on board the ships mitrailleuses and field-pieces were mounted on the gunnels, and, as the attack was to a certain extent expected, a good lookout was kept. It seems that a Russian steamer, taking five torpedoes in tow, left Odessa shortly after dark. On arriving to within some ten miles from the Turkish squadron, the boats steamed away from their escort, and as the lighthouse at the Sulina mouth was lighted on account of the neutrality of the Danube navigation commission who owned it, they had no difficulty in approaching the Ottoman ships. On they came, gallantly enough, till within a mile or so distant they were seen or heard by the lookout steamers, who at once gave the alarm, and then the row began. One steam torpedo-boat, however, managed to run the gantlet of the guard-boats, and came through them bravely at the headmost Turkish ship. No one knows exactly what happened, except that the torpedo on the spar at the boat's bows went off harmlessly, the torpedo-boat capsized and went down, and the officer who commanded her and all his crew were picked up floating about in the water. What became of the other torpedo-boats was never known. Some say that another may have been sunk in the mêlée; the Russian account says, however, that the other four vessels regained their steamer escort, and were towed back to Odessa. Several other attacks by steam-launches armed with the spar-torpedo were made on the Turkish squadrons which were cruising and otherwise employed in the Black Sea, sometimes when the men-ofwar were at anchor, sometimes while they were cruising-all with the same result, namely, failure.

The most remarkable of these attacks was made by four torpedo-boats on a single iron-clad man-of-war lying at anchor off Souhounkali, on the coast of Circassia. The steamer with which were the torpedo-boats kept a long way off in the offing, and approached after nightfall. It so happened, curiously enough, that a total eclipse of the moon took place about midnight. The shrewd Muscovites, profiting by the temporary darkness caused by the phenomenon, dispatched their torpedo-launches against their intended victim the moment the moon was obscured and utter darkness prevailed. But the Turkish commander was quite equal to the occasion: his boats were as usual rowing guard round his ship, and his swinging booms rigged out to represent torpedo

spars. Unhappily, the Turks had no torpedoes. On the approach of the torpedo-boats a tremendous fire was opened upon them from the boats and from the vessels at anchor. Again, as at Sulina, the greatest confusion prevailed; the commanders lost their presence of mind, or found the fire too hot for them, I know not which. All I can vouch for is that, although one torpedo-boat did fire off her weapon, the result of which was a volume of smoke and water, the latter actually wetting the deck of the Turkish ship, no harm was done, and before the end of the eclipse had cleared the moon the attack was over, and the steamlaunches cried, "Sauve qui peut!" Not a scratch was made on the iron-clad; and yet, a few days afterward, we saw in the Russian newspapers the following notice: "Gallant exploit of our naval officers; a Turkish iron-clad destroyed;" and, in the next day's Gazette, a long list of officers made bishops, or some similar high grade awarded. This reminds me of a grand flourish of trumpets that was made in Russia, headed, "Turkish iron-clad driven off and nearly captured by a Russian merchant-steamer," a long description being given of the gallant action: how men, dressed as English officers, were picked off by the unerring rifles of the sailors of the Russian merchant-vessel, of the rivers of blood on the decks of the said merchant-vessel, etc. Here, again, more bishoprics were given, and stars glittered en masse on the gallant conquerors' breasts. What happened truly on this occasion was this: A Turkish monitor was making a passage from Constantinople to Sulina, her deck loaded with heavy guns to be mounted at that place. She saw at a distance one of the Russian armed merchant-steamers, that had the habit of making a dash out of Sebastopol or Odessa and destroying any Turkish merchant-vessel that came in her way. The Turkish ship, loaded as she was, chased for half an hour, and fired a shot or two at the vessel, which pluckily enough returned the fire from a long light gun mounted on her upper deck. One shot from this gun did hit the funnel of the Turkish ship; after this the merchant-craft, having the legs, was soon away out of sight. "Voilà tout!" However, we must not begrudge the honors given "faute de mieux" to our gallant enemies and gallant indeed they are when they have real opportunities. That no one can deny.

