arose. The French claimed 350,000 capital-ship tonnage. Italy, while objecting to such a total either for herself or France, insisted that she must be on a parity with France. Great Britain would agree to no such tonnage for France and Italy if her own was to be reduced and limited, as provided in the 5-5-3 agreement. For a short time the situation was distinctly threatening.

But on December 20 an announcement from the Subcommittee on Naval Limitation set forth an agreement reached in direct correspondence between Secretary Hughes and Premier Briand, who had returned to Europe and was in London at the time. This agreement gave the French 175,000 capital-ship tonnage, one-half what they claimed, and the Italians were allowed the same total. That made the capital-ship ratio 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, respectively. The correspondence between Mr. Hughes and M. Briand was made public at the time the agreement was announced, December 20.

HUGHES TELEGRAPHS BRIAND

Mr. Hughes, it was shown, had cabled M. Briand on December 16, reporting the terms of the agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and continuing:

The agreement, however, as to the number of ships to be retained by them is dependent upon an appropriate agreement with France and Italy with respect to their capital ships. Italy is desirous to reduce her capital ships, because of the obvious requirements of her economic life, to the lowest possible basis, and there will be not the slightest difficulty in making an agreement with Italy if we can reach a suitable understanding with France.

You will observe the attitude of France will determine the success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of naval armament.

5-5-3 Reviewed

In dealing with Great Britain and Japan we have taken facts as they are. We have avoided an academic discussion of national needs and aspirations, which, in the nature of things, could not be realized. It has been pointed out that the ratio of strength in capital ships is that which exists, and that it is futile to desire a better one, for it cannot be obtained if nations with abundant resources build against each other in competition. The predreadnaughts possessed by the three powers are to be scrapped without any suggestion of replacement, and there has been a reduction of over 40 per cent of the naval strength represented by dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts. Now France has 7 dreadnaughts, with a tonnage of 164,500. Reducing in the same proportion as the United States has reduced, her tonnage of capital ships would be fixed at 102,000, or if the predreadnaughts of France were taken into calculation on her side although omitted on the side of the United States, the total tonnage of France's capital ships being taken at 221,000, a reduction on the same basis would reduce France to 136,000 tons.

This would be the sacrifice of France if she made the same sacrifices that have been made by the other powers. We do not ask this. We are entirely willing that France should have the benefit of an increased tonnage which would preclude the necessity of her scrapping her dreadnaughts— that is to say, her present strength in dreadnaughts is about 164,000 tons, and there is not the slightest objection to allowing this and an increase over this, or a total of 175,000 tons, which would be more than 70,000 tons over what she would have on the basis of relative strength as it exists.

If it be said that France desires a greater relative strength, the obvious answer is that this would be impossible of attainment. If such an agreement as we are now proposing were not made, the United States and Great Britain would very shortly have navies of over a million tons, more than 6 to 1 as compared with France, and France would not be in a position to better herself, much less by any possi

ble endeavor to obtain such a relative strength as has been suggested. In short, the proposed agreement is tremendously in favor of France by reducing the navies of powers who not only are able to build, but whose ships are actually in course of construction, to a basis far more favorable to France than would otherwise be attainable. The proposed agreement really doubles the relative strength of the French

navy.

Agreement Up to France

In these circumstances I feel that the suggestion that has been made, that France should build 10 new capital ships in replacement with a tonnage of 300,000 tons or more, suggests a program of such magnitude as to raise the greatest difficulties. In fact, I regret to say that, after canvassing the matter thoroughly and taking the best information I can obtain, I am compelled to conclude that it would not be possible on this basis to carry through the agreement.

I need not point out to you our great desire, which you yourself have so eloquently expressed, that the economic burden of armament should be lifted. It is not against the interests of France that we express the hope that her industry and resources will be devoted to economic recuperation and the enhancement of her prosperity rather than be expended in the building of fighting ships. The particular situation of France with respect to land armament you have vividly portrayed, but that points, as it seems to us, to the very great importance of reduction in naval armament. At this time, when we are anxious to aid France in full recovery of her economic life, it would be most disappointing to be advised that she was contemplating putting hundreds of millions into battleships.

