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186

OF THE

STOICAL PHILOSOPHY OF

MARCUS ANTONINUS

AND

EPICTETUS..

THE Stoic philosophy the founder of which was Zeno, who flourished about three hundred years before Christ, and a little after Aristotle, arose a considerable time after Socrates, and it is on several accounts the most respectable of all the heathen systems, especially as it regards the being and providence of God, and the submission we owe to it, patience in adversity, and resignation to death. It was soon opposed by the doctrine of Epicurus, which made pleasure, though not sensual pleasure, but rather the enjoyment of life in general, the great object and end of human life, whereas, according to the Stoics, pleasure of every kind, as well as pain, is to be ranked among things indifferent, and not to be attended to in the great rule of life.

When the Grecian philosophy was introduced into Rome, some of the most virtuous and respectable characters embraced that of the Stoics, in

preference

ference to any other; especially Cato, and in a later period the emperor Marcus Antoninus, who made what he deemed to be virtue, and whatever he thought to be subservient to the good of his country, more an object than any other of the emperors, or almost any other heathen that we read of. It will, therefore, be well worth while to examine the fundamental principles of this philosophy; as this alone can come in any competition with the christian. And as the fairest specimen of it may be seen in the writings of Marcus Antoninus, and Epictetus, I shall, in this place, confine myself to the examination of their works, in which we may be sure to find the genuine principles of it without any danger of mistake. Seneca indeed, and Arrian came before Marcus Antoninus, and their principles were those of the Stoics. But there is too much of rhetoric in their compositions, especially those of Seneca, whereas the writings of the emperor came, no doubt, from the heart, and express neither more nor less than he really thought. However, I shall subjoin to this section an account of the sentiments of Seneca and Arrian.

SECTION

SECTION I.

Of God and Providence.

It was a fixed maxim with the Stoics, as it was with Socrates, from whom none of the founders of sects that came after him pretended to differ, that there is a principle of intelligence, wisdom and also of benevolence, directing all the affairs of the world and of men, though they do not ascribe proper creation to it. Sometimes they even speak of it in the singular number, though more generally in the plural; believing that, though the principle of intelligence was one, it was distributed to several individuals, and indeed to men, and all other intelligent agents.

But none of the philosophers adopted the popular ideas of the gods of their country. Though they sometimes make use of the same names, (and this is not frequent) they had a very different idea of their characters. In their writings we find nothing of the lewdness, the cruelty, and caprice of the gods of Homer and Virgil; nor do they ever make any apology for rejecting the notions of the common people.

This

This unity of principle in all the orders of intelligent beings would, in the opinion of the philosophers, secure the unity of design in the whole system that was subordinate to them, and governed by them. "There is," says Marcus Antoninus (Lib. vii. sect. 9.) "one world, one god in all

things, one matter, and one law. Consequently, “reason in all intelligent beings is the same in "all, and truth also is one."

He makes use, though only once, of the name of Jupiter as that of the Supreme Being, when he speaks of the principle of intelligence in all men as derived from one source. "We should live," he says, (Lib. v. sect. 7.) " with the gods; and this

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any person will do who preserves his mind in a

disposition to acquiesce in what is appointed "him, and who acts according to that genius, "which Jupiter, having detached it from himself,

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gives to every person to be his future guide and

commander, which is every person's mind, or "reason." He evidently considered the sun as a portion of the universal deity, when he says, (Lib. viii. sect. 19.)" the sun, and the other gods, exist "for some purpose or other."

That this universal mind has a perfect knowledge of all things, even of what passes in the minds

of

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men, was the belief of the Stoics, as well as of Socrates. "God," says Marcus Antoninus, (Lib. xii. sect. 2.)" sees all minds divested of their coverings and flesh. By his own mind alone he sees them as derived from him. If you will do "the same, you will be freed from much trouble." For believing that all minds are only parts of one whole, he ascribes to them all much of the same power, as we shall see more particularly hereaf

ter.

He, however, takes it for granted that all good and evil is the dispensation of the gods, and therefore he holds it as a fixed maxim to be thankful for the former, and patiently to bear the latter. "I "thank God," he says, (Lib. i. sect. 17.) “for

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good grandfathers, good parents, good precep.

tors, good acquaintance, domestics, and friends, "and for good of every other kind. If," says he (Lib. vi. sect. 44.) "the gods take no care of the "world, which it is impiety to believe, why do we "sacrifice, pray, take oaths, and do other things "which suppose the gods to be present with us, "and attentive to us?"

The heathens in general, without excepting any of the philosophers, except Epicurus, were dis

posed

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