Spurious InterpretationColumbia Law Review, 1907 - 386 pages |
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Page 389
... wrong . Said the learned judge : 1 " To permit an artificial creature of the State , unless it be a corpora- tion expressly authorized by law to engage in political matters , by the unauthorized use of its corporate funds , to become an ...
... wrong . Said the learned judge : 1 " To permit an artificial creature of the State , unless it be a corpora- tion expressly authorized by law to engage in political matters , by the unauthorized use of its corporate funds , to become an ...
Page 394
... wrong , although payments for that specific purpose have not been specifically covered by any provision of the Penal Code , nevertheless commits the crime of larceny . " Is it not clear that the adoption of such a doctrine by a unani ...
... wrong , although payments for that specific purpose have not been specifically covered by any provision of the Penal Code , nevertheless commits the crime of larceny . " Is it not clear that the adoption of such a doctrine by a unani ...
Page 396
... wrong- doing or with the responsibilities of possession . Doing what one ought not do with a possession already gained may be wrong and even criminal , but it is not larceny . " According to the orthodox definition of larceny , if ...
... wrong- doing or with the responsibilities of possession . Doing what one ought not do with a possession already gained may be wrong and even criminal , but it is not larceny . " According to the orthodox definition of larceny , if ...
Page 399
... wrong person that person gets possession although he has no title . In shorter form possession may be termed control with inten- tion to exclude . This leaves open the question of the quantum of both control and intent . While Keogh had ...
... wrong person that person gets possession although he has no title . In shorter form possession may be termed control with inten- tion to exclude . This leaves open the question of the quantum of both control and intent . While Keogh had ...
Page 407
... wrong from that point of view alone , leaving aside the question of remoteness . The second point of attack upon the principal case seems to underlie Mr. Williams ' contention . He refers to Jervis v . Bruton ( 1691 ) 2 Vern . 251. In ...
... wrong from that point of view alone , leaving aside the question of remoteness . The second point of attack upon the principal case seems to underlie Mr. Williams ' contention . He refers to Jervis v . Bruton ( 1691 ) 2 Vern . 251. In ...
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Common terms and phrases
accumulations action American apply Ashwell authority Baker Bank breach Burdick claim Code coin COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW Columbia University common law Conn constitutional contract corporation damages decision defendant digest diplomacy doctrine easement Edition equity eventual estate executors fact franchise Held illegal intent interest International Law Interstate Commerce Act judicial Jurisprudence jurists Keogh Kindly mention larceny law canvas Law School law-maker lawyers legislative liability license LL.B magistrate Manice matter mention the REVIEW Minn N. Y. Supp NOTES owner par delictum parties person presumptively entitled plaintiff political possession power in trust Price principal Professor promise Publishers purpose quasi-contract question relator restraints on alienation right of access Roman Roman Law Rule against Perpetuities seems shilling sovereign specific performance spurious interpretation statute stockholders supra testator theory tion Torts transfer trespass ultra vires vested Vols volume Voorhis York
Popular passages
Page 433 - An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to' some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party.
Page 390 - Upon any indictment for embezzlement, it is a sufficient defense that the property was appropriated openly and avowedly, and under a claim of title preferred in good faith, even though such claim is untenable.
Page 413 - ... access to the navigable part of the river from the front of his lot; the right to make a landing, wharf, or pier for his own use, or for the use of the public, subject to such general rules and regulations as the legislature may see proper to impose for the protection of the rights of the public, whatever those may be.
Page 388 - April, 1906. possession, appropriates the same to his own use, or that of any other person other than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof; Steals such property, and is guilty of larceny.
Page 403 - ... undisposed of, and no valid direction for their accumulation is given, such rents and profits shall belong to the persons presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate.
Page 394 - The fact that the defendant intended to restore the property stolen or embezzled, is no ground of defense, or of mitigation of punishment, if it has not been restored before complaint to a magistrate, charging the commission of the crime.
Page 388 - A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property...
Page 393 - It is agreed upon all sides that the crime of larceny may not be committed unintentionally, unconsciously, or by mistake, but that, in order to accomplish it, the perpetrator must have the intent referred to. It may be difficult at all times exactly and satisfactorily to define this intent, but the requirement for it as applicable to this case means that, when the relator took part in the appropriation of the moneys in question, he must have had in some degree that same conscious, unlawful, and wicked...