posing an annual license fee of $1 per pole, and $2.50 per mile of wire on the telegraph, telephone, and electric-light poles, within the limits of the borough. It was claimed that such property, while it could not be excluded from the streets and avenues of the borough, is not exempt from the police regulations of the municipality. Held that such a license was not a tax on the property of the company, or on its transmission of messages, or on its receipts from such transmission or on its occupation or business, but was a charge in the enforcement of local governmental supervision, and as such, not in itself obnoxious to the commerce clause of the Constitution. Western Union Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419, citing St. Louis v. Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92; 149 U. S. 465.

Reasonableness Question for Jury.- What would be a reasonable tax upon property of a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, which property justifies police supervision, in one locality, would not be regarded as reasonable in another. The question as to whether a tax ordinance is reasonable or unreasonable may be a question of law for the court, but the question as to whether the amount of the tax fixed by the ordinance is reasonable or not is usually a question of fact for the jury. Atlantic Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160.

The city of Philadelphia passed an ordinance imposing an annual license tax on the poles and wires of the Atlantic Telegraph Company, within the limits of the city. This ordinance fixed the license fees the same as the fees imposed by the borough of New Hope, in an ordinance sustained by the Supreme Court in the New Hope case, 187 U. S. 419, supra. But the court said that what might be reasonable in the borough of

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New Hope might not be reasonable in the city of Philadelphia. Regulations proper for a large and prosperous city might be absurd or oppressive in a small and sparsely populated town, or in the country. The reasonableness of the license was a question for the jury, unless the testimony was such as to compel a decision one way or the other, in which case the court might be justified in directing a verdict. Ib.

A Kentucky statute (Laws 1890, approved March 31st), declared that it should be unlawful for the Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Company, to charge, collect, demand, or receive for passage over the bridge spanning the Ohio river, with termini at Covington, Ky., and Cincinnati, O., any toll, fare, or compensation greater than the rates prescribed and designated in the act. The court held that the statute was a State regulation which imposed a tax on interstate commerce, and was void. That the traffic across the Ohio was interstate commerce, the bridge was an instrument of such commerce, and Congress alone could prescribe a uniform scale of charges. That the power of the Kentucky Legislature was limited to fixing tolls on such channels of commerce as are exclusively within its territory. Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204.

A Mississippi statute (Laws 1888, chap. 3, approved March 8th), authorized a revenue tax on business conducted within the State. The tax required to be paid. by telegraph companies was $3,000 on each company operating 1,000 miles or more of wire within the State, and if the company operated less than 1,000 miles, the tax imposed was $1 per mile. The tax was declared to be "in lieu of other State, county and municipal

taxes." The court sustained the law in an action by a company engaged in interstate commerce, as a tax on the property of the company within the State, and not a tax on interstate commerce. Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688.

A statute of Alabama (Laws 1885, approved Feb. 17th, § 13) imposed a tax " on the gross amount of the receipts by any and every telegraph company derived from the business done by it," in the State of Alabama. The Western Union Telegraph Company did business in Alabama, and had accepted the provisions of §§ 5263-5268, U. S. Rev. Stat. It paid tax on gross receipts of all business done wholly within the State. It was required to return gross receipts on all business done partly within the State on messages carried partly within and partly without the State. Held, that the statute so far as it required returns on receipts for messages carried partly within and partly without the State was a regulation of interstate commerce, which the State had no power to enforce. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472.

Taxation of Commerce Filing of Charter by Foreign Corporation.- A State may lawfully pass a law requiring a foreign corporation as a condition precedent to transacting business therein, to file with its Secretary of State a copy of its charter, and pay a fee of $25 for so doing. The State of Wisconsin passed such a law (Wisconsin Statutes 1898, §§ 1770b, 4978). The statute further provided that every contract made by such foreign corporation, affecting the personal liability thereof or relating to property within the State, before compliance with the statute should be void. Held, that such a statute did not necessarily operate to regulate

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interstate commerce, so as to conflict with "the power of Congress in that regard," nor was a contract made intermediate the passage of the act and the date when it became operative, impaired by the provisions of the act. Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611.

Tax on Dividends.-The State of New York passed a law (Laws 1881, chap. 361) imposing a tax upon "the corporate franchise or business of corporations," measured by the extent of the dividends of the corporation. Held to be a privilege tax upon the right to be a corporation and do business in the State, and not a tax upon the privilege or franchise which, when incorporated, the company might exercise. That the New York law was valid, though a portion of the dividends may be derived from interest on capital invested in United States bonds. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594.

Taxation of Commerce-Drummers and Agents.-The board of aldermen of the city of Greensboro, N. C., pursuant to a State statute, conferring power to do so, passed an ordinance assessing a license fee of $10 a year on all persons in Greensboro engaged in the business of selling or delivering picture frames, pictures, photographs, or likenesses of the human face. The Chicago Portrait Co., an Illinois corporation, sold pictures in Goldsborough, and sent them to its agent in that city for delivery to purchasers. The agent failed to secure a license, under the Greensboro ordinance, and was convicted for a violation of the ordinance and fined $10. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and claimed

that the Greensboro ordinance was void, as a tax by State authority on interstate commerce. The conviction was reversed upon the ground that transactions between manufacturing companies in one State, through agents, with citizens of another constitute a large part of interstate commerce which cannot be subject to State taxation. Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622.

It was urged that the tax or license fee was not confined to persons in other States, but was a uniform tax on all vendors in Greensboro, whether residents or nonresidents, and made no distinction between domestic and foreign drummers. The court held that this uniform provision did not meet the difficulty. That interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the State. Citing The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; Robbins v. Shelby, 120 U. S. 289; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47. And that efforts to control this kind of commerce, in the interests of States, where purchasers reside, in the form of statutes and ordinances have universally failed. Ib.

Although the State has general power to tax individuals and property within its jurisdiction, it has no power to tax interstate commerce, even in the person of a resident of the State. A statute of Tennessee imposed a privilege tax on persons and citizens in the State engaged in business, as brokers in merchandise. Complainants did business in Chattanooga as representatives of nonresident parties, firms, or corporations,