2. It is also agreed that the United States and its nationals are to be accorded the same rights and privileges with respect to radio-telegraphic service as with regard to cables. It is provided that so long as the Japanese Government shall maintain on the Island of Yap an adequate radiotelegraphic station, co-operating effectively with the cables and with other radio stations on ships and shore, without discriminatory exactions or preferences, the exercise of the right to establish radio-telegraphic stations at Yap by the United States or its nationals shall be suspended.

3. It is further agreed that the United States shall enjoy in the Island of Yap the following rights, privileges, and exemptions in relation to electrical communications:

(a) Rights of residence without restriction; and rights of acquisition and enjoyment and undisturbed possession, upon a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nation or their respective nationals, of all property and interests, both personal and real, including lands, buildings, residences, offices, works, and appurtenances.

(b) No permit or license to be required for the enjoyment of any of these rights and privileges.

(c) Each country to be free to operate both ends of its cables, either directly or through its nationals, including corporations or associations.

(d) No cable censorship or supervision of operation or messages.

(e) Free entry and exit for persons and property.

(f) No taxes, port, harbor, or landing charges or exactions, either with respect to operation of cables or to property, persons, or vessels.

(g) No discriminatory police regulations.

4. Japan agrees that it will use its power of expropriation to secure to the United States needed property and facilities for the purpose of electrical communication in the island, if such property or facilities cannot otherwise be obtained. It is understood that the location and area of land to be so expropriated shall be arranged each time between the two governments, according to the requirements of each case. American property and facilities for the purpose of electrical communication in the island are to be exempt from the process of expropriation.

5. The United States consents to the administration by Japan of the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator, subject to the above provisions with respect to the Island of Yap and also subject to the following conditions:

(a) The United States is to have the benefit of the engagements of Japan set forth in the mandate, particularly

those as follows:

"ARTICLE 3

"The mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited and that no forced labor is permitted, except for essential public work and services, and then only for adequate remuneration.

"The mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and ammunition is controlled in accordance with principles analogous to those laid down in the Convention relating to the control of the arms traffic, signed on September 10th, 1919, or in any convention amending same.

"The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.

"ARTICLE 4

"The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes of internal police and the local defense of the territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory."

(b) With respect to missionaries, it is agreed that Japan shall ensure complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, which are consonant with public order and morality, and that missionaries of all such religions shall be free to enter the territory, and to travel and reside therein, to acquire and possess property, to erect religious buildings, and to open schools throughout the territory. Japan shall, however, have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public

order and good government, and to take all measures required for such control.

(c) Japan agrees that vested American property rights will be maintained and respected.

(d) It is agreed that the treaties between the United States and Japan now in force shall apply to the mandated islands.

(e) It is agreed that any modifications in the mandate are to be subject to the consent of the United States, and, further, that Japan will address to the United States a duplicate report on the administration of the mandate.

INTERNATIONAL NOTES

ON JANUARY 7 appeared the first issue of a newspaper that has a large opportunity for service. The paper is The Red Cross Courier, which will come out on Saturdays, and supersedes the Red Cross Bulletin and all other Red Cross bulletins and periodicals previously issued. The price of the paper is $1 per year, and an attempt is to be made to make it self-supporting. Its first number contains news and articles that, if taken as an index to the future, makes the subscription price very reasonable. One of the features of the first number was the facsimile reproduction of a letter from President Harding, enclosing his subscription and expressing the view that such a publication "certainly has its place in the journalistic field."

FROM THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES an appeal has been sent out for aid, in the effort to save the starving millions of Russia, which paints a terrible picture of terrible things in that land of sorrows, asking that contributions be sent to Carl E. Milliken, treasurer of the Committee on Mercy and Relief, 105 East Twentysecond street, New York, who will distribute them through the American Relief Administration and the American Friends Service Committee, and stating that the grant of $20,000,000 made by Congress does not nearly remove the need for private charity, the Federal Council says:

The Christmas season, with its note of sacrificial giving, was made the occasion for beginning the campaign in the churches in behalf of the Russian children. The month of January, however, is to be the time of special emphasis, as the peak of famine conditions is now being reached.