I have spoken to you thus frankly because of my deep appreciation of your friendship and of your solicitude for the success of the efforts we are making, and in the hope that the present matter, which represents, perhaps, the most critical position yet reached in the Conference, may be adjusted on a satisfactory basis. I repeat that the provisional agreement reached with Great Britain and Japan hinges upon an appropriate agreement with France, and I cannot too strongly urge the most careful consideration of all the matters to which I have taken the liberty to allude. Permit me to assure you of my highest respect and of the keen desire that we entertain in America that you should visit us again at an early date.

BRIAND'S ANSWER

Two days later M. Briand cabled Mr. Hughes from London as follows:

At the moment of my departure for London, Mr. Herrick handed me your friendly telegram in regard to the difficulties which have arisen in the Naval Disarmament Commission in reference to the tonnage of capital ships which have been asked for by the French delegation.

You fear that the maintenance of this French request may have as its effect to hinder the agreement between the five powers.

The will of the French Government is to do everything which is compatible with the care of the vital interests of France with a view to reconcile our points of view.

In the question of naval armament, the preoccupation of France is not the offensive point of view, but uniquely the defensive point of view.

With regard to the tonnage of capital ships that is to say, attacking ships-which are the most costly, I have given instructions to our delegates in the sense which you desire. I am certain that I shall be sustained by my Parliament in this view.

But, so far as the defensive ships are concerned (light cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines), it would be impossible for the French Government, without putting itself in contradiction with the vote of the chambers, to accept reductions corresponding to those which we accept for capital ships under this formal reserve, which you will certainly understand.

The idea which dominates the Washington Conference is to restrict naval armaments which are offensive and costly; but I do not believe that it is in the program to deny to a

nation like France, which has a large extent of coasts and a great number of distant colonists, the essential means of defending its communications and its security.

I am certain, my dear Mr. Hughes, that you will appreciate the effort of conciliation which we are making in order to respond to your request.

I beg you to kindly accept my cordial remembrances and the ardent wish which I form for the complete and striking success of the Conference over which you preside with so much authority and brilliancy.

SUBMARINES

M. Briand's reservation as to auxiliary ships, including submarines, was noted, but in the general rejoicing over the agreement on capital ships, it did not make a deep impression. Few realized how much weight it would have in subsequent sessions of the Naval Subcommittee. There was the great debate in the subcommittee upon the British proposal to abolish submarines. In that debate the British won a moral victory, in that they made their proposal a live issue in the court of public opinion, even though they did not carry their point. France, Italy, and Japan were unwilling to abolish the submarine. There was reason to believe that most of the American delegates were profoundly impressed by the British arguments, but since there was no present chance of abolition being effected, the American delegates did not declare definitely their views when the arguments were concluded.

Japan

France Italy

32,200

Amount of new building permitted under the American proposals.

6,500

9,500

21,800

28,360 In proportion. In proportion. 18,250 In proportion. In proportion.

He felt bound to say that it seemed to him very strange to put before a Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments proposals designed to foster and increase the type of war vessels which, according to the British view, was open to more objections than surface capital ships. Moreover, it would be a certain consequence, if submarines were retained, that the powers which possessed large mercantile marines would be compelled to increase the numbers of their antisubmarine craft. This would give but little relief to the overburdened taxpayer and would provide scant comfort to those who wished to abolish war and to make it less inhumane.

ABOLITION ALONE WILL SUFFICE

The view of the British Government and the British Empire delegation was that what was required was not merely restrictions on submarines, but their total and final abolition. In explaining the position he wished to make clear that the British delegation had no unworthy or selfish motives. He would first like to reply in advance, since this might be his only opportunity of doing so, to the arguments of the friends of the submarine. He understood their first contention to be that the submarine was the legitimate weapon of the weaker powers, and was an effective and economical means of defense for an extensive coast-line and for maritime com

munications. Both these standpoints could be contested on technical grounds and, as he would show, were clearly disproved by recent history. If some weak country possessed an exposed coast-line, it would, of course, desire to defend it against bombardment or the disembarkation of a military force.

