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shipment this public rate had been reduced to sixty-nine cents, but the new schedule of rates, showing this reduction, had not reached the agent at Cameron when the furniture arrived there. The shipper tendered the freight designated in the bill of lading, amounting to $82.80. The carrier's agent detained the goods for one day, awaiting instructions from his superiors, and the carrier, under the Texas statute, became liable for $82.80, which plaintiff sued for and recovered. On writ of error the judgment was reversed, on the ground that the Texas statute was inoperative, being in conflict with the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, which contained not such provision. Ib.

In the absence of the Federal statute the Texas statute might be upheld as a police regulation, but as Congress had legislated upon the subject, and the State law being in conflict with the Federal statute, the former must yield. Ib.

Stoppage of Trains When a Regulation of Interstate Commerce. A statute of Illinois (act approved March 31, 1874) provided that "Every railroad corporation shall cause its passenger trains to stop upon arrival at each station advertised by such corporation as a place of receiving and discharging passengers upon and from such trains, a sufficient length of time to receive and let off such passengers with safety; Provided all regular passenger trains shall stop a sufficient length of time at the railroad stations of county seats to receive and let off passengers with safety."

The State's attorney petitioned United States Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus to compel defendant to stop an express train, known as the "Knickerbocker Special," at Hillsboro, the county seat of Montgomery county. Defendant claimed that it furnished four regular passenger trains each way a day, which passed through and stopped at Hillsboro; and that the "Knickerbocker" was a through express, carrying interstate transportation between St. Louis and New York, and that by stopping at Hillsboro its schedule connections with other roads would be interfered with. Plaintiff demurred to the answer and the demurrer was sustained. On writ of error held, that the statute of Illinois, so far as the interstate transportation was con

cerned, imposed a direct burden on interstate commerce, and was an attempt by the State to regulate interstate commerce, which the State had no power to do. Cleveland R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514.

The court declared that the distinction between the Illinois statute and a statute making regulations requiring passenger trains to stop at railroad crossings and draw-bridges, and to reduce the speed of trains when running through crowded thoroughfares, requiring tracks to be fenced, and a bell and whistle to be attached, signal lights to be carried at night and tariff and time-tables to be posted at proper places, and similar requirements contributing to the safety, comfort, and convenience of patrons is too obvious to require discussion. Ib. Citing Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307.

A statute of Illinois (Laws 1889, chap. 114, § 88) declared that railroad corporation should stop trains at places at which it advertised to stop, long enough to take on and let off passengers, "provided all regular passenger trains shall stop a sufficient length of time at the railroad station of county seats to receive and let off passengers with safety."

Defendant formerly ran all its passenger trains to and from its depot and station in Cairo, the county seat of Alexander county, and made it its southern terminus. It afterward, jointly with the Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans road, constructed a bridge across the Ohio, over which it was connected with the latter road, and put on a daily fast mail to run from Chicago to New Orleans, carrying also passengers. The bridge crossed the river two and a half miles north of its old station. Its fast mail ran through from Chicago to New Orleans, crossed the Ohio at Bridge Junction, three and one-half miles north of the station, and did not stop at its old depot in Cairo. Six regular passenger trains were run daily to the station in Cairo, giving adequate accommodations for passengers to and from Cairo. The court, under the statute, granted a mandamus compelling defendant to cause its south-bound fast mail and all its other passenger trains to be run down to its passenger station south of Bridge Junction to stop and take on and leave off passengers. Affirmed by Supreme Court of Illinois. On writ of error to United States Supreme Court reversed.

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The Supreme Court held, under all the circumstances, that the requirement was an unconstitutional hindrance and obstruction of interstate commerce. It delayed transportation of through passengers and mails, by turning aside from the direct interstate route and running to a station three miles and a half away, and back again to the same point, when defendant furnished other ample accommodations for Cairo passengers. Illinois Railway v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142.

