though the real underlying issue was the candidacy of Gómez. The Conservative Republicans of Havana went through with their plan, and formed the Moderate Party. The Conservative Republicans of Santa Clara turned to the National Liberals, yielding their former attitude about representation in return for an assurance of backing for Gómez, and presently the new Liberal Party emerged as a result of the fusion of these two previously hostile factions. A prime mover in this arrangement was Alfredo Zayas, who became president of the party. General Núñez was not willing to postpone his own aspirations to those of José Miguel Gómez, and so retained the old name Nationalist for a following of his own, hoping that his power as governor of the province of Havana and the support of Máximo Gómez might pull him through. On June 17, 1905, however, Máximo Gómez died at Havana,—a great loss to the country, for in the troublesome days that were to come Gómez was the only man in Cuba who might have had influence enough to bring about an adjustment. As for Núñez, it killed his chances for victory. So presently he veered over to the side of the Moderates.

In due time the Liberals nominated José Miguel Gómez for the presidency and Zayas for Vice-President. The Moderates felt that they would be strongest if they could go to the polls in their first campaign with Estrada Palma as a candidate for reëlection. While he had never been the type of man to attract the rabble, he had the respect of the country, and his achievements as President could not be gainsaid. Business men in particular were enthusiastic over him. But Estrada Palma hesitated to run. Many writers assert, Martínez Ortiz among them, that he was really eager for reëlection, mindful of the fact that most of the great Presidents of the United States had served two terms, but

for some time, certainly, Estrada Palma was seriously in doubt. As one Cuban gentleman whose assertions merit consideration said to the writer:

"Estrada Palma was persuaded to run for reëlection by his followers, who convinced him that his successors would spend the millions he had accumulated. At first he did not intend to, and gave out an interview to that effect, but recalled it before it was published. The point was, that he hoped to save enough out of receipts to take up the thirty-five million dollar loan, and then keep the bonds in the treasury, while continuing to collect the same amounts of revenues to employ on education and public works. His followers persuaded him,-and it was probably true,—that his successor would not retain his policy, but would get his hands on the funds in the treasury for the use of himself and his partisans."

This is very likely an accurate estimate of the situation. It seemed as if the interests of the country had not yet been sufficiently far advanced to risk a government in the control of the average run of Cuban politicians. Gradually, therefore, Don Tomás turned towards an acceptance of a nomination by the Moderates. Disappointed over his inability to get much-desired legislation from Congress, he had for some time tended more and more to abandon his earlier neutrality between the parties, in hopes of getting a working majority, and presently, in February 1905, he affiliated himself with the Moderates. This carried with it a certain admission of duty to help that party, within proper limits, in the forthcoming election. Eventually that was to involve Don Tomás in countenancing measures that were far beyond anything he had contemplated. At length, he agreed to run for the presidency, and though not formally notified of his nomination until September 11, 1905, the issue was fairly joined by the early spring of that same year. Nobody could have foretold it at the time, but it

meant that the "best years" in the first quarter century of the republic had already gone their way.27

"The work of Martínez Ortiz (v. at odd points. A number of the volII) remains the best that has yet umes bearing primarily on the subbeen published for this period. ject of the next two chapters are also Though a Liberal and a partisan of useful to some extent here. The EsJosé Miguel Gómez and not in sym- trada Palma administration is still in pathy with Estrada Palma, Martínez need of a monograph, however, which Ortiz has, nevertheless, written an ac- shall avail itself of the Memorias, the count which is remarkably fair. It is Diarios de sesiones, and the Menalso the only attempt at a complete sajes presidenciales, as well as newshistory of these years thus far made. papers and other contemporary eviAll other works touch this era merely dences.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA

WHAT caused the Revolution of August, as the uprising of 1906 is called? While that conflict was at its height Barbarrosa wrote as follows:

"Two impotent factions are at war in Cuba: the constituted power and the armed revolution. In the background there is nothing more than the interests of parties, ambitions for jobs. The conquest of the twenty millions of the treasury!"1

The evidence to the same effect is so overwhelming in amount that it can hardly be doubted that political and financial considerations far outweighed principles.2 Back of that, however, was the fact that the Cubans were as yet unprepared for self-government, and had something of the turbulence of Hispanic American character, with a none too highly developed understanding of the consequences of their acts. Fortunately, they had an exceptionally good man as their first President, and the excellence of his government postponed domestic strife for more than four years.

In a sense, however, Estrada Palma was a victim of his own "excess" of goodness, in that he could not believe that other people might be swayed by motives so much more sordid than his own, and therefore took no steps to handle

1 Barbarrosa, 65.

there was a surplus in the treasury, The writer has any number of and the politicians felt that they had statements of the same character a better use for it than employing it from persons who lived through those on Cuba's debts." In this instance times. For example: "The revolution the word "better" was used somewhat of 1906 broke out primarily because satirically.

a possible outbreak of civil war. His public documents are replete with expressions of confidence in the "orderliness" and "good sense" of the Cuban people,-at the very moment that a casual observer might have been more impressed by an opposite tendency. In his message to Congress of November 3, 1902, he said that "the most complete order has reigned," attributing it to Cuban patriotism and love of peace. Referring to the somewhat notorious elections of 1904, he remarked, on April 4 of that year, that there was no disorder, despite political agitation and the fact that there were 658 electoral complaints to the courts. Such was the "good judgment of the Cuban people" and "their obedience to the laws," however, that there was no violence. The Cuban "love of order" in connection with the unchanging "tranquility" of the times, and "the sentiment which generally prevails already among our compatriots of respect for the law and love of our institutions" found their place in messages of November 7, 1904, and April 3, 1905. Even the excitement and violence of the electoral period in 1905, while causing the President several moments of doubt, seemingly failed to shake his belief in "the good sense of the Cuban people," which was able to rise superior to "party jealousies," as he put it in his message of November 6, 1905. As late as April 2, 1906, Estrada Palma was impressed by the "cry of indignation" against those who had attacked the barracks of the rural guard at Guanabacoa, asserting it proved that nobody in Cuba could "promote disturbances of a serious character such as may put our institutions in danger." 3 Not until the revolution of August 1906 did the rude awakening come. An extraordinary session of Congress was called "on account of the serious disturbance of the public order," and in his message of September 14 the Presi* Mensajes presidenciales, I: 15; 73; 105; 125; 139; 155.