Gray agt. Hannah. was in these words: "The judgment should have been for a less amount of damages against the defendant." It seems to me, with all due deference to Brother BALCOM, that that is not the statement of any particular in which the judgment in that case was erroneous, within any fair and just construction of this statute. It is about as general and vague a statement of error as could be made. It points to no element or ground of error in assessing damage. It shows no reason or ground for the statement that the judgment should have been for a less sum. It states no fact, refers to no item of claim or of account, going back of the judgment itself. It simply assails the whole judgment. It scarcely could have been more vague, general or uncertain, if it had simply said the judgment was wrong, and should have been for the defendant; it does not impliedly admit that plaintiff should recover any sum above nominal damages. The case of Fox agt. Nellis (25 How. 144), is, I think, equally mistaken. The judgment in that case was for $159.50. The specification in the notice of appeal, which was held good, was in these words: "The judgment at most should not have been for more than $5." Upon such a notice, the plaintiff who recovered $1.30 in the county court, was held bound to pay costs to the appellant. It seems to me that this notice does not comply with the statute. It does not state any particular in which the judgment was erroneous. It states no reason or ground for the allegation that the judgment should be only $1. It specifies no error in making up the judgment. It points out no mistake or misconception by the justice in law or fact, leading to the pretended error of the justice of $154.50. It seems to me that the court should hold that it will not deprive a successful party of his costs upon any notice or specification of error so vague, so inexplicit, as that in either of these cases. Such an interpretation of the statute we cannot but see does great injustice. A Mosher agt. Heydrick.. party who seeks to throw upon his adversary the hazard of further litigation, should take his ground, and put the opposite party upon his guard, in clear, explicit and not doubtful language, in his notice of appeal. Should point out clearly the error he complains of, so that his adversary may know what precise part of the claim is particularly disputed, and will be contested upon the appeal. I think the order of the county judge in this case should be reversed, and the defendant's motion for costs should be denied, with $10 costs of appeal. SUPREME COURT. HENRY W. MOSHER agt. JESSE A. HEYDRICK. Where the affidavit is substantially an allegation forming a part of the statement of confession of judgment preceding it, stating that the matters before stated are true, and being signed by the party making it, it is a sufficient signing of the statement, under the provisions of the Code. Where the affidavit states that the facts stated in the above confession are true, it is in effect that the statement is true, and not merely that the facts only are true. Notaries public, by the act of 1863 (Sess. Laws 1863, chap. 508), were authorized to take affidavits and certify the same in all cases where justices of the peace or commissioners of deeds might, at the passage of the act, take and certify the same. Assuming that an affidavit should only be taken in the county where the notary resides, or in which he was appointed, the presumption is that he acts where the venue of the affidavit is laid, and that he resides there. Consequently, it is unnecessary to add to his signature his place of residence. Clerks of counties, are by statute, classed among the judicial officers. An affidavit taken before a notary public may be used before any county clerk, and under section 384 of the Code, judgment may be entered with any county clerk, and not merely in the county where the statement authorizing it was verified. Second District, Brooklyn Special Term, November, 1865. THIS is a motion to vacate a judgment on confession, for irregularity. WM. HENRY ARNOUX, attorney for judgment creditors of Jesse A. Heydrick, and for motion. Mosher agt. Heydrick. I. There is no signature to the statement. This the Code imperatively requires (§ 383). This point has been twice before the supreme court, in the first instance, Post agt. Coleman (9 How. 64). The court by ingenious special pleading, on the authority of Haff agt. Spicer (3 Caines, 190), and Jackson agt. Virgil (3 Johns. 