command has been court-martialed and will be shot for surrendering.

Then he speaks of the coming in of certain cargoes on board of ships that were landed surreptitiously on the coast.

Then Mr. Casanova writes that the war had included his consulate at Cienfuegos, and speaks of it as follows:

The destruction of sugar estates has been principally directed against buildings of strategic value to the Government troops or that might serve them as shelter; generally buildings of abandoned sugar estates, though occasionally of late the dwellings and labor quarters on "colonias, " or cane farms, have been destroyed. Some of these cases are due to political rancor toward the proprietors who have made themselves conspicuously hostile to the insurgents.

As the most important measure proclaimed by the revolutionary government (leaders?) is the prevention of sugar making, with a view to crippling the resources of the Spanish Government, it is likely that more extensive destruction will follow, as threatened by the insurgents, in the approaching crop season unless this Government is able to afford needed protection by garrisoning the plantations with sufficient forces to enable planters to work in safety. As the insurgents up to the present time to so great extent control the surrounding country, the prospect for preventing the consummation of their plans is not very reassuring, and in consequence great despondency prevails in all classes of the community, so largely interested and dependent on the sugar crop. In fact, on this vital question is involved the gravest problem to the life of this district, and the same applies to the rest of the island.

On the 16th of November, Mr. Hyatt, writing from Santiago de Cuba, says:

SIR: I have the honor to very respectfully offer a brief résumé of the situation in Cuba as it appears to one who has watched it carefully from its inception to the present, a period of nearly eight months.

The total strength of the insurgents at present is between thirty-five and forty thousand men, 10,000 of which are not well armed, but are useful in other directions, which number would be quickly increased if arms and ammunition were available.

Their generalship has been neither brilliant nor dashing, and it has indeed been questionable whether they have not allowed important advantages to get away from them for want of well-directed heroism, yet, on the whole. well calculated to conserve their cause.

Their settled purpose is to fight only when they have advantage in position and numbers; but to harass the Government troops, mostly with small detachments, and depend upon their better knowledge of the country and greater powers of endurance to avoid punishment, and by the aid of yellow fever, dysentery, etc., to finally wear out the Government forces.

Discipline is maintained better than might be expected, and desertions are infrequent, owing to the great difficulty in escaping from the island, so the deserter must either go to the enemy or go home and face Cuban scorn.

As a rule the Cuban army is healthy, their powers of endurance are great, and they show not the slightest disposition to give up the fight.

When prisoners are taken, if they can not be induced to change their allegiance, they are disarmed and released.

They have levied and collected heavy assessments on every industry possible, and seem to have plenty of money.

I am unable to say how much success has attended their attempts to establish a local and permanent government. I think, however, it is of a movable nature.

They respect American property and rights much more than those of other nations.

On the part of Spain there is no lack of disposition to supply all the men and means necessary to subdue the rebellion; but the first 30,000 troops sent to the island were largely boys, too young and inexperienced to take proper care of themselves, and many of them have succumbed to exposure and disease. The later arrivals were more mature men and are able-bodied soldiers. They have also several thousand volunteer natives and acclimated Spaniards, making the number placed in the field up to the present time nearly 100,000, 30,000 of which are dead or unavailable, leaving for service about twice as many as the Cubans have, and are better armed and equipped. About one

third of this number are kept on guard duty, a portion of which may be called off in emergencies, so that fifty-five or sixty thousand are available for field service.

Up to the present writing most of the Spanish forces continue to occupy mostly the cities and large towns near the seacoast, or about the mines, railroads, and large plantations. Transportation of troops and supplies is by steamships along the coast.

In the person of her captain and governor-general, Martinez Campos, Spain possesses a soldier and statesman of marked ability, who tempers justice with mercy to a large extent.

With the exception of iron mining, nearly every industry on the island is going rapidly to destruction, and nothing but a sudden termination of the war can prevent the island from becoming a waste that will require many years to repair.

Native-born Americans have but little cause to complain in regard to their treatment by Spanish officials, and even our naturalized Cubans are treated with far more consideration than those of other nationalities. So apparent is this distinction that it has become a subject of complaint on the part of citizens and consuls of other nations, and has been met by the reply that their treaty with the United States differed with that of other nations, and a counter reply has been made that they were entitled to the " most-favorednation clause."

On the 2d of December Mr. Casanova says:

The prevention of sugar making is the most settled and determined policy of the insurgents. There have been already cases of partial burning of plantations in this consular district, some of them owned by Americans.

In this connection I deem it proper to submit to the Department the following data of the property represented by Americans in the sugar industry in this consular district alone, either residents here or owned by corporate companies in the United States. These plantations are of the most valuable here, yielding an aggregate yearly production of over 600,000 bags, or 86,000 tons, of sugar, at an estimated value of over $4,600,000 at present low prices. There are, besides, large American interests invested in cultivation of cane for supplying the sugar factories.

The effect of the present business depression and the impoverishment of the country that is becoming evident, all largely attributable to the crop difficulties, manifests itself in the lessened importation of goods, the shrinkage of consumption already affecting trade very seriously.

