rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, northern district of Illinois.

United States v. Wabash Railroad Company. Proceeding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Missouri.

United States v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company. Proceeding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Missouri.

United States v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. Proceeding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Missouri.

United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company. Proceeding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Missouri.

United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. Proceeding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Missouri.

United States v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Company. Proceeding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Missouri.

United States v. Chicago Great Western Railway Company. Proceeding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Missouri.

United States v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company. Procceding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Missouri.

United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. Proceeding to enjoin departure from published tariff rates. Temporary injunction granted. United States Circuit Court, western district of Virginia.

United States v. J. E. Geddes, receiver Ohio River & Western Railroad Company. Action to recover penalty under section 6, Safety-Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, as amended April 1, 1896. United States Circuit Court of Appeals, sixth circuit.

United States ex rel. Martin A. Knapp et al. v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company. Petition for mandamus to compel

CONTINUOUS CARRIAGE.

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filing of annual report. United States Circuit Court, district of Massachusetts.

United States ex rel. Martin A. Knapp et al. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company. Petition for mandamus to compel filing of annual report. United States Circuit Court, northern district of Ohio.

United States ex rel. Martin A. Knapp et al. v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company. Petition for mandamus to compel filing of annual report. United States Circuit Court, southern district of New York.

United States ex rel. Martin A. Knapp et al. v. Delaware & Hudson Company. Petition for mandamus to compel filing of annual report. United States Circuit Court, southern district of New York.

W. O. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Company. Damages on account of personal injury, but involving also construction of the Safety-Appliance Law. Intervention by United States applied for and allowed. United States Supreme Court.

§ 7. Continuous Carriage from Point of Shipment to Point of Destination. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to enter into any combination, contract, or agreement, expressed or implied, to prevent, by change of time schedule, carriage in different cars, or by other means or devices, the carriage of freights from being continuous from the place of shipment to the place of destination; and no break of bulk, stoppage, or interruption made by such common carrier shall prevent the carriage of freights from being and being treated as one continuous carriage from the place of shipment to the place of destination, unless such break, stoppage, or interruption was made in good faith for some necessary purpose, and without any intent to avoid or unnecessarily interrupt such continuous carriage or to evade any of the provisions of this act.

Object and Scope of Section 7.- The provisions of section are supplemental to the provisions contained in section 3, and

should be read and construed in connection therewith. Section 3, last paragraph, forbids discrimination among carriers, and is mandatory in its requirements that all connecting competing lines shall be treated alike and furnished with equal facilities for interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for receiving, forwarding, and delivering passengers and property. The design of section 7 was to forbid devices on the part of the carrier, whereby, for the purpose of evading the provisions of the act, collusive arrangements may be resorted to to change time schedules, compel carriage in different cars, break bulk, or require a cessation, stoppage, or interruption to prevent the connecting carrier from performing his contract of "continuous carriage." The statute recognizes the fact that there may be circumstances when breaking bulk or temporary stoppage may be unavoidable. But such acts, if not done in good faith, but merely to evade the provisions of the act, are unlawful, and subject the offending carrier to the pains and penalties of the act. See authorities in this connection under section 3, page 69, ante. The provisions of section 7, however, are not discussed or referred to in such decisions.

§ 8. Liability of Carrier in Damages. That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be done any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this act required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this act, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case.

Object and Scope of Section 8.- The object of section 8 in conjunction with section 9 was to create a civil remedy in favor

of shippers or persons who suffer loss or damage arising by reason of any violation of its provisions by the carrier, and to distinctly declare and impose the liability of the carrier. The act is penal in its nature in so far as it imposes a criminal liability for a breach of its conditions. It is a remedial statute in so far as it creates remedies by authorizing civil actions at law and in equity in the Federal courts. The remedial nature of the statute is emphasized by the amendment to section 22, as amended March 2, 1889, which declares that "nothing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies."

It has been held, in an able and well-reasoned opinion by Chief Justice ANDREWS in the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, that the Legislature, subject to the limitations of constitutional law, may not only invent remedies, but it may also create rights. Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509.

Section 8 creates the liability of the carrier under the act. Section 9 provides the remedies giving the Federal courts jurisdiction to enforce the liabilities imposed upon the carrier for a violation of the statute, both at law and in equity. In so far as the liability declared by this section relates to the duty which was imposed on the carrier at common law, the statute creates no new liability. The ninth section declares the mode in which such liability may be enforced in the Federal courts.

The liability under section 8 is confined exclusively to a breach of duty under the Interstate Commerce Act, in respect solely to interstate commerce. The liability of a common carrier engaged in domestic commerce remains as it always existed at the common law, except in so far as it has been regulated by the laws of the several States.

Treble Damages - Common Law Superseded. At common law a shipper had a cause of action against the carrier to recover damages resulting from unreasonable and extortionate charges. But when the Legislature sees fit to legislate upon the subject the statutory remedy supersedes the common-law remedy, unless the statute declares that the remedy given by the statute is not exclusive but cumulative. (November, 1892, Cir. Ct. West. Dist. Mo.) Windsor Coal Co. v. Chicago Railroad, 52 Fed. Rep. 716.

Treble Damages-State Statute.- The State of Colorado in 1885, two years prior to the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, passed a law (Laws 1885, chap. 309), prohibiting rebates and unjust discriminations by carriers against shippers, giving to a party injured the right to sue for a violation of the statute and authorizing a recovery in treble damages. A shipper of coal sued for a violation of the statute. Defendant set up as a defense a contract whereby it agreed to give the favored shipper and competitor of plaintiff a lower rate of freight only in case it furnished for transportation each year 200,000 tons of coal. The answer failed to allege that the favored shipper furnished this amount for transportation, but it was nevertheless given the rebate. Defendant also set up as an excuse for the giving of the rebate what it alleged was a claim it had against the favored shipper for damages. The damages were unliquidated and arose in tort. The court below ruled out both defenses and plaintiff had a verdict. Judgment affirmed. Union Pacific v. Goodridge, 149 U. S. 680.

The court held that the object of the Colorado statute was intended to cut up by the roots the entire system of rebates and discriminations in favor of particular localities, special enterprises, or favored corporations, and to put all shippers on an absolute equality, saving only a power not in the railroad company itself, but in the Railroad Commissioner to except "special cases designed to promote the development of the resources of this State." The court observed further that it is not the proper business of a common carrier to foster particular enterprises or to build up new industries, but deriving its franchise from the Legislature, and depending upon the will of the people for its very existence, it is bound to deal fairly with the public, to extend them reasonable facilities for the transportation of their persons and property, and to put all its patrons on an absolute equality. Ib.

The above case doubtless was brought in the Federal court and the latter acquired jurisdiction by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties, the action being to recover damages under a State statute.

Suit at Law by Shipper - Pleading. An action by a shipper against a carrier to recover a payment charged by the carrier in