Reagan v. Stanley. by the party: McLean v. McLean, 6 Hum., 452. And a will written by the testator's own hand although not signed by him, nor attested by witnesses, is good as to personalty, provided the handwriting be suffi ciently proved: Suggett v. Kitchell, 6 Yer., 429. The direct point was raised by the facts in McCutchen v. Oehmig, 1 Baxt. 390, but apparently overlooked, because doubtless it was known that the personalty would be exhausted in the payment of debts, and the effort was to set up the instrument as holographic. The entry in controversy is shown by four witnesses to be entirely in the handwriting of the deceased. servant of the deceased testifies that on Wednesday night before his death on Friday morning, the deceased brought the book to her in which the entries are written, and told her to give it to Dr. Pulliam, and it would tell him what to do. We cannot say that there is no evidence to sustain the finding of the trial judge on this branch of the case. Affirm the judgment. And the Bryant v. Woods. ZACK. BRYANT et al. v. JAMES E. WOODS et al. HOMESTEAD. Contracts before enactment of exemption. Bonds, official. The relation between principal and surety, or between sureties themselves, and the rights deduced therefrom, originate in the execution of the instrument of suretyship and is substantially a contract by implication of law from the relation created by the execution of the instrument. Where, therefore, an official bond was executed before the passage of the homestead exemption, and a mortgage given on property to indemnify the sureties, the liability was created by the bond, and the homestead is not exempt, though default was made after the passage of the homestead exemption. FROM GIBSON. Appeal from the Chancery Court at Trenton. JOHN SOMERS, Ch. W. A. COOPER, SPL. HILL and JONES & JONES for complainants. JOHN S. COOPER for defendants. DEADERICK, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The only question presented in this record for our determination is, whether Mary Woods, wife of defendant, James E., is entitled to homestead in the house and lot conveyed to complainants in trust to indemnify them as his sureties. In April, 1866, complainants, with others, became the sureties of said James E. on his bonds as com missioner and clerk of the county court of Gibson Bryant v. Woods. county. His term expired in April, 1870, and in 1871 he failed to account for money received while acting as clerk and commissioner, for sale of land ordered by the court. In 1872, Woods being insolvent, executed the deed for the house and lot to secure complainants, to the extent of its value, which is much less than the amount of their liabilities, a part of which they had paid, when this bill was filed, in November, 1875. Mrs. Woods claims that the default of her husband occurred after 1870, and by the act of that year the house and lot occupied as a homestead, is exempt from liability for said claims. The chancellor held that the contract out of which defendant James E. Woods' liability arose, was entered into before the enactment of the homestead law, and that defendant, Mrs. Woods, was not entitled to homestead in said house and lot, and appointed a receiver to rent out the same, and defendant, Mrs. Woods, appealed from said decree. Judge Cooper, in the case of Eberhardt v. Wood, 2 Tenn. Ch. R., 490-1-4, cites numerous cases holding that the relation between principal and surety, or between the sureties themselves, and the rights deduced therefrom, originate in the execution of the instrument of suretyship, and is substantially a contract by implication of law from the relation created by the execution of the instrument. And this case was upon appeal affirmed by this court : 6 Lea, 467. See also, Johnson v. Harvey, 84 N. Y., 363. The obligation or liability of the defendant, James E., to complainants, then, was created by his bond Tax-Payers of Milan. etc. v. Railroad. executed April, 1866, anterior to the enactment of the homestead law of 1870. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a homestead is not exempt as against contracts made before the enactment of the law creating the exemption. The liability existed upon defendant James E. before the exemption law was passed, and by the same bond creating the liability, an implied contract was created with complainants to fulfill the obligations of the bond, and indemnify them against loss, and the property he then owned, not then exempt from execution, was and is liable for this purpose: Thompson on Home, and Ex., secs. 9 to 11, and 315. There was, therefore, no error in the chancellor's decree and it will be affirmed, and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings. TAX-PAYERS OF MILAN v. TENNESSEE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY et al. AND MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF TRENTON v. TENNESSEE CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY et al. 1. CORPORATIONS, MUNICIPAL. Power to issue bonds. Municipal corporations can only subscribe for stock in railroads and issue bonds under an act of the Legislature conferring the power or right to do so. If the act of the Legislature authorize bonds to be issued of a certain denomination and bearing a certain rate of interest, the municipal corporation has no authority to issue bonds for a greater denomination and an increased rate of interest. Tax-Payers of Milan, etc. v. Railroad. 2. SAME. Same. An act of the Legislature which authorizes a municipal corporation to subscribe for stock in a railroad, and "to lay and collect taxes to pay interest on the bonds which may be issued," does not confer authority to issue bonds. 3. SAME. Bonds. Bonds, being issued without authority of law, are void; are not negotiable, and their possession gives no right to the holders to be repaid by the corporation the amount paid for them. FROM GIBSON. Appeal from the Chancery Court at Trenton. JOHN SOMERS, Ch. T. E. HARWOOD and HILL & WILLIAMSON for complainants. W. A. COOPER and L. W. TALIAFERRO for defendants. TURNEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. On the 19th of July, 1873, the board of mayor and aldermen of the town of Milan passed an ordinance, of which the first section is: "Be it ordained by the board of mayor and aldermen of the town of Milan, Tennessee, That the mayor be and he is hereby authorized and directed, in the name and for and on behalf of the town of Milan, to take one hundred and fifty shares of the capital stock of the Tennessee Central Railroad Company, of one hundred and fifty dollars each, and in payment thereof to execute and deliver on demand to said company the bonds of the corporation of the town of Milan to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), of one hundred dollars each, negotiable and payable to bearer, having |