Mr. Casanova writes, under date of December 12, an interesting statement, as follows:

The larger part of the effective insurgent forces that heretofore operated in the eastern department of the island have gradually invaded the department of Las Villas and are now operating in this and the neighboring districts. These forces comprise some 16,000 to 20,000 men, both cavalry and infantry, fairly well armed, under command of Maximo Gomez, as general in chief of all the insurgent forces, and Antonio Macco, his second in command, with other less noted leaders. This army, the largest that has so far in this war been gathered together in a body, has maneuvered to evade any pitched battle with the various large columns of Government troops acting in combination against them. Several partial engagements have taken place, but without any important results.

The evident purpose of the insurgents is to penetrate further into the heart of this section with large forces and carry the war eastward into the richest and most productive districts. At last accounts the main insurgent army above referred to was in the vicinity of Santa Clara, the capital of the department of Las Villas, one detachment being sent to the vicinity of Trinidad, under command of a colored leader, to destroy the few sugar estates that remain there, the largest of which belongs to an American company. Aside from the above-mentioned forces, there are the numerous bands in larger or smaller numbers that continue to infest every part of the country, harassing the troops and carrying on the usual guerrilla warfare.

The laying waste of all the country and prohibition to the farmers to market their produce or move cattle is causing great hardship and privation. But chief in gravity, in its fearful import to the community, is the impending failure of the sugar crop. This is being effectually prevented by the insurgents in this district, and no attempts are being made by planters to manufacture sugar. Even this passive acceptance of ruin by the planters does not obtain for them immunity from the destruction of their property. The firing of cane fields is assuming alarming proportions; thousands of acres of valuable cane fields are daily being burned, and, notably, on three of the largest sugar estates in this consular district, owned by Americans, the cane fields have been devastated. The machinery and buildings on sugar estates are of great value, costing from half a million to more than one million dollars. The Government, on application, grants a squad of soldiers to guard

those buildings, but not in sufficient force to be entirely effective. Many planters prefer to take the chances of mercy from the insurgents by being ungarrisoned rather than draw on themselves their certain hostility and revenge unless effectively protected.

The recent reenforcements of 25,000 men from Spain will be mostly required for active field service, and not available for the defense of the sugar estates. Thus the existence and future of this valuable industry is threatened with complete annihilation.

I must not detain the Senate by matters which can possibly be omitted from this statement and yet give to the country a fair and just statement of the actual situation in Cuba. Writing on the 7th of January, 1896, Mr. Ramon O. Williams, our consul-general at Habana, says:

With reference to the proclamation of the Captain-General of the 2d instant, declaring a state of war to exist in the provinces of Habana and Pinar del Rio, copy and translation of which accompanied my dispatch No. 2695, of the 4th instant, I have to inform you that the newspapers, now under military censorship, report the burning of the sugar-cane fields throughout a large portion of this province by the insurgents, who entered it, as variously esti mated by popular rumor, numbering all the way from 4,000 to 12,000 men, on foot and horse.

Besides the burning of the cane fields, the newspapers report cases of damage to railroads by the displacing of rails, the cutting of telegraph and telephone lines, the blowing up of culverts, burning of bridges and stations; also the pillaging of country stores, the carrying off of horses, saddles, and bridles from farms on their line of march for the mounting of their men, and the slaughter of cattle for food. Among the railroad stations destroyed are those of Ginviean and Guira de Melena, distant from here, respectively, about 28 and 40 miles on the line from Habana to Güines, and that of Gabriel, about 25 miles on the railroad from Habana to Pinar del Rio; the villages also were burned.

The trains on the first-named road only ran yesterday as far as Bejucal; on the Western Road from Habana to Pinar del Rio, only about 30 miles out, and on the Habana Bay and Matanzas no train goes beyond the latter city. All the railroads have handed in their rolling stock as much as possible to prevent its destruction.

Mr. WHITE. From what page does the Senator read?
Mr. MORGAN. Page 52, January 7, 1896.

On the 15th the same officer gives an account of the capture of a village on the Bay of Habana. Then, on the 15th of January, he writes:

In continuation of my dispatch No. 2707, of the 11th instant, reporting the doings of the insurgents in the Provinces of Habana and Pinar del Rio, I have now to say that, according to the newspapers and private accounts, the only sources of information at the disposal of this office, the insurgents have still continued in their marches and countermarches to leave havoc throughout their train.

They have wrought so much destruction on the Western Railroad, an English company, that the directors have resolved to stop their running. They also burned a large part of the important town of Bejucal, on the Habana and Güines Railroad, because of the resistance made there by the local authorities and volunteers. At the present writing there is no immediate prospect of their being driven out of the two mentioned provinces.

He then gives an order of Maximo Gomez dated January 10, in which he says:

Considering that the operations of the sugar crop have become suspended in the western districts, and it being no longer necessary to burn the cane fields, I therefore issue the following order:

ARTICLE 1. The burning of the sugar-cane fields is hereby absolutely prohibited.

ART. 2. The severest penalties of the military and civil jurisdictions of the revolution will be visited, regardless of rank and station in the army, upon each and all who contravene this order.

ART. 3. The buildings and machinery will be destroyed of all plantations that, despite this humane order, resume work.

ART. 4. All the inhabitants of the Island of Cuba, of whatever nationality, will be respected in their persons and agricultural occupations.

MAXIMO GOMEZ, General in Chief.