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§ 16 Supplemented - Act to Expedite Cases, Approved February 11, 1903. The method of procedure in the Federal Courts in suits and hearings under the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law (Act of July 2, 1890) are regulated by the provisions of an Act of Congress, approved February 11, 1903 (chap. 544), entitled "An Act to expedite the hearing and determination of suits in equity pending or hereafter brought under the Act of July 2, 1890, entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' 'An Act to regulate commerce,' approved February 4, 1887, or any other acts having a like purpose, that may hereafter be eracted." The provisions of this Supplemental Act of February 11, 1903, are as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in any suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in any circuit court of the United States under the Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, "An Act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or any other Acts having a like purpose that hereafter may be enacted, wherein the United States is complainant, the Attorney-General may file with the clerk of such court a certificate that, in his opinion, the case is of general public importance, a copy of which shall be immediately furnished by such clerk to each of the circuit judges of the circuit in which the case is pending. [Preference over Other Cases.] Thereupon such case shall be given precedence over others and in every way expedited, and be assigned for hearing at the earliest practicable day, before not less than three of the circuit judges of said circuit, if there be three or

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SEC. 2.

more; and if there be not more than two circuit judges, then before them and such district judge as they may select. In the event the judges sitting in such case shall be divided in opinion, the case shall be certified to the Supreme Court for review in like manner as if taken there by appeal as hereinafter provided.

Appeal Directly to Supreme Court.-§ 2. That in every suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in any circuit court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, including cases submitted but not yet decided, an appeal from the final decree of the circuit court will lie only to the Supreme Court and must be taken within sixty days from the entry thereof: Provided, That in any case where an appeal may have been taken from the final decree of a circuit court to the circuit court of appeals before this Act takes effect, the case shall proceed to a final decree therein, and an appeal may be taken from such decree to the Supreme Court in the manner now provided by law. (Act of February 11, 1903, § 2.)

Object and Scope of Section 16.- This section provides for the enforcement of any order or requirement made by the Interstate Commerce Commission, in conformity with section 15. The Commission is not clothed with judicial powers, and cannot for that reason compel obedience to its mandates. But it may invoke the aid of a Federal court and enforce its orders through such tribunal. The method of procedure by the Commission is prescribed, and jurisdiction and plenary powers are conferred upon the court to take cognizance of such proceedings and enforce them, when sustained by legal mandate. The findings of fact made by the Commission are made prima facie evidence in the proceeding before the Circuit Court of the United

APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT.

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States, and the burden of proof is upon the defendant who assumes to disobey the order of the Commission.

The powers conferred on the court embrace authority to issue writs of attachment, injunction, and "other proper process, mandatory or otherwise," and power to punish for contempt. It also provides the procedure on appeals, either to the Circuit Court of Appeals or directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. In this regard the provisions of the act of February 11, 1903, to expedite cases under this section, and the provisions of the Elkins Act of February 19, 1903, add to the force and efficiency of the provisions of this section by making it practicable, and the remedy speedy and effective. Provision is made also for jury trials where the right to a jury trial exists, under the Constitution, and has not been waived.

Findings of Fact by Commission. The findings of fact made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in proceedings taken before it to secure an order forbidding the carrier to charge unjust and unreasonable rates, are not conclusive upon the court, upon a petition of the Commission for an injunction to enforce its order after refusal by the carrier to obey it. Such findings are authorized by the statute, which in terms declares that they shall be prima facie evidence only of the facts found. The legal effect of such findings would throw the burden of proof on carrier in a proceeding for an injunction in the Federal court, where the carrier opposes the application and denies the facts found against it. Interstate Com. Co. v. Lehigh Railroad, 49 Fed. Rep. 177; Kentucky Bridge Co. v. Louisville Railroad, 37 Fed. Rep. 567.

No greater force can be given to the findings of the Commission than is given by the statute, which authorizes such findings and confers the power and authority to make them. Ib.

Appeals Directly to Supreme Court.- Prior to the legislation of 1891, creating the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, there was no intermediate appellate tribunal, and appeals were required to be taken from Circuit Courts of the United States directly to the Supreme Court, when the subject in dispute was of the value of $2,000 or more.

Since the establishment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals an appeal lies to that court, except that under the provisions of the act of February 11, 1903, and the Elkins Act of February 19, 1903, appeals must be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States in cases where the United States is complainant, and an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals in such a case will not lie.

Under section 7 of the Sherman Act the limitation of $2,000 is no longer necessary to enable a party to sue, or to appeal, either to the Circuit Court of Appeals, or to the Supreme Court of the United States. Such an action may be brought and an appeal taken irrespective of the amount involved. Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 35.

See also authorities under section 9, ante, page 171.

Appeals to Supreme Court Prior to 1891.- Under section 16, prior to the establishment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, an appeal would lie in a suit by the Interstate Commerce Commission, to enforce its order from a Circuit Court of the United States to the United States Supreme Court, if the subject in dispute shall be of the value of $2,000 or more.

If the action was one triable by jury, or if a jury trial has been duly waived, such appeal was required to be taken within twenty days from the day of the rendition of the judgment of the Circuit Court. Where the suit was to enforce an order of the Commission, for refusal to afford complainant "the same equal facilities, as are afforded to any other connecting road," and for other relief, the Circuit Court dismissed the bill for want of equity. An appeal was taken by complainant directly to the Supreme Court. Held, that the appeal would not lie unless it clearly appeared that the subject in dispute shall be of the value of $2,000. Appeal dismissed. Little Rock & Memphis v. East Tennessee, 159 U. S. 698 (December, 1895), citing Interstate Com. Co. v. Atchison Railroad, 149 U. S. 264.

Jurisdiction over All Carriers for Breach by One - Proper District. A number of railroads were forbidden by an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission from enforcing rates found to be illegal, for transportation between Pueblo, Col., and San Francisco, Cal. The Commission found that the freight was car

ried "under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment." The order was violated in the district of Colorado, by the Southern Pacific having its principal office in California. The suit was brought in the district of Colorado. Section 16 of the act provides that suit by the Commission to enforce its order may be instituted "in the judicial district in which the common carrier complained of has its principal office, or in which the violation or disobedience of such order or requirement shall happen." Held, that where all the roads operated under a common control in making the forbidden rates, the act of one in the district where the disobedience of the order happens is the act of all, and the violation by all took place in the district of Colorado as well as in the district of California. Interstate Com. Co. v. Southern Pacific, 74 Fed. Rep. 42 (May, 1896, Cir. Ct. Dist. Colo.).

All doubt as to the proper district in which suit may be brought is removed by the provisions of section 3 of the Elkins Act, which declares that "when the act complained of is alleged to have been committed or as being committed in part in more than one judicial district or State, it may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, and determined in either such judicial district or State." See Elkins Act, section 3, ante, page 137.

See also authorities under "Jurisdiction" under section 9, ante, pages 154, 155.

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Order of Commission - Terminal Charges When not Enforced. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission declared that terminal charges of a carrier for the delivery of live stock to the stockyards in Chicago were unjust and unreasonable, and a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. The court below refused to enforce the order of the Commission upon the ground that the claim that the charges were unreasonable could not be sustained. On appeal, held, that the through rate existing prior to June 1, 1894, was presumed to provide compensation for services in making delivery at the stockyard, and while the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, yet the Commission should not be prevented from proceeding to correct unreasonableness in the rates as to territory to which the reduction did not apply. Interstate Com. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.