T CHAPTER II APPLICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE HE doctrine proclaimed by Monroe exactly voiced the sentiments of the American people. It was in every way an admirable piece of statesmanship. There had been a real and grave peril; the administration had met it with a brave and explicit declaration of policy. Before this decisive stand buttressed by the might of England, all danger from the Holy Alliance "melted into air." The crisis had arisen, but it had been mastered. The President's inspiring words were caught up in the popular enthusiasm, and echoed and re-echoed to the furthest limits of the United States. At the time of the message Henry Clay was Speaker of the House. He had seemed to feel a special responsibility for the destiny of South America, and had long been opposing Monroe, who had been charged with lukewarmness in the matter. Immediately after the message had been read, Clay caused to be introduced the following resolution: "Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the allied powers of Europe in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States.' The resolution failed to pass. Congress evidently attached but little importance to the alleged threats of the allies. It considered that even if there had once been actual danger of European intervention, such danger had now disappeared. In fact many members "considered the alleged threats of the allies as empty vaporings, unworthy of notice." Mr. Poinsett, of South Carolina, introduced a resolution similar to Clay's, only to meet a similar fate. Had the allies seriously attempted to make common cause with Spain on this hemisphere, Congress would unquestionably have supported the President to the full extent, but it had no academic longing to anticipate, by an abstract exposition of "principles" or "theories," a concrete imbroglio which had been indefinitely postponed, or averted altogether. I In 1825 Monroe was succeeded in the presidency by John Quincy Adams. One of the first things to engross the attention of the Adams administration was the proposed congress of Latin-American nations soon to be held at Panama, under the guidance and patronage of Bolívar,—the object of this conference being to bind the countries together for their mutual interest and protection against Europe. Mexico and Colombia extended an invitation to the United States. President Adams wished to appoint diplomatic representatives to the conference, but desired rigidly to limit their authority by instructions not to commit the United States to any definite policy or alliance of any character whatever. Even this mild programme was vigorously contested by Congress, and a most bitter controversy arose. The Panama Congress proved a sorry failure, not extending beyond its preliminary meeting; but the discussions to which it gave rise threw much light on the views of the leading legislators of the day in Washington as to the effect of the Monroe Doctrine. James K. Polk, then a member of Congress from Tennessee, said in debate: "When the message of the late President of the United States was communicated to Congress in 1823, it was viewed, as it should have been, as the mere expression of opinion of the Executive, submitted to the consideration and deliberation of Congress and designed probably to produce an effect upon the councils of the Holy Alliance in relation to their supposed intention to interfere in the war between Spain and her former colonies. That effect it probably had an agency in producing; and if so, it has performed its office. The President had no power to bind the nation by such a pledge." Such was the status of the Monroe Doctrine at the close of 1826. II From the end of the administration of Adams, in 1829, to the beginning of that of James Knox Polk, in 1845, the Monroe Doctrine was rarely mentioned in the United States. Many events of world-wide importance, affecting our relations on this hemisphere, happened; each one was dealt with on its individual merits, as the exigencies of the case demanded. True, the Latin Americans, engaged in their customary pastime of revolution and of outrage against foreigners, frequently called upon the United States, under pretext of the Monroe Doctrine, to aid them in their schemes or protect them from the consequences of their evil doing; and as we paid no heed to their demands, they denounced us for our alleged insincerity; but all this made little impression on the successive administrations. During this period our Presidents seem rather to have had enough intellect and originality to determine their own policies than to have felt it necessary to adopt a cut and dried schedule formulated by one of their predecessors. They did not admit that even James Monroe was clothed with the attribute of "infallibility" or "divine right." The crisis that called forth his message had long since passed; they stood ready to meet new crises with new messages, and they left the worship of ancestors and of traditions to the Chinese. Thus, when the authorities of the Argentine Republic, in 1829, ousted the English from the Falkland Islands (claiming that these islands were Argentine territory under the Spanish succession), and arrested some American seal-hunters there, the United States warsloop Lexington forced the release of the prisoners, expelled the governor and other officials appointed from Buenos Ayres, and restored the islands to England. President Jackson approved this action, and declined to notice the loud and violent protest by the Argentine goverment against this alleged violation of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1835 England and France established a naval blockade along the entire coast of the Argentine Republic, in order to protect Uruguayan independence from Argentine aggression. From Panama to Cape Horn the South Americans were shouting the violation of the Monroe Doctrine, roundly abusing our government for not interfering in the affair of the blockade; but no fault was being found by our own people. In 1835 and for some time thereafter England was noticeably extending her territorial claims in Nicaragua and Honduras; whereat Central America would utter vociferous protests, and would appeal to President Jackson, with the argument that "it had always been the policy of the United States to resist European settlements