It was necessary to ask, therefore, how such attacks were conducted in modern warfare. The reply was that they were conducted by powerfully armed, swift-moving vessels, fully equipped to resist submarine attack, to escort and protect the convoys of military transports. There was no branch of naval research which had more closely engaged the attention of experts than the counter-offensive against the submarine. He was giving away no secrets when he stated that the methods of detection, of location, as well as of destruction of submarines had progressed so much further than the offensive power of the submarines themselves that the latter had now already a reduced value against modern surface warships. This, however, was bringing him into somewhat technical subjects. During the late war Germany had concentrated her efforts on the use of the U-boat and had built up the most formidable submarine fleet that the world had ever seen up to the present time. He believed that Germany had employed no less than 375 U-boats of 270,000 tons in the aggregate. Of these no less than 203 had been sunk.

What had these U-boats accomplished in legitimate naval warfare? It was almost insignificant. In the early part of the war a few obsolescent ships, which sometimes were not taking proper precautions, had been sunk, but the British grand fleet throughout the war had not been affected; not one single ship had been sunk or hit by the action of submarines, whether at sea or in harbor. Our light cruisers had swept through all parts of the North Sea, and, wherever that sea had been clear of mine fields, had gone where they wished, undeterred by the submarine. Submarines had not prevented the passage of troops across the sea. No less than 15,000,000 British troops had crossed and recrossed the English Channel during the war, and not one man had been lost from the action of submarines except on board hospital ships, which, in the 20th century, it had been deemed` would be immune from the attacks of submarines, and therefore had not been escorted. During the later months of the war some 2,000,000 United States troops had been brought across the Atlantic, and the submarine had proved equally powerless in their case. In fact, the U-boat, whether considered as an offensive or defensive weapon against any sort of organized naval force, had proved almost contemptible.

HOW USEFUL FOR COLONIES?

It had been maintained that submarines were useful for the defense of coast-lines and communications with colonies. He gathered from the press that this was one of the arguments used, and so it would have to be examined. If the argument was sound and if submarines were essential for this purpose, there was no country which would need them so much as the British Empire, which possessed a coast-line which, without wishing to boast, he believed was almost as large as that of all the five powers present at this Conference put together, and the length of which was four times the circumference of the globe, and which, in addition, had the longest trade routes of any country to protect. It was partly because our experience had shown that they were not effective for this purpose that we were ready to abandon submarines. The late war had made it abundantly clear that the greatest peril to maritime communications was the submarine, and that peril was specially great to a country which did not possess command of the sea on the surface; hence it was to the interest of any such power to get rid of this terrible menace; and in this connection it must be remembered that the submarine was of no value as a defense to be used against submarines. It was against merchant ships alone that they achieved real success.

THE GERMAN BLOWS AT COMMERCE

It would be as well to recall what the German submarine fleet had accomplished against mercantile marines. No less than 12,000,000 tons of shipping had been sunk, of a value of $1,100,000,000, apart from their cargoes. Over 20,000 non

combatants-men, women, and children-had been drowned. It was true that this action had been undertaken in violation of all laws, both human and divine. The German excuse for it had been its effectiveness. They had used the same argument as in the case of poison gas, which had set a precedent which appeared likely to endure for all time, now that nations had been driven to resort to it. The menace of the submarine could only be got rid of by its total banishment from the sea. That was the intention of the Treaty of Versailles, which had forbidden Germany to construct submarines, whether for military or mercantile purposes.

Were we to assume (Lord Lee continued) that Germany was always to be bad and the other powers were always to be good? Was there to be one rule for Germany and another rule for the rest of the world? In saying this he was not casting any reflection on any nation, and least of all on the officers and men of the submarine fleets. These men were the pick of their services, gallant and high-minded men; but they were obliged to obey orders; and experience had shown that occasionally governments could go mad. The view of the British Empire delegation, therefore, was that the only proper course was the abolition of submarines. Their limitation was not sufficient. His objection to limitation was that a submarine fleet could so very rapidly be expanded in time of war. Submarines could only be built if the industry were kept alive, and a personnel could only be provided if a trained nucleus existed. Hence it was only by means of abolition that this menace to the mercantile marine of the world could be got rid of.

