Opinion of the Court-STILES, J. [8 Wash. See notes to same case, 8 Am. Dec. 133. In some courts a marriage contracted without the state, by a person under statutory disability, with another, whose domicile was in the foreign state, has been equally subjected to a declaration of invalidity. But this seems a harsh rule, as it might involve a perfectly innocent man or woman in unmerited confusion and disgrace; and the contrary was held in a very learned and conclusive opinion of Chief Justice GRAY in Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458. Respondent insists that this more lenient rule should be followed in the case of a marriage between a white person and an Indian upon a reservation; the locus being considered analogous to a foreign state, and the Indian custom the lex loci. Morgan v. McGhee, 5 Humph. 13, sustains the proposition, and Johnson v. Johnson's Adm'r, 30 Mo. 72, Boyer v. Dively, 58 Mo. 510, and La Riviere v. La Riviere, 77 Mo. 512, go further, and hold that although there may have been no reservation at the place where the marriage took place, if it occurred in what used to be termed "Indian country," it was sufficient, if the Indian customs were followed, although, under those customs, husband and wife could separate at will, and marry again. In none of the cases cited, however, does there appear any intimation that any law of the state was violated by the marriage of a white man with an Indian woman, and in Missouri the doctrine of common law marriages has always been recognized. Cargile v. Wood, 63 Mo. 501; Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391. But there was a prohibition in our territorial statute of 1866, and the final question is whether it had any force within the Swinomish reservation, so as to render void any marriage between Wilbur and Kitty, however celebrated. It has always been conceded that congress had the right, when a new territory was organized, to exclude from its jurisdiction any lands embraced within the territorial limits, Jan. 1894.] Opinion of the Court-STILES, J. for any reason which it saw fit. More frequently than in any other cases, this exclusion was provided for as to lands embraced in Indian reservations. But it has not been by any means universal that either the civil or the criminal laws of a territory have been without force within the boundaries of an Indian reservation; and whether they have had such force or not has depended upon the acts of congress concerning the territories and public lands, and the treaties with various tribes providing for reservations. In Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, it was held that process from a district court of Idaho could not be served within the Shoshone reservation, in that territory, because the act of congress of March 3, 1863, organizing the territory, provided that it should not embrace within its limits or jurisdiction any territory of an Indian tribe, where, by a treaty with such tribe, their reservation was not to be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any state or territory without their consent, and because, five years later, a treaty was made with the Shoshone Indians, whereby it was agreed that no persons, except agents of the government, should be authorized to pass over, settle upon or reside in the territory reserved. The court said that this territory was as much beyond the jurisdiction, legislative or judicial, of the government of Idaho, as if it had been set apart within the limits of another country, or of a foreign state.” But in Langford v. Monteith, 102 U. S. 145, the court acknowledged having made a mistake in the former case, in finding the existence in the treaty of the clause mentioned, and held that where no such clause, or language equivalent to it, was found in a treaty with Idaho Indians, the lands held by them were a part of the territory, and subject to its jurisdiction, so that its process could run therein, although the Indians themselves might be exempt from such jurisdiction. In United States v. Mc Bratney, 104 U. S. 621, held, that the United States Opinion of the Court-STILES, J. [8 Wash. circuit court for the district of Colorado had no jurisdiction of a case of murder committed by one white man upon another within the Ute reservation, because the act of March 3. 1875, authorizing the admission of Colorado as a state, contained no exception of jurisdiction over the reservation, such as had been made in the treaty with the Indians, but that the state courts, alone, could try the accused for the offense. An examination of the organic act of Washington Territory shows only this in regard to Indians and their lands: "Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to affect the authority of the government of the United States to make any regulations respecting the Indians of said territory, their lands, property or other rights, by treaty, law, or otherwise, which it would have been competent for the government to make if this act had never been passed. 