I now return to my experience in torpedo warfare, which, I

take it, is more interesting to your readers than my little anecdotes of Russian brag. Finding that, as used by them, the poletorpedo could not, where a good lookout was kept, avail, the Russian Government decided upon using the more deadly fish or Whitehead torpedo. This weapon is projected at a distance of about a thousand yards, and when tried against imaginary enemies was found to have apparently a most deadly effect; but it will be seen how widely different firing at an object which does not return the fire or in any way shake the much-required coolness of action or, as it is called, presence of mind, is from firing at a wide-awake enemy who is taking every precaution and means to resist and ward off an attack. I was cruising with several vessels, watching the Black Sea, when I received information that a well-organized attack was preparing against the fleet anchored at Batoum. I immediately went to that place to look after the safety of the Turkish ships. Two or three nights after my arriving there the attack was made, which I will endeavor to describe. The Turkish guard-boats were rowing guard about four hundred yards ahead of the men-of-war, which, I must state, were anchored with their bows to seaward, their sterns being hauled in to the shore. Unhappily, we were not provided with electric lights, nor had we any steam-launches, the latter having been all sent for service into the Danube. At about midnight, the night being very dark and hazy, an alarm was given by the guard-boats that something was moving about in the dark. Scarcely had the alarm been given, when a thing like a rocket on the top of the water was seen rushing from the darkness in the direction of the ships at anchor, then another, then another. The boats were immediately recalled, and a heavy fire opened from the ships into the dark in the direction from which these mysterious machines were seen to be coming. Now let us see what these things were, and what was their action. They were Whitehead or fish torpedoes, hurled at our ships from a vessel, vessels, or boats, outside the harbor. The first struck one of the iron-clads just abaft the forechains, knocked its foremost part in like a man's hat when he is what is called bonneted, did not explode, but cannoned off as it were to the shore, where it was found and identified, as before mentioned, as a fish-torpedo. The second rushed past close to the broadside of the flag-ship, struck her stern-chain, which it pol

ished like burnished steel, and went on shore, where it also was captured, in a very perfect state. The third disappeared somewhere under water, and has not since been seen. I am told that five were fired, but of this I have no proof. Now, why was this attack, so well arranged, so successful to a certain point, so well provided with the newest inventions, why, I ask, was it a failure?

On this head there is a diversity of opinion. Some say that the Russians had neglected to take out the safety-pins, thus leaving the torpedoes as it were on half-cock. At all events, some great error was made in the execution of this grand plan whereby the Turkish squadron, consisting of eleven vessels, lying in Batoum, were to have been blown up in the twinkling of an eye. Now, I will give my humble opinion as to why it failed. In the first place, to find Batoum is no easy matter-not a light to be seen, not a mark to be made out in the night; high mountains close at the back of the strange little harbor, rendering the low land which forms it almost impossible to discern; distances very deceiving; no soundings except in very deep water, the description of the bottom (that great help to the pilot who attends to his soundings)—all these difficulties to be overcome. Then the steam-launches must be sent away some distance from the port, and they, too, have to creep about a long time before they can find out their proper position for attack. The officers and crew, tired with hunting about to discover their whereabouts, at last find themselves in view of a forest of masts. The dark hulls, lying so close to the shore, are hidden by the shade of the land. The enemy they are going to attack is evidently on the lookout, as a guard-boat or two are seen flitting about in the darkness between them and their prey. So at last they fire, and take their chances of success. This seems to me to a certain extent the solution of the problem of failure. But, then, again, why did not the torpedoes explode on striking their object? This is to me a mystery. Scientific men, who examined the torpedoes on their arrival at Constantinople, declare that they were not in a state of preparation to go off-that is, they were half-cocked; but this can be to a great extent only conjecture, as the torpedoes had been pulled about by many curious people before they were officially examined by scientific eyes. Here, again, we have a de

cided failure of torpedo-attacks, whether from ignorance of the right method of manipulating this newly-invented and dangerous weapon, or for what reason, I leave my readers to conjecture. I have given them the facts as they occurred, and so leave the question, in doing which I will make the following remarks as to my opinion of the efficacy of this new method of warfare.

I am, like many others, much puzzled to say what will be the effect of the torpedo in the next naval war. I think that, with a very good lookout, with electric lights so arranged that the whole (not a portion-that is most dangerous) of the horizon is made clear as day (and it is probable that, with some alterations in the present system of light, this may be arrived at), a torpedo-attack, or rather a successful one against ships lying at anchor, may be prevented. Nets round the ships will doubtless be most efficacious also. I again speak of vessels at anchor. But your reader will ask, "How about vessels under way?" On this point I venture to think that a blockading squadron may be dreadfully harassed by large numbers of torpedo-vessels, choosing their own time and weather, making dashes out of the blockaded port.

Then, again, how about torpedoes in a naval engagement? In the present day many ships are so fitted that they can, or pretend they can, fire torpedoes out of their ports as from guns. I hardly suppose that this system has been brought to perfection; but, even should it be, there will always be the danger of hitting a friend instead of an enemy, as in a future naval combat, if fleets are engaged, ships will be passing and repassing, and much confusion will be the result.

I shall be told that this is applicable to shot and shell as well as torpedoes, but the latter are much the most dangerous weapon to play with. It has been said that torpedo-boats with spartorpedoes could be lowered during an engagement, and sent against an enemy. This seems to me a feasible plan; but I cannot help thinking that the spar-torpedo projecting from the side of the ship, as in the American men-of-war, would be still better.

There is yet another class of torpedo to be employed as a weapon of defense that I imagine will be used with much efficacy in coming wars. I refer to the torpedo that is fixed on the ground, or anchored to float sufficiently near to the surface to