540), that an affidavit need not be signed, held that the signature to the affidavit following the confession being unnecessary, the signature must be deemed made to the confession itself. In the second instance, Purdy agt. Upton (10 How. 494), in this (second) district, the judge based his decision on a different ground, namely, that the confession and verification were one and the same instrument. The court in the first case overlooked a decision made by the chancellor in 1844, Hathaway agt. Scott (11 Paige, 173), in which he reviewed the decision in Caines and Johnson, and came to the conclusion that they were not sound law, holding that "where the verification is in the form of an affidavit, the name of the deponent must be subscribed at the foot of the affidavit," and to it he applies the decisive test that an action of perjury would not lie in such a case unless the affidavit containing the name of the party was in the affiant's handwriting. This latter suggestion, I conclude, from an examination of the early cases, the chancellor deemed to be the fact and explanation of the decisions, for they were apparently mere practice motions, wherein the affidavits were made by the attorneys. It appearing then that the court in the first case erred in the law as it then stood, let us critically examine the second case. One reason that the learned justice gave for deeming them to be one was, that they were on the same page. That reason does not apply here, for they are on different pages. But that cannot be sound law, for it is held that a single paper that secures a debt and the costs on appeal, is in law two undertakings, one for costs, and the other for the debt, and may be good for one and not Mosher agt. Heydrick. for the other. (Code, § 340; N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. agt. Stafford, 10 How. 344, Court of Appeals.) This supersedes the old warrant of attorney and cognovit; by 3 Geo. 4, chap. 39, there were required the warrant, attestation and defeasance, and an affidavit of the time of the execution thereof. Could the signature to the affidavit of execution be deemed a signature of the warrant? I can find no such decision or intimation in the English digests that would be a parallel case. But does the Code make them one? It requires of the defendant two separate and distinct acts, signature and verification. Verification can no more take the place of sig nature, than signature can supply verification. The rule here needs to be more rigidly applied, because the name of the party making the confession does not occur in the confession. From the foregoing reasoning, the conclusion is inevitable that the signing of the affidavit was not the signing of the statement required by the Code. II. The statement was not duly verified. He swears "that the facts stated in the above confession are true, and further he says not." Could an action for perjury lie against any man who swears that the facts are true? He might as well say that the lies are false. It is an axiom that nobody can dispute. The facts must be true. In Fitzhugh agt. Truax (1 Hill, 644), the court held that an affidavit of merits was insufficient wherein the party swore that he had stated "the facts of the case," instead of the case. Now if an interpolation of this kind can with safety be permitted in any affidavit or verification, it would be in an affidavit of merits, where the party must state facts and rely on his counsel for the law. Yet the court held as above, and that decision is so fully recognized by the bar, that with all the laxity of the present practice no one has ever heard of a similar affidavit of merits. But there is more to a confession of judgment than a mere statement of facts. The Code distinctly requires two Mosher agt. Heydrick. things (383), and they are separately numbered (q. v). The first to apply to all cases, and the second and third in the alternative. The Code applies to the latter clause only the word facts, and requires the whole statement to be sworn to, for the facts may be true as he swears, but it may not be true that he is willing that judgment may be entered. This provision, that the admission of the debt shall not be sufficient, but that the party must consent to the entry of judgment, seems to arise from the old provision in warrants of attorney, that no warrant of attorney executed by a person in custody of the sheriff should be valid unless there was an attorney present on his behalf to advise him. (Reg. Gen. K. B. E. T. 4 Geo. 2, and Id. K. B. C. P. and Exch. H. T. 2 Will. 4.) That is he must swear to consent as well as indebtedness. By the affidavit itself he negatives all presumption as to consent, for he expressly declares that beyond the facts "he saith not." Therefore, if the first paragraph is not included in the second, he has only partially verified the confession. 2. The verification is insufficient, because the notary public before whom the affidavit was made, did not state his place of residence. The venue was laid in the city and county of New York, and the officer signs the jurat "Isaac L. Miller, Notary Public." Originally, that is prior to 1859, commissioners of deeds alone could take affidavits to be read in courts of law. They are local officers. (1 R. S. 102, orig. paging, § 13; People agt. Hascall, 18 How. 119.) In 1859, the legislature (Laws 1859, chap. 360, p. 869) conferred on notaries public, in addition to their then present powers, authority to administer oaths under the same rules, regulations and requirements prescribed to commissioners of deeds. The statute requires that commissioners must reside within their respective towns. Quoad hoc, notaries are local officers, and must affirmatively show their jurisdiction, for it will not be presumed. (This principle needs no citation of authorities.) The laying of the |