10 St. at Large, 172. No act amending or enlarging this proviso came into operation until 1875, when Rev. St. U. S., § 1839, was made applicable to all the territories. In the mean time the treaty with the Swinomish Indians was made, taking effect April 11, 1859. This treaty ceded to the government all the land formerly inhabited by the tribes of Indians joining therein, on both sides of Puget Sound, from Vashon Island northward to British Columbia, and from the summit of the Cascade mountains to the divide between Hood's canal and Admiralty inlet, but reserved to them certain defined tracts, in these words, following the description: "All which tracts shall be set apart, and so far as necessary surveyed and marked out for their exclusive use; nor shall any white man be permitted to reside upon the same without permission of the said tribes or bands, and of the superintendent or agent; but, if necessary for the public convenience, roads may be run through the said reserves, the Indians being compensated for any damage thereby done them." This language, both of the organic act and of the treaty, Jan. 1894.] Opinion of the Court-STILES, J. was wholly different from that concerning the Idaho or Colorado Indians, and under Langford v. Monteith and United States v. McBratney, supra, must be taken to have left the reservation within, and a part of, the territory, for all legislative and judicial purposes not affecting the personal rights and the lands and other property of the Indians. Whether these could have been controlled by territorial statutes, we do not pretend to decide. But it must be, it seems to us, by every rule of jurisdiction, that when Wilbur went upon the reservation, even if he went there with the full purpose of procuring Kitty to be his wife, the law of the territory met him there, in all its force, and prohibited him from making a legal marriage with her, under any forms or ceremonies whatever; and she, although an Indian and a mere child, was bound to know that the same prohibition attached to her. Therefore the only attempt to constitute a marriage between them was void, and the fact that the prohibiting statute was repealed a short time after they commenced to live together, viz., in 1868, made their case no better, since all that appears in the record concerning them subsequently is that they cohabited, and cohabitation did not constitute a marriage. In re McLaughlin's Estate, 4 Wash, 570 (30 Pac. 651). The order of the superior court, granting letters of administration to respondent, must be reversed, and the matter remanded, with direction to grant letters to appellant, if she be still capacitated; otherwise, to some other suitable person, as provided by law. Appellant protests against any administration, but we regard this as one of the cases where such a proceeding is most fitting, since deceased may have left heirs who are entitled to share in his estate, or there may be creditors who are unpaid. The court acquired jurisdiction of the estate through respondent's petition, and should now proceed regularly to final distribution. HOYT and SCOTT, JJ., concur. DUNBAR, C. J., and ANDERS, J., not sitting. Opinion of the Court-HOYT, J. [8 Wash. [No. 1056. Decided January 9, 1894.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. J. H. ROSE- CRIMINAL LAW-INFORMATIONS CLERK VERIFICATION BEFORE DEPUTY INSTRUCTIONS-BODILY INJURY REASONABLE DOUBT. When an information is verified before a deputy county clerk, the verification is sufficient whether the jurat is signed by the deputy clerk in his own name as deputy or in the name of his principal by himself as deputy. Where the court in an instruction to the jury has correctly defined a deadly weapon as one likely to produce death or "great bodily injury," it is not error for the court later in the same instruction to refer to such deadly weapon as one likely to produce death or "an injury" upon the complaining witness, as the omission of the words "great bodily," in the second definition is not misleading to the jury nor contradictory of the first definition. An instruction defining a reasonable doubt, which is possibly open to the objection that it recognizes the right of a jury to require less positive proof of facts in cases of minor importance than in those of a graver nature, is not prejudicial, when the instruction, taken as a whole, defines such doubt as one which would make a man of common prudence pause or hesitate to act thereon. Appeal from Superior Court, Whatcom County. Black & Leaming, for appellant. W. C. Jones, Attorney General, Thomas G. Newman, Prosecuting Attorney, and Albert S. Cole, for The State. The opinion of the court was delivered by HOYT, J.-The appeal in this case is from a judgment and sentence imposed upon the appellant upon a verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict upon the person of another a bodily injury where no considerable provocation appears. Two reasons are assigned why the judgment and sentence |