"Conditions are growing worse by leaps and bounds," according to a dispatch from Colonel Haskell on December 17. "I am thoroughly convinced that half of the population of the Tartar Republic will starve before the end of winter. Unless the outside world awakens to conditions, I doubt if we shall save more than half the children we are feeding today. Conditions took a turn for the worse at the beginning of November and will reach a crisis in January." The number of men, women, and children actually face to face with starvation is estimated at fifteen millions. The first effort is being directed to saving the children.

That the Russian Government is bending every energy to help save its own people is indicated by its action in appropriating $10,000,000, its last reserve of gold, if reports be true, to the American Relief Administration for the purchase of grain. Cables from Colonel Haskell also testify to the good faith of the Russian Government in co-operating with the Relief Administration.

IN THE ATTENTION given by the world to the Washington Conference and to economic problems in Europe, scant notice has been given the situation in Egypt; but dispatches to the London papers indicate that the hopes entertained some months ago that the discontent was fast subsiding were too optimistic. In a series of dispatches to the London Times, covering several days in

THE RECENT CHANGE OF REGIME IN GREECE

By JOANNES GENNADIUS1

Late Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Greece to Great Britain

been remarked as a coincidence not alto

ing events is given. The dispatches, dated Cairo, read:

DECEMBER 22.

An order under martial law today forbids Zaglul Pasha to make public speeches, attend public meetings, write to the press, or take part in political affairs. Further, he has been ordered to leave Cairo and to reside at his country residence.

Fathallah Pasha Barakat, Atef Barakat, Sadik Henein, Mustapha el Nahas, Sinnott Hanna, Amin Ezz-el-Arab, Gaafar Fakhry, and Makram Obeid, all supporters of Zaghlul, have been ordered to proceed to their country residences and to refrain from all political activity.

Zaghlul Pasha and his eight supporters, who had been ordered to leave Cairo and refrain from all political activity, have declined to obey voluntarily, and will, therefore, leave under military escort tomorrow.-Reuter.

DECEMBER 23.

In consequence of the arrest of Zaghlul disturbances occurred this morning in Cairo, and as a result British troops have taken over the city. Considerable damage was caused in shops by bands of youthful hooligans, who smashed many

windows, but the presence of the troops prevented a spread

ing of the trouble. Two natives were killed, one of whom was the ringleader of a band erecting a barricade to prevent the movement of the troops.

Zaghlul is still interned at Suez with five members of his entourage.-Reuter.

DECEMBER 27. The city is now quiet, and many taxicabs have returned to the streets, although the horse cabs are still absent. Practically all the government officials are working.-Reuter.

THE JAPAN Times and Mail, published at Tokio, had this editorial comment in its issue of December 17 upon the Four-Power treaty:

However, the greatest concern here is the question of how the Entente will affect Japan. Paris recognized Japan as one of the three great powers of the world, chiefly because of her position in the Far East. Be that as it may, there is no one in Japan foolish enough to imagine that Japan, even at her best, is anything like the equal of the United States or Great Britain. This is even more true now when one considers the alliance discontinued and her armament strength reduced. It was this consciousness that made many Japanese wary of accepting the invitation of President Harding to the Washington Conference. The Conference, it was expected, would sit in judgment over Japan and order the shearing of her wings and the plucking of her feathers. It was feared that Japan was going to the Conference to return deserted and isolated, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance demolished, and her fleet cut down to name only.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been the stay of Japan and it will be missed when abrogated. America was determined that it must go, and go it will, but fortunately not without a substitute; and, to be candid, this is a great relief to this country.

Conference, who represented the interests of the allied and associated powers, were all, with the exception of the British Premier, Mr. Lloyd-George, ousted from office, not to say disavowed by their countrymen, as soon as they affixed their signatures to the treaties they had negotiated. That the fate of President Wilson, of M. George Clemenceau, and of Signor Orlando had befallen also Monsieur Venizelos is known to all. But, while the reasons which drove from office the other three are not in dispute, considerable doubt and confusion seem to prevail as to the causes of Venizelos' downfall. Ever since my arrival in this country I have been challenged to explain what appeared to some of my interlocutors as a riddle, and to others as proof positive of the fickleness and want of political sagacity in the Greek people.

