Although probably disputed by highly-intelligent diplomatists, it seems to me that a fair construction of these clauses entitles both governments to establish in each other's country judicial courts. The United States has had its consular courts in all the open ports of Japan for many years; and it is no novelty to say that they have exhibited at times the most curious proceedings and results, which were in keeping with anything but the spirit and letter of law. On the other hand, Japan has not as yet had any occasion to establish similar courts in the United States. It need hardly be said that the attraction will be great when a Japanese consular court or some other "authority" shall be created in a metropolis like New York, and a trial shall take place when the plaintiff is an American and the defendant a Japanese! Is it likely that the American judges would feel any "exceeding joy" because they were thus much relieved of their labors? And once again: "In the opened harbors of Japan, Americans shall be free to go where they please, within a limit of about twenty miles in all directions." And, finally: "The articles for the regulation of trade which we append to this treaty shall be considered as forming a part of the same, and shall be equally binding on both the contracting parties to this treaty, and on their citizens and subjects." This makes it binding upon the Japanese Government to strictly observe the "regulations of trade," which cannot be changed in the least degree, however incompatible with the interests of Japan, without the most elaborate "diplomatic" negotiations with, and "consent" of, the foreign representatives. How would America like to adopt such trade regulations at home? Do we not find in this a beautiful application of the golden precept to "do unto others as we would have them do unto us?" The trade regulations conclude by providing that "Five years after the opening of Kanagawa, which took place in 1859, the import and export duties shall be subject to revision, if the Japanese Government desires it." We shall presently return to this clause and show how its spirit and letter were alike ignored, and a tariff of an entirely different nature was adopted. The above text was adopted by the other powers, as one would adopt an India-rubber suit, and several treaties were signed as follows: Russia, August 7, 1858; Holland, August 18, 1858; Great Britain, August 26, 1858; France, October 9, 1858; Portugal, August 3, 1860; Prussia, January 24, 1861; and Switzerland, February 6, 1864. Then came the famous "Tariff Convention" of June 25, 1866, with "bonded warehouse regulations," followed by Belgium, August 1, 1866; Italy, August 25, 1866; Denmark, January 1, 1867; Sweden and Norway, January 11, 1868; Spain, November 12, 1868; North Germany, February 20, 1869; and Austria, October 18, 1869. It will thus be seen that America led the rest of the world in its intercourse with the empire of the "Rising Sun.” It was the United States that made the first treaty of peace and amity with Japan; it was that republic which made the first treaty for "regulating the intercourse of American citizens within the empire of Japan;" it was the United States also which made the first treaty of "amity and commerce," and in none of these do we find as cunning devices of diplomatic imposition as have since been inaugurated by later "diplomats." The course of American diplomacy was appreciated then, is appreciated now, and will be in the future, shining brightly in the pages of history. After the first treaty had been signed, and the sincerity of American friendship confided in by the Japanese authorities, as was the case, it would have been comparatively easy to impose any stipulation which might ultimately destroy the prosperity of the empire, upon those who hardly knew what a treaty meant. But America would not attempt such an unjust policy against a people enfeebled by long isolation from the family of nations, and by the suicidal policy of the Tokugawa despotism. The friendly and conscientious course of the United States in dealing with Japan in those days cannot be over-estimated. That republic, I must repeat, led others in making reasonable treaties, but not in inaugurating the cowardly policy of "coöperation"-a policy introduced at a later date to carry out the purely selfish object of forcing the products of Manchester upon unwilling markets. It was the fair and manly action of the American minister at the time that secured the confidence of the Tycoon's authorities; and were it not for this confidence, thus early obtained, the agents of other powers would surely have met with anything but success in their endeavors to make treaties with Japan. To show the correctness of this view, it is enough to say that even the British Government presented to Mr. Harris a gold snuff-box, in acknowledgment of his good offices and assistance when Lord Elgin was negotiating for a treaty; and that his name is often resorted to by some of the foreign representatives in justification of the claim that the "Tariff Convention" of 1866 must always remain in force, because the system was inaugurated by him, "the faithful friend of Japan." But they cannot convince us that his motive in attaching the tariff stipulation to the treaty of 1858 was to perpetuate a system; but it was merely a temporary expedient, to remain in force only until such time as Japan should become familiar with the ways of enlightened foreigners. The whole career of this diplomat, whatever he may have been, proves him to have been a true friend of Japan, as well as entirely loyal to his own country. Returning to the concluding provision of the trade regulations, above cited, let us examine the details and circumstances under which the "Tariff Convention" was signed. Instead of carrying