perfect furor of excitement in the country. Asbert had his defenders, however. El Mundo asserted that Riva had been persecuting Asbert for political reasons, at the instigation of the Secretary of Government, asking why Riva pursued gambling at the Betancourt and Asbert clubs and let it go unpunished elsewhere. This argument is even yet maintained by the friends of Asbert, who claim that Menocal, although still in alliance with the Asbertist Liberals, was making plans to annihilate Asbert politically, as he was no longer needed by Menocal and was troublesome on account of his ambition for the presidency. Riva, however, was a Liberal, and it is at least doubtful that he was lending himself to any such Conservative project. Nobody denies that he was certainly enforcing the law as against Asbert. El Triunfo ascribed the affair to "assaults of the police" on the two clubs, and said this would not have happened under Gómez,-which was rather a left-handed compliment for José Miguel! La Lucha, in an interesting article defending Asbert, said that the incident was a reflection of Cuban social and political conditions. It asked the public not to condemn Asbert out of hand. "It is enough that we have to struggle against our sad destiny." The Riva murder did not pass unnoticed in Washington. There must have been some preliminary enquiry, for in a note of July 11, 1913, the United States chargé d'affaires expressed the satisfaction of his government that Menocal had evinced a determination to bring the perpetrators of this crime to justice. Menocal was assured of the "vigorous support" of the United States in his efforts on behalf of the maintenance of order and fulfilment of the laws. Menocal did act, though not until after the receipt of this note, whether or not there may have been any relation between that and the steps he took. He suspended Asbert from his governorship by a decree of July 12, and on the 14th called the Senate in extraordinary session. A little later he summoned an extra session of Congress as a whole, sending a message on July 24 asking Congress to take up the question of congressional immunity, which had been raised in connection with the participation of Arias and Vidal Morales in the affair.35 Congress was no more willing to discuss this much cherished privilege of its members than it had been under Gómez, and it was impossible to get a quorum. The sequel is concerned mainly with the efforts made to clear Asbert and the others, and is taken up in a later chapter dealing with amnesties.38 There might have been no difficulty in the first place, but for the objections of the United States. Secretary Bryan is once said to have sent a note to the effect that to allow veterans like Asbert to commit murder was not consistent with Cuba's obligation to the United States to maintain a government that was adequate to protect life and property. On this account two amnesty bills were held up, and it was not until a bill went through which virtually excluded Arias but included Asbert that the United States government waived its objections. As for Vidal Morales, no great point had ever been made about him. Cuban opinion, too, has quite generally excused Asbert. It is admitted that he fired on Riva, but it is claimed that he did so after Arias had already mortally wounded that officer and consequently that his shooting should hardly be considered against him, as the issue was already settled. However that may be, the excessive disposition to leniency in Cuba in the aftermath of crime, together with the high regard in which Asbert was held by many Cubans, is explanation enough of the indulgent attitude toward the for 36 "In Mensajes presidenciales, I, 449- See infra, pp. 531-533. mer governor of Havana. As for Asbert, it virtually killed his own chances in politics, although he still retained some influence on behalf of others. The incident may also have had a bearing on the break that presently developed between the Asbertist Liberals and the Conservatives. This in turn was a very nearly decisive factor in the events leading to the election of 1916 and its sequel, the revolution of February 1917.37 "The early years of the Menocal and has been the principal basis of administration are lacking in any the story given here. Several other monographic work of even moderately respectable calibre. Martí covers the most ground, but is a eulogist pure and simple. The sections in Johnson about Menocal belong in a similar category, and are also lacking in precision and atmosphere. Los sucesos del Prado is a detailed and valuable account of the Asbert affair, brief pamphlets on this and other questions are also mentioned in Trelles. But government documents, newspapers, and magazine articles (both Cuban and American), together with the accounts of living witnesses, must still be the principal resort of the investigator. CHAPTER XV THE ELECTIONS OF 1916 THE turning-point in Menocal's career came when he decided to run for a second term in the presidency. Reëlection in the United States is accepted as a matter of course when a man has made a good record in his first term, but in Hispanic America, possibly because of the insistent demand for a redistribution of the jobs, it is regarded as a dangerous evil. "In no republic of the American continent," said José Manuel Cortina, "has the presidential reëlection brought anything but revolution, dictatorship, and corruption in all branches of the administration." Cortina was thinking merely of Hispanic America in his use of the term "American continent." His remarks certainly describe what took place in Cuba under Menocal.1 Even more significant were the words of Menocal himself in a letter of October 1912 to General Enrique Loinaz del Castillo: "The effort of the President to bring about his own nomination for the post while he is still holding it will be taken . . . as an indication, in countries of our race, of a certain dangerous spirit of partiality in whomsoever may conceive this aspiration . . . The principle of nonreëlection is the firmest support of peace.' Menocal had made a one-term preëlection promise, and, indeed, Dolz says it was hard to get him to run the first time, as also for a second term.3 He at first backed General Emilio Núñez to succeed him, but later accepted the nomination for 1 Quoted in Pardo Suárez, 168. 118. Also in Cabrera, 37, n. 1. 8 9 Dolz, 6. himself. This factor in the political situation was not very prominent in the first two years and a half of Menocal's administration, however. For a little while his government managed at least moderately well, even in its relations with Congress, due to the alliance of the Asbertist Liberals and the Conservatives. But Menocal's stand in the Riva affair, unavoidable though it was, caused something of a break between the two groups, and in 1914, for political reasons, the entente between them was formally dissolved. Furthermore, in the biennial elections of that same year the Conservatives lost their majority in the House. Mention has already been made of Menocal's difficulties from this time forward in getting needed legislation from Congress. It is probable that this factor turned his mind toward reëlection, as it did also to the employment of other evil methods in Cuban politics for the attainment of his ends. He was urged by leading politicians to stand for renomination, on the ground that he was the only man in the party strong enough to unite all factions and give hopes of success in the ensuing campaign for the presidency.5 4 During 1915 the name most commonly heard as candidate for the Conservative nomination was that of General Núñez, then Secretary of Agriculture, but toward the close of that year rumors were already in circulation that Menocal would run. These were not received with favor by some of the 'The elections of 1914 reflected the normal evils of Cuban functions of this sort, except that there seems to have been no noteworthy executive pressure. Menocal called attention to the frauds that had been committed, in a message to Congress of Dec. 14, 1914. The voting lists, made up in the time of Magoon, were now utterly untrustworthy. A great many persons did not vote in 1914, but it would appear from the count that everybody had done so. In some towns the voters were forty-six to forty-nine per cent of the entire population, an impossible figure. Menocal asked Congress to authorize a new census as the basis for a correct voting list. Mensajes presidenciales, I, 559-560. Congress, it may be mentioned, took no action on this message. See chapter XXIV for a further discussion of general election evils. 'Dolz, 6. |