He had said earlier in his remarks that the British Empire delegation were animated by no selfish motives. At the same time it would be foolish not to recognize that Great Britain was the nation most exposed to the menace of the submarine. So long as submarine warfare continued, it would be the greatest menace to the food supplies on which our country was dependent. The British people lived on a crowded island whose soil only produced two-fifths of its supply of food. For the remaining three-fifths they relied upon sea communications. On an average, only seven weeks' stocks were maintained in the country. By far the greatest anxiety which the British Government had felt during the war was to prevent the reserves of food falling to zero.

THE NEGATION OF HUMANITY

Was it surprising, therefore, if, with a danger in front of them as great as any to which M. Briand had so eloquently explained France was subject, the British people protested against a weapon which was the negation of humanity and civilization itself? There were some people who said it was this vulnerability of Great Britain which justified the retention of the submarine, since it was by these means alone that the British Empire could be stricken down. The late war had shown, however, that the British Empire was not easily stricken down, and if war should ever come again, it can be imagined that means would be found for our country to save itself from starvation.

But it might be claimed, if the U-boat had begun its operations earlier or had had better luck, the result might have been different. To this he would reply that the British navy had constituted almost the keystone of the Allied arch; but for the British navy, France would have been ruined, Belgium would have been overrun, and even the United States of America, self-contained, self-supporting, with vast resources, would have been impotent to intervene and might have had to abandon its army and all that it had in France or else to make a humiliating peace.

That would not have been a disaster to Great Britain alone. That was why he resented the idea, which had been published in a part of the press, that the abolition of submarines was merely a selfish and unworthy design. It had been suggested that the conditions of the late war might never recur. Could France be sure of this? Could France run the risk of a disaster to her near neighbor and only certain ally if the situation of 1914 were ever reproduced? It was necessary to take long views in this matter, and the British Empire delegation believed that they were fighting

the battle not only of the Allied and associated powers, but of the whole civilized world, in advocating the abolition of the submarine.

POWER OF WORLD OPINION

He felt sure that some one would ask, How can we feel sure that if we abolish submarines other powers who are not represented here will not proceed with the building of submarines? The same question might be asked as to other classes of craft mentioned in the American scheme. He found it impossible to believe that other powers would set themselves against the opinion of the rest of the civilized world regarding this particular weapon. If, however, the great naval powers should at some future date find themselves exposed to piracy by the action of some smaller power, surely they would find the means of bringing Nemesis to the transgressor. World opinion was a very powerful weapon, and certainly some means would be found by which the great naval powers could protect themselves if necessary.

SHALL WAR BE CHEAP?

It was said that submarines were a cheap method of warfare. Surely this Conference did not desire to make war cheap? When war had been cheap it had been almost continuous. He hoped the submarine would not be defended because it would be a weapon within the reach of all. It might, perhaps, be cheap for the aggressor, but it was not so for the victim. The average number of German submarines at sea simultaneously during the late war had not been more than nine or ten, but Great Britain had had to maintain an average of no less than 3,000 anti-submarine surface craft in order to deal with these. It could be seen, therefore, that it was a very expensive form of war for the defender.

The British delegation were anxious to contribute toward the ideals of the present Conference. They desired not only a limitation of armaments, but also a limitation of expenditures, which constituted so great a burden in time of peace. That was why Great Britain, which had the tradition of possessing the greatest navy, had welcomed the proposals for curbing capital ships. What should we gain, however, if this competition were merely transferred to submarines? Certainly not much; and meanwhile the submarine threatened our very life and existence. But if the submarine were abolished we could accept, with modifications in detail, practically the whole of the American proposals in regard to the lightening of these burdens.

Lord Lee said he was not impressed with the argument that because it was found impossible to deal effectively with poison gas or air bombs, which were by-products of essential industries, we could not deal with the submarine. The submarine was not a by-product of any industry, but was essentially an offensive weapon. He therefore said that it could be, and therefore ought to be, abolished. It was a weapon of murder and piracy and the drowning of non-combatants. It had been used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships, and even hospital ships. Technically, the submarine was so constructed that it could not be utilized to rescue even women and children from sinking ships. That was why he hoped that the Conference would not give it a new lease of life.