out that provision, namely, that the tariff shall be subject to revision, five years after the opening of Kanagawa, according to the desire of the Japanese Government, the foreign representatives forced upon the Yedo Government the adoption of the "Tariff Convention" of 1866. This nefarious transaction was done at the time when Japan was convulsed by internal commotion, growing directly or indirectly out of her sudden association with the family of nations. The old system of feudalism was falling to pieces, the relation of retainer to his hereditary prince was being discussed, the dual government of Mikado and Tycoon was being criticised, peasant and noble saw that a great change was impending, clans were gathering, men were muttering, and Japan found herself in the throe of a revolution. Notwithstanding all this, the Japanese Government was faithfully carrying out its treaty obligations; but with the general discontent prevailing it was impossible to control every action of irresponsible people, or to prevent individual Japanese and foreigners from occasionally coming into collision. Such collisions were infrequent, but, when they did occur, were always magnified, and reparation and indemnity demanded from the Government; and thus, in addition to internal troubles, were added perplexing and unnecessary complications and demandsmade for the purpose (as the Japanese will always believe) of increasing the difficulties of the Government, and, by weakening it, placing it in a condition in which it might be coerced. These foreign demands, as they became known, increased the popular commotion, and resulted, as they were bound to do, in unfriendly acts and outrages upon several foreigners by irresponsible Japanese. But there were indeed many cases where fatal collisions were purposely provoked by foreigners, the results of which were no more a matter of satisfaction to us than of regret. Such was precisely the case of Richardson, the Englishman who willfully tried to ride through the train of the state procession of "Prince Satsuma," and was killed by a retainer of the prince, an act which, at that time of feudalism, was entirely justifiable, because such discourtesy to a princely retinue was deemed an unpardonable outrage. It was in retaliation for the death of Richardson that a British squadron, in 1863, bombarded the city of Kagoshima, destroying a large part of the place and property to the value of several millions of dollars; and, not satisfied with this, the Japanese Government was compelled to pay the British representatives an indemnity of over four hundred thousand dollars. About this time a certain French vessel and an American merchant-vessel were fired upon by the reckless soldiers in the fortress of Shimonoseki, and prompt retaliation was meted out by the naval forces of the respective countries so offended. Even an indemnity was demanded in the case of the United States vessel, and duly paid by the Tycoon. But the English authority in Japan (although no English vessel had been attacked) was not satisfied with such lenient punishment and limited indemnity. Hence, in spite of his instructions, he concocted a famous naval expedition; and thus, on a certain day in 1864, was fought the great and memorable battle of Shimonoseki, between a prince of Japan on the one hand and Great Britain, Holland, France, and the United States, on the other. The combined fleet of the foreign powers consisted of eighteen vessels, carrying 287 guns, while the Prince of Choshin was fortified with a few crude batteries, and had three small vessels, fitted out as gunboats, and a few battalions of irregular soldiers. His batteries were spoiled and razed; the boats were sunk; and the town of Shimonoseki destroyed. It was indeed a glorious victory! And what else? A convention was subsequently forced upon the Tycoon's government, and reluctantly signed by the latter, the substance of which was as follows: "1. The amount payable to the four powers is fixed at three millions of dollars ($3,000,000)," etc. "2. The whole sum to be payable quarterly," etc. "3. Insomuch as the receipt of money has never been the object of the said powers, but the establishment of better relations with Japan, and a desire to place these on a more satisfactory and mutually advantageous footing is still the leading object in view : therefore, if his Majesty the Tycoon wishes to offer, in lieu of the payment of the sum claimed, and as a material compensation for loss and injury sustained, the opening of Shimonoseki, or some other eligible port in the Inland Sea, it shall be at the option of the said foreign governments to accept the same, or insist on the payment of the indemnity in money, under the conditions above stipulated. "4. This convention to be formally ratified by the Tycoon's government within fifteen days from the date thereof." As this indemnity was declared by the American Secretary of State to have been most unjustly exacted, and as the United States is the only Government which has thus far, by the votes of its national Legislature, acknowledged that indemnity to have been a gross wrong against the law of nations, as well as against Japan, we are once more enabled to draw a contrast, in their line of conduct, between the European powers and the United States. A most "eligible port," that of Kobe, on the Inland Sea, was demanded by the foreign representatives, backed by the fleets of the four nations, and was subsequently opened and settled; and yet, the last farthing of the indemnity was insisted upon. Was not this a handsome business? Did those representatives imagine that such dealings with a feeble nation would glorify their names in the pages of history, and be read without a blush by future generations? Passing over, for want of space, some details in this connec |