In these circumstances it is in the interest of M. Venizelos himself that a truthful, circumstantial, and impartial explanation should be offered in response to inquiries which are the result partly of the absence of reliable information and partly of the propagation of misleading reports by fanatical partisans and disappointed office-seekers. In my endeavor to give an account of the succession of events which have led to the overthrow of the Venizelist régime in Greece I shall be guided by that strict observance of impartiality and truthfulness which I have invariably set before me in dealing with our home affairs; for, while I cede it to none in admiration of M. Venizelos' talents and have promoted to the best of my ability the purely patriotic side of his policy, I was never included in his "inner circle" and I never made it a secret that I could not identify myself with certain aspects of his administration at home. Indeed, I have never been a party man. I do not mean to say that I am what Americans call a Mugwump. But I have always observed it as a rule in my career never to be mixed up in internal party politics, believing, as I do, that the diplomatic representative, especially of a small State, can most usefully serve his country if he is known to speak and act, not as for a party, but for the interests of the country as a whole.

Well, then, let me say at the outset that the diplomatic achievements of M. Venizelos will ever stand out as one of the most brilliant feats recorded in modern history. Unfortunately, the grandiose structure which he raised by the Treaty of Sevres did not rest on a firm foundation; and it is an axiom in politics that no foreign policy can be successful or enduring which does not. stand on a substructure of a healthy, upright, good administration at home, compelling confidence and imposing respect.

M. Venizelos' first administration was quite admirable; this much even his opponents admit; and it was on the excellence of that administration that his strength

1 Dr. Gennadius has been in the Greek diplomatic service for over half a century.-THE EDITOR.

in the country rested; but on his return from Salonika, and the departure of King Constantine, things rapidly changed for the worse. From June, 1917, onward his friends and his organs entered upon a veritable orgy of lawlessness and of reprisals, in revenge for disorders and attacks which had admittedly occurred before their advent to power, but which no party, claiming to be liberals and reformists, could reciprocate without the entire loss of whatever prestige and influence they claimed.

Officers of the army and navy, venerable university professors, civil servants of irreproachable record, but suspected of royalistic sympathies or as not sufficiently zealous supporters of the régime, were summarily dismissed by the thousands. The article of the Constitution decreeing the immovability of judges—a guarantee for impartial justice secured after long efforts in Greece was arbitrarily suspended and a number of judges, considered not friendly, were destituted. Even the bar was tampered with and obscure lawyers were suddenly raised to high functions. Worst of all, in a certain sense, the hierarchy of Greece, which we were proud to know had ever remained outside politics, was also invaded, and such members of the Holy Synod as were involved in that shameful anathema against M. Venizelos, were either deposed (in contravention of Article 2 of the Constitution) or exiled to some convent. Emergency laws of the most drastic kind were promulgated without any regard to existing constitutional guaranties, especially the notorious "Law No. 755," which created a new offense, loosely described as "unfriendly attitude or malevolence against the status quo." It must be said in all fairness that some of these measures would have been enforced by any government in times of great stress and storm. Some other of the regulations decreed were avowedly intended to hold in check those who were not favorably disposed toward M. Venizelos' régime. But their misapplication by unscrupulous or overzealous adherents resulted in a veritable coup d'état, which gradually deteriorated into a state of siege and of actual terror. The asylum of private houses ceased to exist, and peaceable men and women were summarily imprisoned or exiled without trial of any sort, but on the mere suspicion that they

were royalists or the unsupported accusation of detractors. It may read as a good story, but it is a fact, that even a parrot which had in happier days learned to chirp the song of "The Eagle's Son" (King Constantine) was placed under police restraint.