LIMITED IN DEFENSE

He had endeavored to state frankly that the submarine was only to a limited extent a weapon of defense, and that for offense it was only really valuable when used against merchant ships, and that it constituted the greatest peril to which the mercantile marine of the world was exposed. For defense, he did not say it was useless, but merely inefficient, and that the disadvantages exceeded the advantages, except for war on the mercantile marine. The submarine was the only class of vessel for which the Conference was asked to give-he would not say a license, but permission to thrive and multiply. It would be a great disappointment if the British Empire delegation failed to persuade the Conference to get rid of this weapon, which involved so much evil to peoples who live on or by the sea.

To show the earnestness of the British Government in

this matter, Lord Lee pointed out that Great Britain possessed the largest and probably the most efficient submarine navy in the world, composed of 100 vessels of 80,000 tons. She was prepared to scrap the whole of this great fleet and to disband the personnel, provided the other powers would do the same. That was the British offer to the world, and he believed that it was a greater contribution to the cause of humanity than even the limitation of capital ships.

However, it was useless to be blind to the facts of the position, and he hardly hoped to carry with him all the powers present at that table, though he believed that in the end all civilized powers would come round to the British point of view. In any event, the British Empire delegation did not intend that the settlement in regard to capital ships should be affected if they failed to carry their point in regard to the abolition of submarines. Should he fail to convince his colleagues, he would nevertheless welcome any suggestions for the reduction and restriction of submarines which they might like to make, and in particular he would await with the greatest interest the proposals of his French colleagues, which had been promised earlier in the day.

When Lord Lee sat down, Mr. Hughes complimented him, but corrected Lord Lee's figures as to existing tonnage. American naval experts, Mr. Hughes said, reported the tonnage as follows: United States, 95,000; Great Britain, 82,464; France, 42,850; Italy, 20,228; Japan, 31,400.

THE FRENCH CALL SUBMARINE DEFENSIVE

The communique sets forth the following expressions from the French, Italian, and Japanese delegations, following Mr. Hughes' interpolation:

M. Sarraut, in paying tribute to the able statement of Lord Lee, joined with the other delegations in expressing his profound disapproval of the barbarous use which was made of submarines in the late war.

The French delegation recalled the fact that the question of the use of submarines had already been dealt with during the discussions at the Peace Conference, as well as by the League of Nations, and that public opinion had shown itself favorable to the continuance of submarines.

The French delegation believed that the submarine was pre-eminently a defensive weapon, especially for nations scantily supplied with capital ships.

In its present state, the submarine had proved itself to be unequal to gaining control of the seas and could not be considered as a dominating weapon. Moreover, it was undeniable that the submarine could be used under honorable conditions, and it was certain that these conditions should be examined, discussed, and formulated in such a way as to determine the laws of sea warfare, in conformity with the lessons and precepts drawn from the late war.

In view of these facts, the French delegation therefore felt called upon to give its approval to the use of the submarine, under the restrictions already outlined. It wished to point out that, in view of the technical considerations governing the use at sea of these vessels, subject as they are to frequent withdrawal from service, it would be necessary for a navy to possess a number of them which would be proportionate to the needs of national defense.

The French delegation wished, moreover, to observe that the use of large submarines was, under existing conditions, undoubtedly more in accordance with the laws of humanity, which demand that the crews of torpedoed vessels should be rescued. Finally, submarines with a large cruising radius are, in the opinion of the French delegation, necessary to assure the defense of distant colonies and possessions, as well as to maintain the safety of lines of communication between the mother country and the possessions or colonies for which she is responsible.

THE ITALIAN VIEW

Senator Schanzer said:

We have been listening with the greatest attention and sympathy to Lord Lee's important speech.

In the name of the Italian delegation, I wish to declare with the greatest sympathy upon anything that can make war less inhuman.

The Italian delegate in the Subcommittee for Poisonous Gases, in this same Conference, proposed the abolition of these gases.

Nevertheless, the submarine question is mainly one of a technical nature. Lord Lee has asserted that submarines are not efficient means of defense.

Our naval experts do not share this opinion. They think that the submarine is still an indispensable weapon for the defense of the Italian coasts, which have a very great extension and along which some of our main centers, our principal railways, and a number of our most important industrial establishments are situated. Our naval experts are, furthermore, of the opinion that submarines are necessary to protect the lines of communication of our country, which for the greater part depends upon the sea for its supplies. We are not ready today to resolve these doubts of a technical character.