A statute of Ohio (Rev. Stat., § 3320. Act approved April 13, 1889) provided that " each company shall cause three each way of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at a station, city, or village containing over three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers." The statute provided as a penalty for a violation of the act a forfeiture of not more than $100 nor less than $25, to be recovered in an action in the name of the State. Defendant company was sued for a violation of the statute in failing to stop its trains at West Cleveland, a municipal corporation, having more than 3,000 inhabitants on a secular day, and judgment was recovered against it, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Defendant, by writ of error, came into the United States Supreme Court and claimed that the power to regulate interstate commerce is vested in Congress, and that the Ohio statute, in its application to trains engaged in such commerce, was repugnant to the Federal Constitution and void. The carrier insisted that it had a right to start its trains at any point in one State and pass into and through another State, without taking up or setting down passengers within the limits of the latter State. Defendant was incorporated in Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois.

The carrier operated each day an express, fast mail, and one other train easterly through West Cleveland, carrying through passengers between New York and Chicago, and four through trains eastwardly through West Cleveland, carrying passengers from Chicago to New York, none of which stopped at West Cleveland. Only one train a day, each way, stopped at West Cleveland. These trains did not carry through passengers. There were thirteen villages in Ohio containing 3,000 inhabit

ants, through which such trains passed; average time required to stop, three minutes. The court affirmed the judgment and sustained the validity of the Ohio statute. The court, in its opinion, observed in part, that to hold that the Legislature of Ohio had no power in the absence of an act of Congress to pass the statute in question would mean that the carrier could manage its affairs without taking into consideration the interests of the general public, and its directors could so regulate the running of interstate trains as to build up cities and towns at the ends of its lines, or at favored points, and by that means destroy or retard the growth and prosperity of intervening points. It would mean that a State which had granted a charter to a carrier had no power to prevent such carrier from running all its trains through such State without stopping at any city within its limits. The carrier could thus prevent people within such State from engaging in interstate commerce and from using its interstate trains at all or only at such points as the carrier might choose to designate. That the statute of Ohio was in aid of interstate commerce, not hostile to it, and by the statute in question the Legislature did nothing more than regulate the use of a public highway, established and maintained under its authority in such a way as to reasonably promote public convenience. Lake Shore v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, distinguishing Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485; Wabash v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 556; Illinois Central v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142.

Stoppage of Sunday Trains. A statute of Georgia (Code 1882, § 4578), forbade the running of freight trains on any railroad in the State on Sunday, and declared a violation of the statute to be a misdemeanor. Defendant was indicted and set up the defense that he was operating a freight train engaged in interstate commerce, and that the Georgia statute was a regulation by the State Legislature affecting interstate commerce and was, therefore, unconstitutional and void. Defendant was convicted, his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, and on writ of error the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299.

The court held, that had the statute related only to trains transporting domestic freight within the State of Georgia it

could not be regarded otherwise than as an ordinary police regulation, under its authority to protect the health and morals and to promote the welfare of its people. It was not intended as an cnactment to regulate interstate commerce, or with any other purpose than to prescribe a rule of civil duty for all who, on the Sabbath day, are within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. While in a limited degree the statute may affect interstate commerce it is not necessarily an intrusion upon the domain of Federal jurisdiction, nor strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, but an ordinary police regulation which the State had power to enact. Ib.

Speed of Trains When State May Regulate. A city, when authorized by the Legislature, may regulate the speed of railway trains within the city limits. Such act is, even as to interstate trains, one only indirectly affecting interstate commerce, and is within the power of the State at least until Congress shall take action in the matter. Erb v. Morash, 177 U. S. 584, citing Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521; Cleveland R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514.

Express Companies - When not Subject to the Act.-An express company, independently organized, doing business on its own account and for its own benefit, independent of any connection with the carrier, is not subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. To render an express company liable to indictment for a violation of the provisions of the act the indictment must aver that the defendant carries on the express business in connection with the railroad or a combination of railroads as a branch or department of their general freight traffic. In that case the express company would be the mere agent of the carrier, and liable to indictment for a violation of the penal provisions of the act. United States v. Mossman, 42 Fed. Rep. 448 (May, 1890, Dist. Ct. East. Dist. Mo.).

Damages for Unreasonable Charges. The act declares that all charges by the carrier must be reasonable and just, and every unreasonable and unjust charge is declared to be unlawful. A shipper who suffers damage by reason of an unlawful charge has a cause of action under section 1. Such an action is not based