3

The chief agent in these heroic exploits, which generally ended in some tragedy, was the notorious Gyparis, a Cretan of criminal antecedents, who was given command of the "Corps de Sureté" and who enjoyed unlimited credits at the public treasury. He trumped up secret plots when some unfriendly person was to be removed or a newspaper office to be raided. He went so far in the exercise of his arbitrary powers as to enter the chamber in full session and, revolver in hand, drag down from the tribune a deputy whose discourse was not to his liking. His crowning misdeed was compassing the butchery, in broad daylight, of Ion Dragonmis, a young man of great promise and a dear friend of mine, whose loss I still mourn. The assassins were well known, but remained unmolested for several weeks after the crime. And the true friends of M. Venizelos saw with deep regret this foul individual accompany that illustrious statesman on his departure from Athens.

Another grave error, which aroused the feelings of the Greeks, proverbially susceptible in matters of family affections and ties, was the refusal to permit Queen Sophie to be by her dying son, King Alexander. Her imploring telegram was left unanswered. A similar message from the Dowager Queen Olga, relating to the circumstances of that tragedy, was held up by the censor for four days, and the funeral ceremonies of that unfortunate young prince were hurried and bungled in an unseemly way. The most elementary amenities of civil life came gradually to be ignored and a wave of violence swept over the country. Fourteen former cabinet ministers were impeached. The Cretan Deputy Coundouros boxed the ears of a bishop while officiating, and no one, unless a declared and reckless partisan, could count himself safe.

Now the Greeks are naturally a peaceable, amiable people; they have the sense of equality and independence developed in a very high degree and are instinctively averse to brutality. The proceedings, therefore, of which I have just given a summary account gradually aroused most bitter feelings throughout the land. The spirit of partisanship become intense; the old political parties seemed to disappear and the country was divided into two factions-the Venizelists and the anti-Venizelists a deplorable division which extended among Greeks beyond the confines of Greece. The nation was torn in twain as it was never before.

Such was the state of affairs which gradually matured in Greece. Little of all this was heard at the time outside the Kingdom, because of the all-absorbing events of the war and also because of the brilliant effects of

The following is his record in the books of the prefecture of police at Athens a few years anterior to his appointment as chief of the Corps de Sureté: "Gyparis, Paul. Native of Crete; former chief of a gang; always without visible means of support. Gambler. Incriminated for various acts of violence against life. Criminal by nature. Condemned, No. 1723/12, to two months' imprisonment for act of violence; No. 1423/12, to 30 drachmas fine for threatening; No. 2719/16, attempted murder and high treason." Signed by the prefect of police, Caragonnis.

the foreign policy of M. Venizelos, who was practically a dictator at home, but who for the last two years of his premiership was almost continually absent in Paris and. London. During this time he entrusted the administration of the country to a cabinet who were mainly responsible for the abuses committed, both administrative and financial. For incapacity, jobbery, peculation, contempt of every restraint, and arbitrariness, not to say for proceedings of actual tyranny, it would be difficult to find a match for that cabinet in the annals of Greece. Without going into minute biographical data, it is a fact that one of its principal members was a partner in a firm twice declared bankrupt, and another was admittedly the most notorious jobber in Greece.

M.

Now, how could all this have occurred? How could any one, in choosing such men, have expected that a cabinet of this description would obtain the confidence, or even the respect, of a people like the Greeks. Venizelos is a man of extraordinary genius, a man endowed by nature with rare gifts, whose charm of manner, persuasiveness, and magnetism are positively irresistible. It is impossible to deny to him the enduring gratitude of Greece for all he has accomplished. But, great as are his merits, he has his serious shortcomings. Even Achilles had his vulnerable point. And M. Venizelos has had the misfortune of always choosing his instruments badly-so badly that one would almost be driven to believe that he has a predilection for nonentities and shady individuals. His surroundings, those in whom he most confided, were almost invariably men of an undesirable kind. And there is hardly a man in Greece outstanding for character or preeminence of some sort whom he has not either set aside or completely estranged. One of the greatest qualities of the great is their ability to enlist all available talent in their service.

And let it not be supposed that he was unaware of the deplorable administration of Greece during his absence. From Paris and London he thundered threats against the guilty and promised radical reforms; but on his periodical returns to Athens no one was punished, no minister dismissed, while some of them were even commended for their services. What is the explanation? Apparently he had lost control over them; they had acquired too much power, and possibly also knew too much; he was impotent to check them. His home policy had deteriorated into a vacillating opportunism; his whole mind was centered in his foreign policy, by the success of which he evidently expected to outweigh and set aright the disordered administration at home-a fatal inversion of the political axiom recorded above.