in America.' But Jackson was a man capable of thinking for himself. He knew the English, having met and defeated them at New Orleans; he did not choose to invoke the glamour of Monroe's declaration; perhaps he considered that neither the world in general nor the United States in particular would be seriously injured, even if England should colonize all Central America; at all events, he did not interfere. In 1848 England besieged San Juan and compelled the native government to respect her territorial claims. England's course caused much discussion in the United States, where the affair was generally referred to as the Mosquito Coast controversy. Briefly stated, England, prior to 1783, had made certain claims to jurisdiction over portions of the coast of Nicaragua and Honduras, by virtue of concessions for cutting wood, etc., which had been granted by Spain to British subjects. All such claims on the part of England were renounced by her treaty with Spain in 1788 and by explanatory amendments thereto in 1786, reaffirmed and ratified in 1814. In 1821 the Central American colonies threw off the Spanish yoke, and formed a federal union which was dissolved in 1838. In 1841 England seized Ruatan Island (off the Honduras coast) in spite of the most vigorous protests of the latter country, which claimed jurisdiction over it. England then proceeded to seize large tracts along the coast of Honduras and Nicaragua, where there were British settlements, and in 1848 took possession of San Juan del Norte, or Greytown, considered the most strategic point in Central America. She based her claims on alleged treaties with the Mosquito Indians, who had never acknowledged the sovereignty of the Latin-American countries, but who by treaty had authorized England to assume a protectorate. Much vindictive rhetoric has been expended with reference to these pretensions of England. That these Indians possessed sufficient sovereignty to warrant such a treaty has never been seriously believed in the United States. However, the Central American countries, speaking generally, were in a state of chronic anarchy, not much in advance of the primeval condition of the savage tribes. Stephen A. Douglas and others invoked the sacred Monroe Doctrine in an effort to persuade the United States to interfere; but the Monroe Doctrine had not yet become an ignus fatuus, and the United States preferred to take no radical action. It is probable, however, that the episode was one of the chief factors leading up to the treaty with England of 1850. III During the administration of President Taylor was concluded, between the United States and Great Britain, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of April 19, 1850, a compact distinctly contrary to the spirit of Monroe's message. Indeed, this convention (superseded in 1901 by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty) may be regarded as the most unfortunate and preposterous treaty ever made by our government, involving us in most serious complications, of which it took half a century of wearisome diplomatic negotiations to relieve us. The reader interested in the history of this great diplomatic blunder must examine the text of the convention and the literature pertaining to it; we can here refer to it but briefly, remarking its repugnancy not only to the Monroe Doctrine, but also to Washington's message advising against entangling alliances, and to every sound principle of statesmanship. The first article of the Clayton-Bulwer convention was as follows: "The governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal [from the Atlantic through Nicaragua to the Pacific]; agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America; nor will either make use of any protection which either affords or may afford, or any allegiance which either has or may have to or with any State or people, for the purpose of erecting or maintaining any such fortifications, or of occupying, fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion over the same; nor will the United States or Great Britain take advantage of any intimacy, or use any alliance, connection, or influence that either may possess with any State or government through whose territory the said canal may pass, for the purpose of organizing or holding, directly or indirectly, for the citizens or subjects of the one, any rights or advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal which shall not be offered in the same terms to the citizens or subjects of the other." Further provisions of the treaty were that vessels of the contracting parties traversing the canal should, in case of war between the two nations, be exempted from blockade, detention, or capture by either of the signers of the treaty; that the two governments jointly undertake to protect the property of any parties constructing such canal under authority of the local governments of the territory; that they will forever afterward jointly protect said canal and guarantee its neutrality and the security of the capital invested therein; that— "the contracting parties in this convention engage to invite every State with which both or either have friendly intercourse to enter into stipulations with them similar to those which they have entered into with each other, to the end that all other States may share in the honor and advantage of having contributed to a work of such general interest and importance as the Canal herein contemplated"; and that, as they not only desire, "in entering into this convention, to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection by treaty stipulations, to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama.” It is clear that the United States ought not to bind itself by treaty obligations to act in conjunction with any foreign power on questions of our policy in the Western Hemisphere. Not that we should never co-operate on this hemisphere with other civilized countries, should an exigency from time to time demand co-operation; but our government must be and remain unfettered, free to work out, step by step, its own policy on this hemisphere according as its conscience and interest may dictate, entirely without reference to any other considerations. If, as Washington recommended, entangling alliances should be avoided in European affairs, how much more important it is that the |