We venture to observe, moreover, that we do not think this Conference, in which only five powers are represented, could resolve the question of submarines, which can concern many other powers which are not present here. For these reasons and in spite of our appreciation of the humanitarian arguments brought forward by Lord Lee, we are not today in measure to associate ourselves with the proposal of abolishing submarines and we are not authorized to do so. THE JAPANESe for restrICTIONS

Mr. Hanihara said:

Japan was unconditionally opposed to all abusive uses of submarines, such as those recently committed by a certain nation. However, Japan felt that a legitimate use of submarines was justifiable as well as necessary, from the point of view of defense. He suggested that the international rules of war be so modified as to vigorously guard against abusive use of submarines.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S REPORT

Mr. Hughes spoke again, saying there was at least one point upon which all the delegates seemed in accord. That was restriction of the use of submarines, to prevent recurrence of the horrors of the last war. Still declining to take an official position upon the value of the submarine for legitimate defense, Mr. Hughes then read the report on the submarine made to the American delegation by the American Advisory Committee. It follows:

In the recent World War the submarine was used in four general ways:

(a) Unlimited use against both enemy and neutral noncombatant merchant vessels.

(b) Use against enemy combatant vessels. (c) Use as mine-planters.

(d) Use as scouts.

Whatever is said about unlimited warfare by submarines is also true of unlimited warfare by surface craft, provided the combatant wishes to violate the rules of war. The confederate cruisers destroyed all property, but not lives. The English expected the Germans in the latter part of the World War to use surface craft for unlimited warfare and had provided means to offset this. However, the Germans, with one exception, were unable to get out of the North Sea. The Moewe, a surface ship, sank almost all merchantmen that she came into contact with, saving the lives of the crews. So that unlimited warfare is not necessarily an attribute of the submarine alone.

SUBMARINE AGAINST COMMERCE

The unlimited use of submarines by Germany against commerce brought down upon her the wrath of the world, solidified it against the common enemy, and was undoubtedly the popular cause of the United States entering the World War.

The rules of maritime warfare require a naval vessel de

siring to investigate a merchant ship first to warn her by firing a shot across her bow, or in other ways, and then proceed with the examination of her character, make the decision in regard to her seizure, place a prize crew on her, and, except under certain exceptionable circumstances, bring `her into port, where she may be condemned by a prize court. The rules of procedure (1917), as laid down for United States naval vessels when exercising the right of visit and search, make no exception in favor of the submarine. In the early part of the World War the German submarines exercised this right of visit and search in the same manner as surface vessels. When sunk, the papers and crew of merchant ships so visited were saved. Later, when the cases ame up in a German prize court, sitting on appeal at Berlin, the responsibility of the German Government was often acknowledged and indemnities paid. When unlimited submarine warfare commenced, in some cases where necessary evidence was produced by the owners making claim in the prize court, the court decided that the matter was outside the pale of the prize regulations, though it did not deny the justice of the claim.

Assuming that a merchant ship may be halted by a submarine in a legitimate fashion, it becomes difficult, because of limited personnel, for the submarine to complete the inspection, place a prize crew on board, and bring her into port. It is also difficult for her to take the passengers and crew of a large prize on board, should circumstances warrant sinking the vessel. However, these remarks are applicable to small surface crafts as well.

During the World War, on account of the vulnerability of the submarine and on account of the probability of its sinking the vessels it captured, the tendency was for all merchant ships (including neutrals) to arm themselves against the submarine. Such action greatly hampers the activity of the submarines and tends toward illegal acts both by the merchant vessels and by the submarine. In other words, the general tendency of submarine warfare against commerce, even though starting according to accepted rules, was sharply toward warfare unlimited by international law or any humanitarian rules. This was because the vulnerability of the submarine led the Germans to assume and declare she was entitled to special exemptions from the accepted rules of warfare governing surface craft. The merchant ship sank the submarine if it came near enough; the submarine sought and destroyed the merchant ship without even knowledge of nationality or guilt.

a

SUBMARINES CAUSE ARMING OF MERCHANTMEN Submarines were largely responsible for the extensive arming of merchant vessels, neutral and belligerent, during the World War. The average merchant vessel could not hope to arm effectively against enemy surface combatant vessels, and as a rule submits to visit and search without resistance. Prospects of saving the ship and certainty of safety to personnel have caused them to accept as the lesser risk the visit of belligerent surface vessels. When, however, as in the World War, they met a belligerent submarine, with a strong probability of being sunk by that submarine, the law of self-preservation operated and the merchant ship resisted by every means in its power. Defensive armament was almost sure to be used offensively in an attempt to strike a first blow. The next step was for each to endeavor to sink the other on sight.