It was urged by the apologists of that administration that others would not have done better in like circumstances. It would be idle to endeavor to prove or disprove such a proposition. But in the case of M. Venizelos it may be truly said, "Eminence oblige." The Greek people had placed themselves and all that was theirs unreservedly in his hands, expecting good government; and no free people forgive the wrongs inflicted by their own governors. There is no such thing as a bill of indemnity by popular acclamation. Yet the position of M. Venizelos, even on the eve of the elections of November, 1920, was, generally speaking, so strong, that the gates of hell itself would not have prevailed against him, had he on his return to Athens made an

example of some, at least, of the most notorious offenders, and reformed his cabinet. What did prevail against him were his colleagues and protégés. They assured him that they were supreme in popular favor and that they would sweep the country at the elections. To the last they persisted in their perversity and blindness, with the result that there was never in Greece such an overwhelming electoral defeat as that of M. Venizelos. To have expected the Greeks not to record their votes against the deplorable maladministration and shameless peculation during three continuous years, would have been nothing less than to have deemed them unworthy of the rights and duties of free citizens. It was their duty to vote as they did; and the significance of that vote is all the greater, since extraordinary efforts had been made and large sums of money had been spent to secure the return of the Venizelists. To the honor of M. Venizelos be it recorded that he himself acknowledged the verdict as constitutionally sound and binding, and he publicly counseled his friends to support the new government, and to unite while the interests of Greece were still debated, and to relegate party politics to other times. Unfortunately, certain overzealous or self-interested adherents have not followed that patriotic advice.

What was, then, the position? The throne was vacant. Young King Alexander had died a tragic death. The offer of the succession to his youngest brother, Prince Paul, who was under his father's tutelage in Switzerland, was admittedly a farcical proceeding. King Constantine had never abdicated. He had yielded during the war to the pressure of the Allies to absent himself, and he confided the throne to his son, Alexander. The Greek people, free after the elections to settle as they pleased their home affairs, called back King Constantine to the vacant throne. That is the plain and unadorned recital of events. We are told it was a mistake to call back King Constantine. Why so? Let us consider. The facts which the Greek people had clearly before them were these: Capodistrias, the Governor of Greece immediately after the war of independence, was assassinated. King Otho was dethroned. For these two upsets we were, at the time, bitterly criticised. King George had met with a violent death. King Alexander died in tragic circumstances. Were we to have one more upheaval, another tragedy, another radical change of régime? How could we thus ever reach stability and finality?

This latter dynasty has taken root in Greece; it is already in its second generation, and that generation embodies the realization of the prayers and hopes of the Greeks during five consecutive centuries-a Greek-born Prince, bearing the charmed name of Constantine. At his christening representatives from every commune in Greece and from every Greek center abroad had assembled in Athens to witness and celebrate the realization of that secular national promise. This may not be high politics, but who of you will not tolerate, will not respect, will not be moved by a national tradition so noble, so touching, so full of poetry and simple faith? Moreover, King Constantine's prestige with his people was heightened by the glory of the victories of the two wars against the Turks in 1912 and the Bulgars in 1913, during which he displayed, without any doubt, the talents of a consummate strategist.

Let no one suppose that these facts are put forward in order to evade the more important issue the faulty foreign policy attributed to King Constantine. The advice tendered by some of those around him may have been partly at fault. But what I would ask my readers to bear in mind is this: The actual facts, all the details, the precise attitude of the King on one side, and M. Venizelos on the other these important items in the controversy are not yet fully ascertained. Moreover, during the four years of the war hesitancy, mistrust, failing faith, faint-heartedness, doubt, and self-interest were manifested not in Greece only. Who has been, during the whole of that time, so steadfast and so unselfish as not to fear the scrutiny of some such unhappy interludes?

