the United States. The Washington authorities as thoroughly approved of the Veterans and Patriots' program as they disapproved of Zayas, and probably believed in the sincerity of the reform movement, but from the first news of the outbreak they came out on the side of the constituted power. An embargo was placed on the sale of munitions to the insurrectionists, while Zayas was allowed to purchase needed equipment from the United States government itself. More than anything else, this probably accounts for the failure of the movement to gather headway. In keeping with its policy in dealing with other Caribbean countries as well as Cuba, Washington seemed to be putting a veto on revolution, whatever the cause. So it was useless to proceed, and the expected uprisings in the eastern provinces did not materialize.

It is probable that many of the criticisms of the Veterans and Patriots' movement, after the dismal failure of the Laredo Brú uprising, were overdrawn. The leadership was faulty, but not so insincere as was frequently alleged. Not only Despaigne, but also Carlos Alzugaray and a number of others were at least honest, whatever may be said for their judgment. Back of them were the best elements in Cuba, who were undoubtedly inspired by a desire for thoroughgoing reform, and not by any idea of personal profit. As for García Vélez, the writer is impressed by the opinion of those who say that his real motive in the campaign of the Veterans and Patriots was not, indeed, reform and not revenge or blackmail against Zayas, but ambition for the presidency. He prated about revolution, but did not want it, hoping, however, to get the backing of the Association at some favorable turn in the political situation that might carry him to the first magistracy of the republic,—and perhaps a chance then to reap his profits. It was a mistake

for the Veterans and Patriots to have entered the political arena at all, and certainly for them to have engaged in an armed revolt. As a protesting body they could have kept alive the moralization movement, but their defeat in such a fiasco as the so-called revolution of 1924 gave Cuba to the politicians, who felt henceforth that there was no further need for them to restrain themselves in the pursuit of private fortune at the expense of the state.

Almost surely Zayas had not staged the Laredo Brú revolt, for he was frightened; it was impossible to say how far it might go, in a country that disapproved of Zayas, even though it may not have wanted revolution. For a while Zayas put aside his much vaunted "patience," and acted as Menocal might have done. He provided for a strict watch over communications by telegraph or telephone, forbade radio broadcasting, suspended El Sol and El Heraldo (not Heraldo de Cuba), exiled some of his opponents, and arrested Alzugaray, Soto, and other leaders of the Veterans and Patriots. Incidentally, too, he decreed himself a million dollars for war purposes, and bought military supplies in the United States.33 With the crisis past, however, he soon restored matters to the status quo, making no effort (be it said to his credit) to wreak vengeance upon his opponents.34 And, indeed, there was no longer any reason

The Cuban Senate, somewhat un- who had given out a public statement expectedly, approved the million dol- alleging that Zayas was a poor man lar decree. In commenting upon this, when he became President and had one writer said: "It makes very lit- used his office to make himself rich. tle difference whether the lower house These men were accused of insulting concurs or not since the million dol- the President, and a penalty of six lars have already been spent. "A months' imprisonment was asked for Sage," in Havana Post, May 15, 1924. them. In their manifiesto they had While the issue of the revolution referred to Zayas's having overdrawn was still uncertain, Zayas initiated a his account at the National Bank and famous case against a number of his denial of his own signature on highly respected citizens, members of that occasion, prior to his inaugurathe Good Government Association, tion as President, and to his lavish

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to be afraid of them, for the Veterans and Patriots were "very dead."35

CHAPTER XX

EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925

ONE immediate result of the defeat of the Veterans and Patriots was the resumption of corruption, with scarcely any further need for attention to public opinion. The Santa Clara purchase at length became a law, early in June 1924, and the most notorious amnesty bill in the history of the republic was enacted in that same month.1 To be sure, there were other ways of making money outside of the great "deals," as by picking it up in small amounts in transactions that were engaged in frequently over a long period of time. There was an enormous graft, for example, in the importation of laborers for work on sugar plantations. This mainly concerned negroes from Haiti and Jamaica, but applied also to the Chinese. As for the last-named, Cuba had a Chinese exclusion law that was operating very rigidly, according to the official reports of Zayas. In his message to Congress of April 7, 1924, Zayas said that three persons of Chinese race were admitted to Cuba in 1922 and seven in 1923, and a year later (April 6, 1925) he said that none at all came in during 1924. Yet it was common knowledge that they were entering every year by the thousands. One paper claimed that there were 150,000 in Cuba, most of whom had arrived since the census of 1919; a shipload of five hundred had been landed just a few days before.2 Another writer asserted that a Cuban consular representative in

1 For a discussion of the amnesty La invasión amarilla, in Mundo, bill, see infra, pp. 534-538.

May 10, 1924.

3

Canton, China, was said to have cleared two hundred thousand dollars in three years for his visés of passports. In the light of Zayas's exceedingly meagre estimates it is not hard to believe the charges to the effect that he was profiting from this traffic. On the other hand, the government now ceased to do much of anything of a really useful constructive character. From this time forward, to the end of Zayas's rule, hardly a day passed but that some newspaper complained of congressional inaction. For weeks there would be no meetings of either house, unless to pass upon some notorious bit of legislation. Even the most imperatively needed laws, such as the sanction of the budget and of further payments on the floating debt (to say nothing of reforms), were left without study or even to fail because of congressional inertia. The same phenomenon was to be observed in administrative circles. Practically nothing was done to get rid of the illegal contracts in the Public Works Department after the dismissal of the Honest Cabinet, and various of the national services were sadly neglected. This is not to say that no money was being expended. By no means! Furthermore, Zayas was now planning to employ a large portion of his thirty-three million surplus on a "program" of public works, ostensibly for such things as the long discussed central highway and other roads as well as on aqueducts, schools, and hospitals. There was little or no enthusiasm for the Zayas projects, however, as it was pretty generally understood that the politicians would get

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articles calling attention to the failure of the government to perform its ordinary administrative duties, even in the care of such well known thoroughfares as Obispo and O'Reilly streets.

'From an interview with the President's son-in-law, Celso Cuellar del Río, in Discusión, May 10, 1924.