War on commerce by surface combatant craft causes change of ownership of merchant vessels only, provided the surface craft does not sink these ships; but these merchant vessels for the most part remain in service; they are not destroyed. The world does not lose them. The object of war on commerce is not to destroy shipping, but to deprive the enemy of its use. Submarine warfare on commerce, if unlimited in character, injures the enemy and greatly injures the world as well. The world is so highly organized and so dependent on ocean transportation that shipping is essential to livelihood; without it vast populations would starve.

At present, when war breaks out, belligerent vessels tend to transfer to neutral flags and also to fly false flags. This hampers lawful warfare by submarines, as, owing to their great difficulty in making the proper visit and search, it is

thus impossible for them to prevent belligerent commerce from going forward.

The net results of unlimited submarine warfare in the World War were (a) flagrant violations of international law, (b) destruction of an enormous amount of wealth, (c) unnecessary loss of many innocent lives, and (d) to draw into the war many neutrals.

Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedure of submarines against merchant vessels, both neutral and belligerent. These rules should accord with the rules observed by surface craft. Laws should also be made which prohibit the use of false flags and offensive arming of merchant vessels. The use of false flags has already ceased in land warfare. No one can prevent an enemy from running "amuck" but immediately he does he outlaws himself and invites sure defeat by bringing down the wrath of the world upon his head. If the submarine is required to operate under the same rule as combatant surface vessels, no objection can be raised as to its use against merchant vessels. The individual captains of submarines are no more likely to violate instructions from their government upon this point than are captains of any other type of ship acting independently.

SUBMARINES AGAINST COMBATANT SHIPS

Against enemy men-of-war the submarine may be likened to the advance guard on land, which hides in a tree or uses underbrush to conceal itself. If the infantry in its advance encounters an ambuscade, it suffers greatly, even if it is not totally annihilated. However, an ambuscade is entirely legitimate. In the same fashion a submarine strikes the advancing enemy from concealment, and no nation cries out against this form of attack as illegal. Its navy simply becomes more vigilant, moves faster, and uses its surface scouts to protect itself.

The submarine carries the same weapons as surface vessels, i. e., torpedoes, mines, and guns. There is no prohibition of their use on surface craft and there can be none on submarines. Submarines are particularly well adapted to use mines and torpedoes. They can approach to the desired spot without being seen, lay their mines, or discharge their torpedoes and make their escape..

The best defense against them is eternal vigilance and high speed. This causes added fatigue to the personnel and greater wear to the machinery. The continual menace of submarines in the vicinity may so wear down a fleet that when it meets the enemy it will be so exhausted as to make its defeat a simple matter.

The submarine, as a man-of-war, has a very vital part to play. It has come to stay. It may strike without warning against combatant vessels, as surface ships may do also, but it must be required to observe the prescribed rules of surface craft when opposing the merchantman, as at other times.

THE SUBMARINE AS A SCOUT

As a scout, the submarine has great possibilities; it is the one type of vessel able to proceed unsupported into distant enemy waters and maintain itself, to observe and report enemy movements. At present its principal handicaps are poor habitability and lack of radio power to transmit its information. However, these may be overcome in some degree in the future. Here, again, the submarine has come to stay; it has great value, a legitimate use, and no nation can decry its employment in this fashion.

Then followed a statement of the proposal of the United States for limitation of naval armament, so far as submarines are concerned, as made at the opening session of the Conference.

The report continued:

A nation possessing a great merchant marine protected by a strong surface navy naturally does not desire the added threat of submarine warfare brought against it. This is particularly the case if that nation gains its livelihood through overseas commerce. If the surface navy of such a nation were required to leave its home waters, it would be