But let us face squarely and impartially the main and one important fact in this controversy. The differences which had arisen between King Constantine and M. Venizelos were not so much disagreements on policy as they were personal dislikes, arising out or incompatibility of temperament and varying conceptions of conduct. Had M. Venizelos chosen to exercise his fascinating persuasiveness he might have discovered a way to compromise. Unfortunately, his relations with the royal family of Greece were from the outset marked by hostility and harshness. Under his administration two of its members, King George and King Alexander, met with tragic deaths. Of course, no one will lay this down to M. Venizelos' account; it was his misfortune; but he might have avoided the quarrels which resulted in the forced abdication of Prince George from the governorship of Crete, and he could surely have prevented the bitter dispute which necessitated King Constantine's absence from Greece during three eventful years. M. Venizelos is a wise statesman and would, I believe, have followed a different policy from that which compelled him to place himself at the head of two revolutions had he not been incensed and irritated by the intrigues and innuendoes of unscrupulous and self-seeking followers. These same men are now clamoring for another upset in Greece they want to set up a republic. With characteristic absence of good sense, they do not tell us what is the matter with the liberties now enjoyed by the Greek people, or what they propose to add to those liberties, or what sort of a republic they project. They only tell us it will not be on the American model. I should think not! For a president of a republic, invested with the powers an American President wields, would not be tolerated in Greece for so much as four months, let alone four years.

The people of Greece enjoy, in many ways, wider liberties than those of the United States; but there is no people less fit for a republican form of government than the Greeks. We are the most democratic people in Europe; but we have the sense of equality developed to such a pitch, we are égalitaires to such an extent, that we would not tolerate one of ourselves as President of the State, not for a twelve-month; and then we would have a republic of the traditional pattern of certain tropical republics. This is perfectly well understood by our newly inspired republicans; they themselves are perfact types of égalitairism and of insubordination to any authority. But, then, if they do not go on agitating frantically their raison d'etre would be gone!

We want no more of such nuisances. We want no more agitations and upsets. We want no more factious politics. Good Greeks serve neither parties nor persons. We serve first our country and only our country—our country, right or wrong-and to serve her well we need peace and quietness, unity and absence of factions. He is a traitor who will not now, in the hour of danger, eschew partisanship, and work in concord and with unselfishness. Our

Dangers of all kinds face us from without. brave and victorious army, our brothers who have been under arms for nine consecutive years without so much as a whisper of complaint or a symptom of weariness, but with the noble cheer of successive victories—our army stands as a firm bulwalk against that hoard of Kemalist cut-throats. But these professional butchers of women and children are now being strengthened afresh by those whom we were wont to honor as the defenders of liberty and civilization. It is not with dissertations about the best form of a republic that we shall ward off this danger. We must rely on ourselves and be ready with sacrifices. And the country is best served. by those who offer as sacrifice their pet schemes and their personal preferences. We must support the established régime in Greece, being mindful of this allimportant fact, often forgotten or ignored: The concessions and promises in favor of Hellenism recorded in the Treaty of Sevres were not made to M. Venizelos personally, but to Greece; and without the people of Greece at the back of him, M. Venizelos would not have obtained them. As long, therefore, as his successor to the premiership enjoys the confidence of the country, he is the leader we must follow in the circumstances in which the country finds itself now.

I hope I have not deviated from my promise at the outset to state the truth squarely and impartially. I have endeavored to do so undeterred by the result, almost invariably in such cases, of displeasing both parties.

SUPERFICIALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By JACKSON H. RALSTON

ERHAPS there is some branch of legal knowledge which has received less analysis than has inter'national law, but it does not at the moment appear what that branch may be. The books, to all intents and purposes, fail to uncover the differences between ordinary usages and conventional agreements; between adjective. law and the basic laws by which, consciously or unconsciously, masses of mankind embodied into States are controlled-laws which when violated bring inevitable punishment. Little attention is given to the penal and natural sanctions which follow the breaking of international law. The State is treated as if it were a nonmoral institution, not subject to the workings of any law higher than itself. Such a non-moral thing as a rock is constructed according to and controlled by the operations of a great variety of natural laws. Writers have been strangely blind to the fact that a State is but an aggregation of human units, just as the rock is an aggregation of atoms, and that it is not freed from the