Glenn v. Moore. JOHN C. GLENN v. WILLIAM MOORE et al. CHANCERY COURT JURISDICTION. Unliquidated damages. An officer to satisfy an execution levied upon some wheat, a supersedeas from the circuit court issued. The clerk took insufficient bond; wheat was released by the officer, and disposed of by the debtor, who was insolvent. Upon bill in chancery court to hold the clerk and sureties upon his official bond liable for the value of the wheat, upon demurrer for want of jurisdiction in the chancery court. Held: That the action was not for "unliquidated damages," and that the chancery court had jurisdiction. FROM GIBSON. Appeal from the Chancery Court at Trenton. JOHN SOMERS, Ch. M. M. NEIL and MCFARLAND & BOBBITT for complainant. ants. SPL. HILL and McDEARMON & TYREE for defend COOKE, Sp. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The complainant recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace of Gibson county against one Davidson for about $220, upon which execution was issued and levied upon some 230 bushels of wheat. Davidson preferred a petition to the circuit judge, and obtained a fiat directed to the clerk of the circuit court ordering a supersedeas to issue, to supersede said execution, upon the petitioner executing bond with security as required by law. Glenn v. Moore. The respondent, William Moore, who was the clerk of the circuit court, carelessly and negligently and in violation of his duty as such clerk, took an unauthorized and insufficient bond, with insolvent security, and issued the supersedeas, by virtue of which the wheat was released by the officer making the levy, and disposed of by Davidson, who was insolvent. The petition for supersedeas was dismissed by the circuit court, and this bill has been filed against the clerk, William Moore, and the other respondents, who are his sureties upon his official bond, seeking to have an account of the amount and value of the wheat so levied upon and released, and a decree for the same, upon the ground of the failure of said. Moore to discharge his duty as such clerk according to law and the requirements of his official bond, by not taking and requiring a good and sufficient bond, with solvent and responsible sureties, before issuing said supersedeas. There was a demurrer to the bill, which was overruled, and the respondents required to answer. Proof was taken, and account was ordered according to the prayer of the bill, as to the amount and value of the wheat levied upon and released, and a report in obedience thereto by the master, which was confirmed, and a decree rendered against the respondents for the amount so ascertained, from which they, or some of them, have appealed to this court. now The only question which is was raised by the demurrer, the cause 17— VOL. 11. insisted upon of demurrer Glenn v. Moore. assigned being "that a court of equity has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this bill, the same being only cognizable at law," etc. This raises the question as to whether this case falls within the exceptions of the act of 1877, ch. 97, entitled an act to increase the jurisdiction of the chancery court, the second section of which act is as follows: "That from and after the passage of this act, no demurrer for want of jurisdiction of the cause of action shall be sustained in the chancery court except in cases of unliquidated damages for injuries to person, property or character." The facts of this case do not bring it within the above exception, or constitute an injury to property within the meaning of said act. By the levy of the execution the title to the specific property was vested in the officer for the satisfaction of the judgment. clerk to discharge By reason of the failure of the his official duty, it was released and lost, and by virtue of the obligatory force of his official bond, the complainant became entitled to recover of him and his sureties, the respondents in this cause, the value of the wheat, and which might, under the provisions of said act, be sued for and recovered in a court of chancery. This case is very easily distinguishable in its facts from the case of Ramsey v. Temple, 3 Lea, 252. Here the liability was fixed, and the complainant's right to recover of the defendants the value of the specific property was clear; and a court of chancery and the mode of procedure therein was well adapted McCutchin v. Taylor. None of the to the ascertainment of that value. inconveniences or objections to the jurisdiction pointed out or suggested in that case can apply to this, and that case went to the utmost verge of legitimate judicial construction, and we cannot extend it further. The demurrer was properly overruled. There is no error in the decree of the chancellor, and it will be affrmed with costs. J. D. MCCUTCHIN v. R. Z. TAYLOR. 1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE. Contract. An agreement to give a part of the crop in consideration of the labor of tillage is as much a hiring as an undertaking to pay in money. 2. SAME. Damages. Upon a suit for decoying away hands under such an agreement, in estimating the damages it will be competent to look to everything resulting from the loss of labor such as the reasonable cost of procuring other labor; the damage to crops from delay in planting or failure to work them, and such kindred damages as plaintiff by reasonable diligence could not have prevented. FROM GIBSON. Appeal in boldt. error from the Law Court at HumJ. T. CARTHEL, J. JOHN S. COOPER for McCutchin. W. C. CALDWELL and S. H. WILLIAMS for Taylor. McCutchin v. Taylor. TURNEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. McCutchin sues Taylor for damages "for decoying The proof shows that from him certain hands," etc. The crop to McCutchin had contracted with certain negroes to cultivate certain lands for the year 1878. be divided. It is insisted that Taylor ticed the negroes to leave McCutchin in violation of chapter 93 of the act of 1875. hired or en There was verdict and judgment for McCutchin. Taylor appeals and insists that the negroes were not in the employ of McCutchin, in the sense of the statute. That the statute is applicable to contracts for personal service only. The language is: "That hereafter it shall not be lawful for any person in this State, knowingly to him, to contract with, decoy or entice away, directly or indirectly any one, male or female, who is at the time under contract or in the employ of another." The second section provides: "That any person violating the provisions of the first clause of the first section of this act, shall be liable to the party who had originally had and was entitled to the services of said employee, by virtue of a previous contract, such damages as he may reasonably sustain by the loss of the labor of said employee," etc. If it be admitted as insisted that the statute is only applicable to contracts for personal service, the case comes within it. The substance of the proof is, McCutchin wanted them to cultivate his land. He contracted with the negroes to do it. He was to superintend and direct. |